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This dissertation situates historically a group of philosophical 
problematics informing a thread of post-World War II American music theory, 
begun at Princeton University under Milton Babbitt (1916–2011) and his 
students.  I historicize and demonstrate the logics behind, without attempting to 
explain away, problematic notions from experimentalism to experience, 
solipsism to ethics.  Initially a formalist project, Princeton Theory in the early 
1970’s underwent an under-discussed Turn toward experimentalism, seemingly 
rejecting its earlier high-modernist orientation.  The dissertation situates this 
Turn as an auto-critique and provides a variety of hermeneutics for the Turn.  I 
discuss how Princeton Theory before the Turn problematically situated itself as 
both a logical positivist or empiricist discourse, wherein musical experience 
plays a foundational role, and a formalist, conceptual, discourse, complicating the 
claim that Princeton Theorists were unconcerned with music hearing as such.  
Because musical experience seems to be personal, not sharable, I historicize 
Princeton Theory’s uneven appeals to the notion of solipsism—that only the 
listening or theorizing “I” exists—and question this position’s implications for 
ethics, arguing that Babbitt and his students have been more concerned with 
ethics and morality than their formalist commitments may imply.  This 
dissertation offers a sustained discussion and critique of mid-century high-
modernist formalism, raising the stakes of our understanding of this 
foundational discourse for modern music theory by showing its historical 
situatedness, contentious status even for the practitioners involved, and what 
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I.  Defining Princeton Theory 
 
 
I accept Reality and dare not question it, 
Materialism first and last imbuing. 
 
Hurrah for positive science! long live exact demonstration! 
 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
Your facts are useful, and yet they are not my dwelling, 
I but enter by them to an area of my dwelling. 
 
—Walt Whitman, “Song of Myself,” Leaves of Grass 
 
 
This dissertation historicizes philosophies informing music theory as 
practiced by composers trained for the most part, but not exclusively, at 
Princeton University, from post-World War II to now.  Their discourses started 
as high-modernist, appealing to then-latest developments in philosophy of 
science—verifiability, logicism, foundationalism, phenomenalism, etc.—but 
around 1972 took a postmodern Turn to experimental discourses about music.  
Unpacking this Turn constitutes Chapter Two.  Chapter Three discusses 
Princeton Theory’s uneven appeals to musical experience, as opposed to 
conceptual thought, yet within a music-theoretical discourse.  Chapter Four 
historicizes, starting with Wittgenstein, Russell, and Carnap, and moving to 
Descartes, Husserl, and others, the problematic of solipsism, as a kind of grey 
cloud hanging over the music-theoretical discourse, always threatening.  The last 
Chapter inquires into ethical considerations in their discourses: asking if 
solipsism can ground an ethics; discussing the fact/value dichotomy as 
articulated by Babbitt; and arguing that for Lewin musical analysis should be 
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moral.  One way to describe the project is as an historicization of a thread of 
modernist musical discourse, but also, now, an historicization of postmodern 
discourse.  Another way is to say that it is a collection of chapters on various 
problematics (experimentalism, experience, solipsism and ethics) that are 
operative in crucial ways within that discourse and music theory more generally. 
Yet another way to describe the project, with its sonic or aural side out, so 
to speak, is as follows: this dissertation situates historically a group of 
philosophical problematics informing a thread of post-World War II American 
music theory, begun at Princeton University under Milton Babbitt and his 
students.  I historicize and demonstrate the logics behind, without attempting to 
explain away, problematic notions from experimentalism to experience, 
solipsism to ethics.  Initially a formalist project, Princeton Theory in the early 
1970’s underwent an under-discussed Turn toward experimentalism, seemingly 
rejecting its earlier high-modernist orientation.  The dissertation situates this 
Turn as an auto-critique and provides a variety of hermeneutics for the Turn.  I 
discuss how Princeton Theory before the Turn problematically situated itself as 
both a logical positivist or empiricist discourse, wherein musical experience 
plays a foundational role, and a formalist, conceptual, discourse, complicating the 
claim that Princeton Theorists were unconcerned with music hearing as such.  
Because musical experience seems to be personal, not sharable, I historicize 
Princeton theory’s uneven appeals to the notion of solipsism—that only the 
listening or theorizing “I” exists—and question this position’s implications for 
ethics, arguing that Babbitt and his students have been more concerned with 
ethics and morality than their formalist commitments may imply.  This 
dissertation offers a sustained discussion and critique of mid-century high-
 3 
modernist formalism, raising the stakes of our understanding of this 
foundational discourse for modern music theory by demonstrating its historical 
situatedness, contentious status even for the practitioners involved, and what 
claims it may still make on our own musical imaginations. 
More expansively still: this dissertation discusses a set of problematics in 
the writings of Princeton Theory—that group of composers, theorists, 
composers/theorists collected around Milton Babbitt (1916–2011) during the 
post-World War II period at Princeton University, whose main public voice 
became, starting in 1962, the magazine or journal Perspectives of New Music.  We 
may choose to problematize any number of themes in these authors’ writings, 
but after over a decade of study and seven publications, four themes stand out, 
interest me most intensely: the experimental Turn, experience, solipsism and 
ethics.  Although located in separate chapters, I should state that these themes 
are interrelated: the problematic of the Turn raises the problematic of how to 
grasp and expand musical experience through discourse, which in its turn 
involves problems of who is doing the talking (and to and for whom), of the 
ethics of these positions, relations.  How we might theoretically model pieces or 
speculate away from a given repertoire contorts musical experience, implying 
communication and yet problematizing the ready transfer of knowledge about 
music from one mind to another.  The assertion of solipsism (methodological, 
epistemological, or even metaphysical) problematizes musical experience and 
appears to turn its back on the ethics—the sociality—of discourse and musical 
composition.  Ethical questions seem to supervene over the others, but arise from 
the considered reflection upon the preceding problematics.  Hence we will have 
occasion to revisit earlier themes during the discussion of later ones, the 
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disintegration of the chapters occurring as a remnant of the assertion of 
discursive control over lived historical practices. 
This chapter seeks to define Princeton Theory in various contexts, situate 
my approach to the topic(s) and offer a rationale for the dissertation as a whole. 
Chapter Two argues that Princeton Theory’s noted but undertheorized 
Turn to experimentalism around 1972 in fact presents an auto-critique, seeming 
to overturn the logical positivism for which Babbitt had argued and into which 
his students had invested considerable energy.  The Turn was not all-
encompassing, however, as certain threads of continuity can be traced. 
Chapter Three argues Princeton Theory was dialectical, ambivalent, or 
tense as regards musical experience, that musical experience co-existed in equal 
measure with conceptual thought (which we find in the motion toward 
theorizing), but that the motion toward the conceptual at times revivifies 
experience. 
Chapter Four argues that solipsism presents itself as a persistent 
problematic for Princeton Theory’s discourses by situating historically the work 
of Benjamin Boretz, Godfrey Winham, J. K. Randall, John Rahn, and others, via 
the work of Hans Driesch, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Rudolf Carnap, A. J. Ayer, and 
others’ discussions of solipsism.  This provides context for the arguments of 
Babbitt’s ([1958] 2003) infamous “Composer as Specialist”/“Who Cares if You 
Listen?” 
Chapter Five uncovers an ethics or morality latent in Princeton Theory.  
High-modernist composition/compositional theory seems anti-social, seems 
therefore amoral; indeed, it assumes a positivist distinction between fact and 
value, what is and ought to be the case.  I discuss this distinction’s implications 
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for musical discourse in Babbitt and Boretz.  I argue further that Babbitt’s 
contextuality is an ethics of the musical text/interpretation, and that later Rahn 
and Boretz present an ethics: works are almost identified with their authors, we 
should respect this closeness, and be careful in our words—not too close to cover 
entirely the piece’s own life, implicitly, therefore too, the composer.  Lastly, I 
argue that Lewin presents a utopian gesture to moral self-actualization through 
music analysis. 
While I conceive of this dissertation as a history concerned primarily with 
metatheory (the philosophy of music theory or the analysis of theory as opposed 
to the more usual theory of analysis), and do not therefore address explicitly 
anthropology nor use its methods, it nevertheless appears impossible to bracket 
anthropology completely: anthropological questions weigh on the discourse, my 
mind.  This is especially so given the historically both past and very much 
present times of the discourses considered, my editing roles for Perspectives of 
New Music and The Open Space Magazine (another organ of Princeton Theory in 
some of its moods), a series of pieces I have written both about and performative 
of Princeton Theory and as a student and friend to some of the authors here 
discussed (and some of their students).  I say this emphatically not to claim 
authority; I say this for the purpose of full disclosure and to emphasize the 
degree to which I am aware that there are areas I cannot discuss, avenues I 
cannot travel, words too close for comfort, which may cause pain.  There is 
always an implicit anthropology within discourse, an oral history silent in the 
official written history, a self-theorization occurring by the authors considered, 
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an insider/outsider discursive economy.1  There are always people—alive or 
dead—behind words.2  The ethnographic critique of history suggests it is merely 
congealed ethnography, forgetting its origins. 
What, we might ask, is the received view of Princeton Theory?  That is, 
what is its “official” history?  What is the history that most non-practitioners, 
insofar as they are aware of this corpus of writings, assume?  The main themes of 
Princeton Theory would seem to include logical positivism; that it constitutes 
itself in a difficult, perhaps impenetrable, discourse; that it is concerned with 
twelve-tone or serial theory; that it bridges this with compositional theory; that it 
is a metatheoretical as well as theoretical project; and that it is somehow 
unethical or amoral (insofar as it alienates itself from culture and society as a 
whole by assuming an avant-garde stance).  As far as they go, these themes 
appear largely, although not entirely, accurate descriptions both as the 
composers/theorists represented themselves, and as we might most profitably 
represent them. 
If a main tenet of these theorists was that their projects would be 
metatheoretical or “epistemologically secure musical discourse[s]” (Blasius 1997, 
xii), then Princeton Theory would seem utterly aware of its own moves, its 
implicit claims: there appear to be no subtexts to unearth.  Hence I feel 
ambivalent about what at one time I would have taken to be the central goal of 
this dissertation, which was announced as a project by Joseph Kerman over 
twenty-five years ago:  
                                                
1 See Taruskin (2009, 274) who attributes this position to Martin Brody, what we 
might consider a kind of participant-observer status. 
 
2 Although left unstated as such, I take this to be the main point of Rahn 2008. 
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There will be a time when formalism attracts new interest and then the 
serial music of the postwar decades will seem like music again.  At such a 
time, avant-garde theory will be looked at again, if not by composers and 
theorists, by critics and musicologists….  Musicologists will read this 
theory selectively and critically, paying attention to the difficult texts 
themselves but also to the possibly even more difficult subtexts.  They will 
read avant-garde theory for what it reveals about the music itself, even 
though they know it was generated in order to create music, not to 
elucidate it.  Musicologists, some of them, know how to read for subtexts.  
They have learned it from long bouts of wrestling with older theory. 
(1985, 106)  
 
For “musicologists” we might substitute “historians of theory.” (But see p. 60, 
where Kerman defines history of theory as a species of historical musicology.) 
This, perhaps, is my project.  As always, the method is to situate historically 
Princeton Theory’s uneven historical memory; to provide greater historical 
context for arguments and ideas occurring seemingly free of such context.  As 
Kerman has also said, “Theory, like aesthetics, has to be understood historically” 
(Ibid., 60).  Unlike Kerman, however, my purpose is to show the depth and 
richness of music-theoretical ideas that otherwise may seem bizarre or 
unmotivated.  This said, I am also aware of the fear of domesticating these ideas.  
Let me assure readers prone to such concerns that I share them, and will try to 
keep things as strange as possible. 
As to the title of this dissertation, the problematics I discuss (the 
experimental Turn, experience, solipsism and ethics) do not resolve, precisely 
because I refuse them closure.  This seems to be a working definition of 
“problematic” as a noun: I, and the material, refuse resolution, rather than 
seeking naively or scientistically to “solve” Princeton Theory’s “problems.”  
“Problematic” as a noun was perhaps first introduced into English-language 
philosophical discourse in Macquarrie and Robinson’s 1962 translation of 
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Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit, wherein Heidegger uses “Problematik” repeatedly, 
and seemingly free of theory—it appears untheorized in that work.  
Interestingly, his first use of the notion in that work comes in reference to the 
theological problematic, (Heidegger [1927a] 1962, ¶3) and “problematic” seems 
to identify an interrelated complex of problems, a system or range of problems, 
or the totality thereof—a problem, after Aristotle’s Problems, being a question 
posed for discussion, beginning with the word “why.”3  Why, then, did many of 
the Princeton Theorists Turn to experimental discourses?  Why do their 
discourses—both before and after the Turn—appear both so concerned with 
experience and conceptual thought?  Why do the Princeton Theorists appeal to 
the social isolation implicit in the notion of solipsism?  Why do the Princeton 
Theorists begin with a positivist disavowal of ethics, yet after the Turn seem to 
embrace it?  As I conceive the project, discussing these questions involves 
holding their answers in tension; as Frederic Jameson says, “This [dialectical 
process] can be imagined as a series of interlinked problems or paradoxes, which, 
ostensibly solved, give rise to new and unexpected ones, of greater scope” (2011, 
3).  I will essay throughout, but not argue, that the overarching problems or 
paradoxes of greater scope, the problems that unify the problematics I do 
discuss, are those of intersubjectivity (self and others), music-theoretical 
temporality, and of the relations between language and music. 
If there is one moment that started Princeton Theory as we now know it, 
that moment would be the Princeton Seminar in Advanced Music Studies, which 
                                                
3 Aristotle (2011, xiii).  Husserl uses “Problematik” slightly later than Heidegger, 
in the Cartesian Mediations ([1931] 1999), wherein it is often translated simply as 
“problems,” but often within the locution, “Die konstitutive Problematik.” 
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convened between August 17 and September 5, 1959, with funding from the 
Fromm Music Foundation.4  In January of the same year, Vladimir Ussachevsky 
(1911–1990), Otto Luening (1900–1996), Roger Sessions (1896–1985) and Babbitt 
founded The Columbia-Princeton Electronic Music Center with a five-year grant 
from the Rockefeller Foundation, in the amount of $175,000 ($1,384,845.36 in 
today’s money, according to the U. S. Dept. of Labor Statistics) for both 
universities (See Babbitt [1960] 2003, 74–6 and Patterson 2011, 490).  If everything 
that begins must come to an end, then we can posit the Abendrot of Princeton 
Theory to have occurred as a result of the critiques leveled by Brown and 
Dempster (1989).  For thirty years, then, Princeton Theory sustained a highly 
productive level of discourse.  If, however, we acknowledge that Princeton 
Theory anticipated many of Brown and Dempster’s critiques (as we shall have 
occasion to say in this dissertation), and we read Perspectives of New Music as the 
principal organ of Princeton Theory, then we can argue that Princeton Theory 
continues, in some form, to this day. 
This dissertation does not seek, however, to discuss what we might term 
the prehistory of Princeton Theory, whose origins we might locate with the 
arrival of Babbitt at Princeton as professor in 1938.5  We know that Babbitt and 
Edward T. Cone (1917–2004) earned the M.F.A. at Princeton in 1942.  We know 
                                                
4 Lang 1960 collects papers read at the conference; see also “Music Seminar 
Planned” 1958, Cohen 1960 and Gamer 2012. 
 
5 Babbitt states that he was originally to be appointed in 1937, but that his 
appointment was delayed for a year because the chair of the department was 
concerned with appointing a Jew during the first year of the department’s 




that Babbitt taught mathematics to engineers at Princeton during World War II 
and at the same time commuted to Washington, D.C., to work on still-classified 
projects.6  We know that Babbitt wrote his thesis in 1946, in Mississippi, because 
he could not compose, because he was feeling very decomposed after the War 
(Zuckerman 2002, n.p.).  We know that Peter Westergaard (1931– ) received his 
M.F.A. at Princeton in 1956, and that Godfrey Winham (1934–1975), J. K. Randall 
(1929– ), and David Lewin (1933–2003) graduated together in the same M.F.A. 
class at Princeton, two years later.7  We do not have much of a sense of the 
texture, however, of Princeton Theory between 1938 and 1958, again, what I am 
calling its prehistory—the seminars offered, readings, pieces analyzed, a sense of 
a larger program.  Martino (2002) reports that, “Milton’s 1952 lectures covered 
only hexachordal all-combinatoriality, and that only cursorily.  Great teachers do 
not tell all.” (See also, Martino 1961.)  We know that what became known as the 
“Mallalieu Row” was of special interest when, in 1954, its namesake Pohlman 
Mallalieu devised it. (See, “Set Puzzle Solution” 1976, and, most recently, 
Morgan and Davis 2009.) However, there is no record of Babbitt publishing an 
article until 1949, with one on the string quartets of Bartók in The Musical 
Quarterly (Babbitt [1949] 2003).  We know Babbitt’s articles after that date, 
prominently the ([1952] 2003) review of Salzer’s Structural Hearing; “Some 
Aspects of Twelve-Tone Composition” ([1955] 2003); and the infamous, “Who 
Cares if You Listen?”/“Composer as Specialist” ([1958] 2003).  Although perhaps 
                                                
6 Justin Hoffman and I are engaged in an ongoing project of declassifying this 
information and discovering exactly Babbitt’s role in the war effort. 
 
7 See Blasius (1997, ix).  Randall amusingly refers to the three as a “good crew” 
(Randall 2011, disc 2, c. 44:00). 
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its originator, hence we can read the early Babbitt articles along with his ([1946] 
1992) dissertation as indicators of this prehistory, and although every informant I 
have spoken with emphasized Babbitt’s personal and intellectual centrality for 
Princeton Theory, we should not identify Princeton Theory with Milton Babbitt 
completely.8 
As to a definition of Princeton Theory proper, most music scholars and 
general readers aware of new music are also aware of Milton Babbitt and his 
importance.9  But general histories rarely mention that Babbitt’s students were 
engaged in a music-theoretical project and that together they constituted, no 
matter how ambivalently, a “school.”  While not monolithic, and at Princeton to 
create as much as be created by it (Boretz [2001b] 2003, 445), the group of 
students shared overlapping interests and even beliefs and practices: avant-garde 
composition, twelve-tone and serial theory, Schenkerian theory, and a meta-
theoretical or philosophical component of their discourses. 
Indeed, already in 1963 Joseph Kerman could define a “Princeton School” 
of composers whose discourse appeared in the pages of Perspectives of New Music, 
one year after the journal’s founding.  According to Kerman (1963), the Princeton 
School of contemporary composers was the most significant in America at that 
time; it was conservative in the German sense, meaning it admired the 
compositions of Mozart, Bach, Beethoven and Brahms, to which the School 
added twelve-tone composers and Roger Sessions; the School was anti-historical 
                                                
8 For further background, see Brody 1993, Harker 2008, Girard (2007, 168–84 and 
202–19) and Girard 2008 and 2010. 
 
9 See, e.g., Ross (2007, 303–307).  On “new” music, see especially Adorno ([1949] 
2006, xxvii, 9, 13, 24, 47–8 and 81–2). 
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or ambivalently historicist; respectful of performers; it took Schenkerian analysis 
to be compositional; and “recently a mathematical strain of thought has been 
growing very prominent” (Ibid., 152–53).  Although polemical and intended to 
be dismissive, I think there is more accuracy in Kerman’s characterization than 
many would like to admit.  It is understandable that someone predisposed to 
find fault could so conceive of the Princeton School. 
Princeton Theory, then, was music theory created by a “school” of 
composers, trained largely, although not exclusively, at Princeton University.  
The patronage of new music composers by the university was seen as a new and 
revolutionary occurrence, displacing traditional sources of funding such as the 
aristocracy, governmental agencies, the public at large, or private interests in the 
sense of businesses.  Babbitt ([1958] 2003, 53) famously championed this new 
interpretation of the academic composer: “Such a private life is what the 
university provides the scholar and the scientist.  It is only proper that the 
university, which—significantly—has provided so many contemporary 
composers with their professional training and general education, should 
provide a home for the ‘complex,’ ‘difficult,’ and ‘problematical’ in music.  
Indeed, the process has begun.”  Later, Babbitt adds, “The university is the best 
of all available worlds” ([1970] 2003, 261).  Arthur Berger (1912–2003) suggests 
that before Babbitt and new music composition entered the university in full 
force, the notion of an academic composer carried a different sense:  
 
Another semantic problem arises with the assimilation of “modern,” a 
concept notorious for its aggressive innovation, to “academic.”  Since in 
the twentieth century “academic” long signified composers who had 
persisted in pursuing the well-worn paths of nineteenth-century 
Romanticism, which posed no problems to either composer or listener, it 
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is paradoxical to find the label applied to composers who do pose a 
challenge, whose work was (and still is) less accessible to average listeners 
than most music they hear.  The serialists were not called “academic” 
simply because academe was now their haven (though that helped).  By 
throwing in epithets like “austere” and “arid,” critics left no doubt that 
they were giving their impression of the music and pointing to serialism’s 
reputation for being cerebral and systematic as well as without feeling. 
(Berger 2002, 100) 
 
And so the notion of “academic” composition appears to be a music-critical 
category, performing functions not necessarily sanctioned by the practitioners. 
While the above discussion by Babbitt affords us an understanding of the 
rationale for composers choosing the university, Boretz here offers a description 
of the locus of composers as the fount of intellectual musicianship during the 
1950’s; that is, that composers specifically would be the theorists and musical 
thinkers chosen by the university:  
 
Schenkerian theory was first promoted by Roger Sessions and elaborated 
by Milton Babbitt and Edward T. Cone as a matter of intellectual and 
musical conviction.  Arthur Berger promoted the aesthetic theories of D. 
W. Pratt and greatly elaborated the theoretical ideas of Nadia Boulanger 
as well as the philosophies of people like R. G. Collingwood and T. E. 
Hume [sic], not to mention Whitehead and Dewey and Bergson.  If you 
were a music student in the 1950’s, it would only have been from 
composers that you would have been made aware of these thinkers, of the 
notion of “musical thinking” as such, or of theory as an intellectual and 
crucial compositional issue. (Pasler 2008, 334) 
 
This historicization partially supplies, in retrospect, a sense of a larger program 
for, if not Princeton Theory specifically, then certainly modern compositional 
theory generally or the emerging original ethos of Perspectives of New Music, as 
Boretz experienced it.  Indeed, the phrase, “if you were a music student in the 
1950’s,” implies precisely the folding into academia of composers and their 
concerns. 
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Leslie Blasius (Ph.D., Princeton, 1994) discusses five disciplinary factors in 
the late 1950’s which had to be in place for Princeton Theory to come into being, 
and which partially define it: “[1] the establishment of historical musicology as 
an autonomous, scientific, and professionalized discipline… [2] the growth of a 
theoretically aware compositional community… [3] the introduction and 
dissemination of Schenker’s analysis of music (with its claims to displace a more 
impressionistic or heuristic critique of musical works)… [4] the availability of 
various analytic tools in contemporary writings on logic and mathematics… and 
the fifth, the advent and promise of electronic computation” (1997, 1).  Blasius 
further glosses these characteristics by implying the ambivalent tension of 
Princeton Theory in relation to historical musicology, the creation of a 
metalanguage with which to scrutinize musical structure, and the reconstruction 
of the foundations of music (Ibid.). The latter two we shall explore in detail 
during this dissertation. 
Blasius’ discussion appears fairly removed from the five-part plan which 
Allen Forte set forth in 1959, however.  This platform would go on to define Yale 
Theory, and to a large extent, what we might term normal music theory: “1. 
Constructing a theory of rhythm for tonal music…. 2. Determining the sources 
and development of triadic tonality…. 3. Gaining information about 
compositional technique…. 4. Improving theory instruction…. 5. Understanding 
the structure of problematic modern works” ([1959] 1977, 24–34).  While Blasius 
tells us the conditions of possibility for a music-theoretical discipline to emerge 
either at Princeton or Yale in 1959, Forte assumes this discipline and sets forth his 
program.  This said, if the mainstream or normal theory of music theory from 
that time until perhaps the early 2000’s involved discussion of “Schenker and 
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sets,” then we should question whether Princeton Theory in its formalist heyday 
was so far removed from this normal theory.  In some measure the project was to 
generalize set theory and formalize what was perceived to be the systematic 
inadequacies of the late Schenker.  Add to this a meta-theoretical component, 
and we have Princeton Theory.  Perhaps, then, the meta-theoretical or 
philosophical component was the only genuine difference between Princeton 
Theory and normal theory.10 
While some of the above characterizations apply to Princeton Theory after 
around 1959, as stated, around 1972 the discourse began to include what we 
might call autobiographical musical criticism, expressed through extravagant, 
performative, texts.  Princeton Theory, before this Turn (which I historicize and 
theorize in Chapter Two), often goes by different names: avant-garde theory, 
modernist or high-modernist, formalist, or compositional theory.  We shall treat 
each of these appellations at some point in what follows, but perhaps what 
defines Princeton Theory generally more than anything was precisely its ability 
to Turn, and this Turn was from discussions of forms sounding in motion to an 
even more private discourse.  Perhaps the Turn defines Princeton Theory, and as 
such shows the degree to which, unlike normal music theory, which to this day 
commits itself to formalism, Princeton Theory was able to anticipate the New 
Musicological critiques by showing its concern with the subjective and even the 
social.  One way of reading the entire dissertation, then, is as an attempt to come 
to grips with the Turn, for all of the other problematics I discuss (experience, 
                                                
10 How much normal theory stands for Yale Theory I shall not venture here; 
Wason (2002, 72) believes it does in large measure: “But ultimately, it was the 
Yale model of the academic music theorist that seems to have taken root during 
the heady expansion of North American university programs in the 1960’s and 
1970’s.” 
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solipsism, and ethics) are cut across by this Turn—hence also its presentation 
first among the following chapters. 
I should emphasize here that Princeton Theory is diasporic: although 
most, but not all, of the Princeton composers/theorists actually studied at 
Princeton University under Babbitt, Princeton University’s composition 
department as an institution has moved away from the high-
modernist/experimental dialectic that identifies much of Princeton Theory pre- 
and post-Turn.  This diasporic condition of Princeton Theory is one of the 
reasons we can use Perspectives of New Music (and, indeed, The Open Space 
Magazine) to define it.  Princeton Theory is thus a community of choice, not all of 
whose members actually attended Princeton University. 
Stepping back in time, and as a motion toward further specifying 
Princeton Theory, let us mark the limits between the Princeton School and the 
work of the Darmstadt School of composers/theorists located at Darmstadt, 
Germany, collected during summers beginning in 1946, and publishing in Die 
Reihe: Information über serielle Musik between 1955 and 1962 (in English translation 
between 1957 and 1968).11  That the Darmstadt composers, such as Luigi Nono 
(1924–1990), Karlheinz Stockhausen (1928–2005) and Pierre Boulez (1925– ), 
would be known generally as a school, reified as such by Nono in 1958, but the 
Princeton School would be reified in the person of Milton Babbitt, would seem to 
represent a kind of anti-Americanism on the part of the musicological 
imagination, prioritizing the European avant-garde.  Avant-gardism is to be 
respected in Europe—that is its tradition—but not in the United States—whose 
                                                




traditions prioritize popular musics and jazz.  The United States lacks an 
indigenous classical musical culture.  Babbitt will then be accepted in place of his 
students, and the whole marginalized so as not to demand too much cultural 
imagination or attention, except as foils for the construction of twentieth-century 
music in the United States. (Girard 2010 politicizes similar conclusions.) 
For Richard Taruskin (2005, 135–36), Princeton Theory and that practiced 
at Darmstadt differed critically: “Darmstadt serialism was the fruit of pessimism, 
reflecting the ‘zero hour’ mentality of war-ravaged Europe.  It thrived on the idea 
of the cleanest possible break with the past.  Princetonian serialism reflected 
American optimism.  It rode the crest of scientific prestige and remained 
committed to the idea of progress, which implied the very opposite attitude 
toward the past: namely a high sense of heritage and obligation.”  If for 
Darmstadt Theory, Zero Hour (Stunde Null) devastation represented a starting-
anew, with denazification and literal rebuilding mapped onto the utopian spaces 
of musical rebuilding, then Princeton Theory would not experience a need to 
begin from a tabula rasa, would, instead, experience the utopian spaces of the 
ticker tape parade but eventually the Cold War, space race, communist purges, 
and burgeoning civil rights movement.12  Unlike German composers, who had to 
forget a past too painful to remember, composers in the United States had to 
reach into the past in order to continue into the future.  Babbitt time and again 
emphasized the intellectual and personal migration from Germany to the United 
                                                
12 Most German scholars now argue that the Zero Hour never actually occurred, 
choosing instead to discuss the notion of Vergangenheitsbewältigung (coming to 
terms with the past), but given its impact on historiography of the period, it is 
important to evoke it.  See Grant (2001, 17–20), Beal (2006, 11–18), and 
Brockmann (2009) for critiques; Fox (2007) deploys the former category for his 
discussion. 
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States (see, Babbitt [1955] 2003 and [1999] 2003, 471–73 and 481–85).  Although 
not ideologically neutral, Babbitt always stressed the continuities between 
Schoenberg, Webern, and Stravinsky and his own practices.  Indeed, the first 
issue of Perspectives of New Music, “devoted considerable space to a problem that 
seriously concerned composers for centuries, and that has been attacked with 
particular ardor in the last decade or so: the relation of the contemporary 
composer to tradition” (Berger and Boretz 1962, 5).  If Boulez could proclaim 
Schoenberg dead, ([1952] 1991) Babbitt knew only too well, and mourned his 
passing. 
Amy C. Beal discusses Babbitt’s less than well-received 1964 trip to 
Darmstadt, mentioning that Babbitt felt the Darmstadt composers had, “no 
knowledge of the theoretical-analytical writings of his Ivy League colleagues, 
and their disinterest in American academic composer-theorists irritated him 
immensely” (2006, 140).  As Boretz says, “If the editors of Die Reihe had, say, not 
been so implacably unfriendly to our interests we might not have been so alert to 
the deficiencies in their discourse” (Berger and Boretz [1987] 2003, 243–44). 
Boretz is referring specifically to Backus (1962), a scientific critique of Die Reihe 
printed in the first issue of Perspectives of New Music.  Although polemical, it is 
balanced by Stockhausen (1962), an article appearing in that same first issue.  
Additionally, later in the 1960’s Iannis Xenakis (1922–2001) submitted a paper to 
Perspectives of New Music.  Boretz accepted it with the provision that it be edited 
by an expert in the field—a form of peer review—to which Xenakis responded 
less than favorably, withdrawing his submission (Berger 2002, 141 and Berger 
and Boretz [1987] 2003, 250).  Unlike Princeton Theory, Darmstadt composers 
seem never to have taken an experimental Turn, this despite the influence of 
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Cage (Iddon 2013).  Cage is narrated as ending Darmstadt Theory, not causing a 
Turn at Darmstadt.  Indeed, the founding of the Institut de Recherche et 
Coordination Acoustique/Musique (IRCAM) in 1977 can be read as a retrenchment.  
This said, Adorno (1965–1966) was published in translation in Perspectives of New 
Music; Adorno ([1969] 2002) treats themes similar to Princeton Theory (Schenker 
and Schoenberg, composition as analysis, what Babbitt calls contextuality; see 
also, Adorno [1949] 2006, 81–2); and the Stockhausen Gedenkschrift in the 2012, 
50th Anniversary double-volume of Perspectives of New Music figures as its own 
attempt to work through the past. 
Having further specified Princeton Theory by way of its tense relation 
with Darmstadt Theory, I am interested now in writing through the notion of 
“compositional theory” as distinct from other forms of music theory, because 
that is the most common appellation for Princeton Theory, its more general 
category, because compositional theory seems distinct from normal theory, and 
because compositional theory seems to have perished—so few practice it today 
that it is difficult to remember with any clarity what it once was.13  What, then, 
was compositional theory?  A trivial definition is that compositional theory is 
whatever theory composers create, but this definition is less trivial than it may at 
first seem, because it focuses our attention on the ideological component of 
“being” a composer—a person who puts sounds together.  It claims that the 
identity of the theorist qua composer is important, defining, even if otherwise the 
                                                
13 In the recent 50th Anniversary issue of Perspectives of New Music a number of 
interviewees voiced concern over this issue.  See, Rahn (2012, 55); Morris (2012, 
71 and 78); Dubiel (2012, 88–91); Kielian-Gilbert (2012, 104); Cory (2012, 148–49); 
Lansky (2012, 179–81); and Scotto (2012, 217–18), among others. 
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discourse is not as different in theoretical or analytical practice, a position which, 
for example, Joseph Dubiel (Ph.D., Princeton, 1980) has problematized recently 
(2012, 90–91).  Indeed, an expansive definition of composition guides Joel 
Lester’s monograph, Compositional Theory in the Eighteenth Century.  (Lester 
graduated with the Ph.D. from Princeton in 1970.)  In the following definition, 
“composition” stands in for compositional theory, “to the extent that it can be 
separated from speculative theory, aesthetics, or performance theory” (Lester 
1992, 5).  I want to pause here to mark Lester’s reticence to separate 
compositional theory from these other discourses—the separation appears to be 
a condition of modern disciplining of musical discourses.14  Even still, 
“Composition is construed here rather broadly to include everything from 
musical rudiments, intervals and chords, the study of harmony and voice 
leading, considerations of melody, musical phrasing and form, and the actual 
process of working out a composition” (Ibid., 6). This, we might say, is the most 
expansive and yet empirical understanding of compositional theory available, 
pre-Schenker: formalist but useful for Lester’s project of understanding the 
practical or pedagogically applicable music theories from that century. 
Kerman (1985, 90–1) argues that (high-)modernist compositional theory’s 
roots lie early in the last century, in Schenker’s project and Schoenberg’s 
Harmonielehre ([1911] 1978).  Hence, what we might call the Received View of 
music theory in the twentieth century reduces, again, to “Schenker and sets”—
sets, in this reading, being an extension of Schoenberg’s compositional practice.  
                                                
14 See, for example, Blasius (2002, 43) which discusses Guido Adler’s map of the 
musical disciplines, and Girard (2007, 185–327) on the institutionalization of 
music theory at Princeton and Yale Universities. 
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“Unlike tonal theory,” however, “compositional theory is valued primarily for 
what it enables the theorist to do as composer of new music, only secondarily for 
what it tells him or anyone else about music already composed.”  This definition 
emphasizes the pre- (or proto-) compositional component of compositional 
theory.  But Kerman continues with the ahistorical, condemning, lines: “therefore 
its relevance to anyone but the composer-theorist and his circle of associates is 
limited” (1985, 94–5).  Whether or not this is actually so, we should complete 
Kerman’s unthought thought, which is that “new music” becomes its own 
corpus, able to be studied using the theories constructed for it, making claims to 
a broader public than Kerman might like to admit.15  “Precompositional” theories 
can become “post-compositional,” for want of a better word.  Kerman (Ibid., 95) 
inherits a nineteenth-century conception of the artist which denies that 
knowledge and creation can take place in the same moment, in the same act. 
Perhaps the most sophisticated explication of the differences between 
compositional music theory and normal music theory, and a kind of response to 
Kerman, takes place in Blasius (2002).  Implying a notion of precompositional 
theory and using the language of Seeger (1958)—which Kerman (1985, 94) adapts 
and suggests was introduced into music-theoretical discourse by Cone (1959, 
37)—of a distinction between prescriptive and descriptive theory, Blasius implies 
an alignment with compositional and normal music theory, respectively, and 
unpacks the differences with reference to Babbitt and Princeton Theory’s 
formalist project and Schenker’s own project, this latter contra-Kerman and the 
usual reading of Princeton Theory: 
                                                
15 Recall, however, that Kerman (1985, 106) does admit that there will come a 
time when, “serial music of the postwar decades will seem like music again.” 
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The domain of the transcendental might further be parsed into two 
mirroring regions, one prescriptive and a priori and the second descriptive 
and a posteriori, both of which admit a constellation of theoretical 
constructions.  The first (a priori) kind of prescriptive theory admits such 
music theories as derive from constructivist formalism.  For an example, 
the equally tempered diatonic collection can be characterized by a specific 
property; after Milton Babbitt, it can be said to exhibit a unique 
multiplicity of interval classes.  Given this fact, one might generalize a 
sequence of axioms and theorems revealing further properties, and 
possible compositional uses for these properties.  Yet this analysis stands 
before any particular empirically accessible mechanisms of perception, or 
any historical or cultural theorization or compositional manifestation of 
the diatonic collection. 
 The most influential exemplar of the second (a posteriori) sort of 
descriptive theory is given in the mature work of the early twentieth-
century music theorist Heinrich Schenker.  Schenker’s early theoretical 
work concentrates on the affectual psychology of harmony and 
counterpoint: the latter, in particular, comes to be seen as a pedagogical 
laboratory within which the affect of music can be studied…. In 
Schenker’s later work this reconstruction of counterpoint is synthesized 
with a consistent narrative of the history of music, one which sees a 
unique conflation of contrapuntal and diminutional techniques in the 
works of the German instrumental masters.  Hence the command of 
musical psychology and the plotting of a particular historical trajectory 
produce between them the analysis of the transcendental masterwork. 
(Blasius 2002, 42–3; see also Babbitt [1965] 2003, 195, and Blasius 1996, 
107–14) 
 
As with Lester, in Blasius’ discussion, compositional theory shades into 
speculative theory, a motion to which we shall return.  We might be surprised to 
read Blasius’ ahistoricism here, because we could always argue that precisely 
because Babbitt “invented” the principle of the unique multiplicity of interval 
classes within the diatonic collection, it is cultural through and through.  A fair 
amount of cultural work went into the notion of an interval class, even.16  Blasius 
knows this, however, and is articulating the tension between historicizing theory 
                                                
16 See, for example, Babbitt’s discussion of interval classes ([1960] 2003, 57 and 




and unpacking theory’s claims to transcend history.  I do not want to obfuscate 
Blasius’ important and subtle distinction, however, between normal and 
compositional theories, a distinction which helps us specify compositional theory 
with more precision, and, hence, Princeton Theory.  Specifically, Blasius 
describes many of Princeton Theory’s high-modernist projects when he extends 
the discussion to the point where, “one might generalize a sequence of axioms 
and theorems revealing further properties, and possible compositional uses for 
these properties” (Ibid.).  As we shall see, many Princeton Theorists—including 
Lewin, Winham, Randall, Michael Kassler, Boretz and John Rahn—took up Ernst 
Krenek’s suggestion to do just that, to create an axiomatic musical system.17  
Indeed, Babbitt ([1961] 2003, 79) would later claim that this is precisely what a 
musical theory is.  After all, Schenker’s theory, “is a theory; it can be formalized” 
(Babbitt 1987, 175), the implication being it should be formalized.  (Additionally, 
in Chapter Three we shall consider Princeton Theory’s engagement with what 
Blasius here terms a prescriptive and a priori music theory, and its problematic 
relation with the descriptive and a posteriori.) 
By the time Dubiel ([1999] 2001) discussed his own work as a composer, 
theorist, composer/theorist, he saw fit to problematize the alleged problematic of 
the composer/theorist.  He asserts: “The combination of activities is as natural as 
can be: wanting to write music has always involved wanting to explore ideas 
about how to write it and how it is heard…. Somebody sees an issue with the 
combination, though” (262, emphasis original).  That somebody, Dubiel strongly 
implies and indeed cites shortly thereafter in a footnote, is Kerman.  Further, 
                                                
17 See Krenek ([1937] 1977, 80–1) and, for discussion, Schuijer (2008, 254 n 20) and 
Derkert (2007, 227–35). 
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Dubiel takes offense at the implication that the composer/theorist is, “too 
intellectually concerned to be a real composer, yet too uncritical to be a real 
scholar” (Ibid., 263).  The remainder of Dubiel’s essay involves a detailed and 
continuously illuminating exploration of the phenomenology of listening qua 
composing, drawing distinctions but faintly imagined beforehand. 
This dissertation presents a history of ideas, and as such during much of it 
I shall be concerned with the history of especially twentieth-century philosophy 
as it informs Princeton Theory’s projects: this will involve discussion of logical 
positivism and the analytic or Anglo-American traditions of Carnap, 
Wittgenstein, and Russell, among others, as well as the continental traditions of, 
for example, Husserl and Heidegger.  To the extent I discuss both traditions, the 
dissertation pivots uncomfortably between the analytic and continental modes of 
thought.  While in order simply to understand Princeton Theory in its high-
modernist phase of engagement with logical positivism and analytic philosophy, 
I have had to immerse myself in those discourses, to draw close sympathetically 
those ideas, nonetheless continental ideas can be read to inform Princeton Theory 
after the Turn, and, indeed, I am myself more disposed to continental thought.  
The nature of the bifurcation between analytic and continental traditions of 
philosophy has been discussed in the literature (see e.g., Dummett 1993), and so 
rather than attempting to spirit away the tensions between the two, the 
dissertation seeks to increase their urgency, for I feel them intensely. 
This said, as with the Whitman epigraph, Mailman (1996), and Girard 
(2010), I should emphasize that appeals to philosophy do not determine the 
content of the music-theoretical literature.  Theorists can make a range of appeals 
to scientific and philosophical discourses, thus I do not assume that a given 
 25 
proposition within philosophy of science determines that proposition’s truth 
value within music theory.  We cannot assume a one-to-one mapping.  This is the 
main complaint I have with Davis (1993, 10–60) and Brackett (2003, 1–83): Davis 
reads philosophy of science supervening to such a degree over Princeton Theory 
that the mere appearance of logic in the latter discourse leads him to the 
conclusion that there could not be appeals to experience within analysis.  
Although illuminating and uncovering a certain logic in Babbitt’s metatheoretical 
writings, Brackett reads those writings too closely in step with the Received View 
of Scientific Theories (Suppe [1973] 1977), assuming a discursive transparency 
and coherence Babbitt and Princeton Theory as a whole do not, in my reading, 
evince.  Music theorists (or composers qua theorists) put scientific theories to use; 
we can think of music theory in this mode as applied philosophy.  This implies 
particular ends, particular changes in the initial conceptions, and therefore a 
degree of indeterminancy between philosophical input and metatheoretical 
output.  (It would be an interesting project to track these changes, but a degree of 
this will occur here.)  Additionally, it overlooks the personal quality of these 
uses, qualities which must be unpacked at each turn.18  On the other hand, in 
defending Princeton Theory against critique, Mailman (1996) purposefully 
underestimates the power and sophistication of its involvement with (nearly) 
contemporaneous problems in philosophy of science.  This dissertation seeks to 
chart a middle course between this Scylla and Charybdis of philosophy and 
music theory.  That is, assuming music theory and philosophy are separate 
pursuits. 
                                                
18 Randall ([1967] 2003, 144–150), Boretz (1969, 1–8 and 20–70) and Boretz ([1970] 
2003) are informative here. 
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Finally, why discuss Princeton Theory, as opposed to, say, normal theory?  
What is the rationale?  Princeton Theory appears to be a lost tradition, to have 
been displaced by normal theory.  As discussed, insofar as Princeton Theory was 
compositional theory, it appears lost.  Further, we shall find time and again that 
Princeton Theory seems misunderstood, caricatured in the music-theoretical or 
musicological discourses generally.  We can often detect here a kind of 
suppressed fear, and yet admiration.  Princeton Theory often evokes emotional 
reactions in scholars, which is especially interesting if we allow the possibility 
discussed earlier, that Princeton Theory might not be so different from normal 
music theory after all.  In terms of our disciplinary moment, as music theory 
moves ever closer to music cognition—as it creates itself in that image, as a 
growth industry, and courts the utopian hills from which the money flows—the 
unique hearings and theorizings of the autonomous, charismatic though 
disciplined listener, will be lost: precisely the tradition, Bourgeois perhaps, which 
Princeton Theory presents. 
The most general goal of the dissertation is both to clarify and critique: to 
clarify Princeton Theory’s often difficult texts and subtexts, but also to intensify 
the tensions inherent in these problematics, to intensify their urgency, and to 
problematize our sometimes uncritically accepted assumptions about what 
music theory is, its history, how it can function, what it can mean and its 
importance.  Further, we can conceive of this dissertation as answering the 
question, for a broader audience than solely music theorists, what was 
formalism?  This search, then, understands the historicization of music theory as 
a formalist discourse reliant upon its own blindness to its cultural encodings: the 
discovery of precisely those cultural encodings.  In this sense, this dissertation 
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contributes to the rethinking of logical positivism, (high-)modernism, and 
postmodernism generally.  For many, history is selective and artificially linear, 
but for Walter Benjamin, for example, history is a kind of picking through the 
ruins of a newly passed discourse.  Princeton Theory as a topic of study at this 
point in time unites new music with the history of theory—a seeming paradox.  
As a practice, it is just out of fashion, is just passed or past enough to be history 
in some sense, and yet not wholly past: it appears at the perfect spacing from the 
present moment to provide some sort of critical leverage into our own moment.  
“Fashion is its most evocative in an imagined, ‘dated’ condition.  The ‘clothes of 
five years ago’ (as Benjamin postulates vis-à-vis surrealism…)—that is, the 
expression of a past that has just ceased to be fashionable—are the ones fueling 
the imagination and phantasmagoria necessary for Benjamin’s individual 
historiography” (Lehmann 2000, xviii; see also pp. 290–99). 
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II. The Turn 
 
Willard: And, uh… that your methods were unsound. 
 
Kurtz: Are my methods unsound? 
 









Would you agree that a noun is just a placeholder for adjectives? 
—J. K. Randall, “Intimacy—A Polemic” 
 
 
As discussed during the last, introductory, chapter, the post-World War II 
era in the USA saw the emergence of an intense new strain of composing music, 
begun by Babbitt and students collected around him, at Princeton University.  
This high-modernist project also produced writings about music aspiring to the 
verifiability or corrigibility of scientific discourse, embodying the then-latest 
developments in science, philosophy, and linguistics.  By the 1960’s Princeton 
was the American center of avant-garde music composition, or, by extending to 
include electronic music and a certain geographical imagination, Princeton and 
Columbia Universities and uptown Manhattan—comparable to Darmstadt in the 
cultural imagination.  Supporting the composition was the theory and a 
discourse purportedly rid of subjectivity, and projected through the journal 
Perspectives of New Music (1962–current).  The notion of there being such a thing 
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as “Princeton Theory,” as distinct from other forms of music theory, has been 
with us for many decades, for as discussed in Chapter One, Kerman (1963, 152–4) 
defined and problematized a “Princeton School.”  Additionally, Blasius (1997, 2) 
reports Godfrey Winham’s (1934–1975) unfortunately undated response to “a 
prospective ‘Princeton issue’ of the Journal of Music Theory”; and Kerman’s (1985, 
60–112) critique can be read largely as a response to the composers/theorists 
working at Princeton—Kerman’s own alma mater (Ph.D., 1950).  It is difficult to 
overestimate the importance of Princeton Theory’s writings for a vigorous 
engagement with the image of music (theory) as a science, with musical 
discourse purified of “incorrigible” personal criticism, hermeneutics. 
 But around 1970, something happened.  The sustaining premises of music 
theory as a scientific pursuit were challenged by some of Babbitt’s own students, 
prominently, Benjamin Boretz and J. K. Randall; writers for Perspectives of New 
Music, e.g., Elaine Barkin; and, eventually, some of their students.  A drastic Turn 
occurred, a Turn away from the scientific ideals of the previous discourse, from 
Enlightenment rationality, and toward a phenomenological discourse; a motion 
toward first-person narratives; toward pragmatism; toward the feminine, queer; 
toward language as a music; toward a leveling of the distinction between 
creation and criticism; a search for poetics; toward, in short, the experimental.1  
The Turn had occurred. 
                                                
1 Additionally, a number of watershed events transpired, for which I have never 
made causal claims: many of the original board members resigned from 
Perspectives of New Music; Paul Fromm pulled funding from the same (see Berger 
2002, 146–47); Robert Ceely (1972) called for the resignation of Boretz from 
Perspectives of New Music—the very journal he founded—in its tenth anniversary 
issue; Boretz and others were denied tenure at Columbia (see, “A Columbia 
Group Bids 4 Get Tenure” 1971, Wuorinen 1971, and Deaver 1993, 51–53).  I shall, 
however, make causal claims for Randall’s publication of Compose Yourself—A 
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As to the historical significance of the Turn, it is difficult to overemphasize 
the degree to which the Turn presented a shock, occasioning aporia: it seems to 
be a disavowal of everything for which Babbitt had argued, a revaluation of all 
previous values.  (See Berger and Boretz [1987] 2003, 252–54 for discussion.)  
Indeed, the recent 50th Anniversary Issue of Perspectives of New Music (50/1, 
2012) can be read easily as an attempt to come to grips with the Turn, forty years 
later.  I would like to claim further that critiques of Princeton Theory that ignore 
the Turn and solely discuss its high-modernist moment must seem belated, must 
seem to have missed the internal or auto-critique the composers/theorists 
themselves leveled, must seem to have created their own foundation myths in 
order to proceed.2  As an example of the continuing presence of the impact of the 
Turn even within Princeton Theory itself, at the Princeton University release of 
The Collected Essays of Milton Babbitt (entitled “Re-reading Babbitt: The Composer 
as Author,” December 5, 2003), none of the initial figures we associate with the 
Turn—Barkin, Boretz, or Randall—were asked to present papers or reflections  
(Carey n.d.).  Randall did not attend in protest.  When asked as to why the 
organizers had not invited Randall or Boretz or Barkin to present, the conveners 
said they had always assumed that the Turn had alienated Babbitt from his 
students.  (Personal conversation with Benjamin Boretz; we shall return to 
Babbitt’s perception of the Turn.)  
The primary goal of this chapter is to situate the Turn historically, 
specifically as an experimental discourse, an historicization which has not been 
                                                                                                                                            
Manual for the Young ([1972] 1995) and its influence on the Turn, as has Berger 
(2002, 148). 
 
2 See, for example, Nattiez ([1987] 1990, 166–67); McClary ([1989] 1997); Brown 
and Dempster (1989); Hubbs (2004, 162–65); and Taruskin (2005). 
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carried out before.  Toward this end, I first characterize in greater detail 
Princeton Theory’s high-modernist moment, and then situate Princeton Theory’s 
high-modernism against a strain of the history of philosophy (Carnap’s Aufbau), 
and high modernism in the arts generally.  Secondly, I shall discuss further the 
manifestations of experimentalism as they have occurred within American 
music.  I then show Princeton Theory’s participation in this movement and 
discourse after the Turn, by tracing the ways in which other writers—largely, 
members of Princeton Theory themselves—have retroactively figured or 
historicized the Turn.  This will involve a characterization of the field’s projects 
both before and after: a kind of reception history.  Thirdly, I shall suggest my 
own readings of the Turn.  I shall do so by characterizing Princeton Theory’s 
experimental phase as a collapse of the meta-/object-language distinction in its 
discourses.  I also characterize the Turn as an engagement with Martin 
Heidegger’s concern for an already temporalized being, and a Derridian critique 
of the metaphysics of presence.  I then discuss the continuities between Princeton 
Theory’s high-modernist and post-modern or experimental phases, for lately 
(indeed, after Babbitt’s passing) a counter-discourse has arisen, challenging if not 
the fact of a Turn, then at least the degree to which it overturned Princeton 
Theory’s previous values.  I end with my own experimental reading of sections 
of J. K. Randall’s Compose Yourself—A Manual for the Young, again, the most 
important early document in Princeton Theory’s Turn.  I do so because solely to 
write conventional discourse about experimental discourse is ideological.  This 
chapter will be incomplete: I cannot possibly cover all of the manifestations and 
ramifications of the Turn here, and I do not explore here possible broader socio-
economic reasons for it (the Vietnam War, Late Capitalism, the Stonewall Riots, 
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May 1968, Kent State, Second-Wave Feminism, etc.).  This discussion appears 
early in the dissertation because the Turn cuts through or inflects the remaining 
problematics, and therefore in some sense the entire dissertation can be read as 
inflected by, responding to, and attempting to historicize Princeton Theory both 
pre- and post-Turn.  That is, one way of reading this dissertation is as exploring 
the Turn through the problematics of experimentalism, experience, solipsism and 
ethics.  The Turn was, in a word, an event. 
But of course the language of a “Turn” carries its own discursive history, a 
filiation specifically with the linguistic and postmodern turns, and Heidegger’s 
Kehre.3  The point to emphasize, however, is that the Princeton Theorists took 
their Turns nearly contemporaneously with the linguistic or postmodern turns.  
The Princeton Theorists were, indeed, practitioners.  While we shall discover 
Elaine Barkin and Fred Everett Maus (Ph.D., Princeton, 1990) using the language 
of a “turn” to refer to this event, my intervention is the historicization of the turn 
with a capital T.  To this end, I will allow a certain slippage in the use of “Turn,” 
as between a noun, verb, or hypostasized discourse as if a person with agency.  
Indeed, I treat “Princeton Theory” as a being.  To a degree this reifies a lived 
practice, but I believe that discourse partially stands outside its putative creators, 
and even if it does not, as Barkin has said in reference to Perspectives of New Music 
volume 17/2, the participants reified it themselves: “And then, 1979, whammo, 
trrrrrrrrrrrrr, the RED issue, Revolution Reified” (Barkin 2012, 25). 
 
 
                                                
3 We shall return to a Heideggerian reading.  On Heidegger’s Kehre, see 
Heidegger ([1946] 1998), and ([1969] 1972), and Richardson (2003, xxxiii–vi). 
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1.  Princeton Theory’s High-Modernism 
 
The best definition of Princeton Theory in its high-modernist phase—prior 
to the Turn—of which I am aware, under the rubric of “modern formalized 
theory,” takes place in Blasius (1996, 112).  Princeton Theory is, “compositional 
(in that it is not tied to a fixed and transcendental composer or canon).  It is 
discursively autonomous (in that its argument stands outside of history or 
psychology).  It is consistent (in that it is epistemologically self-aware) and it is 
transparent (in that the statements it makes about music need in some way to be 
verifiable).”  The first seems a denial of the canonic closure found in Schenker’s 
writings; the second characteristic presents a difference from Schenker’s project, 
insofar as that project served as a replacement for history or psychology.  The 
latter two tenets appear to derive from logical positivism or empiricism.  To 
restate the third tenet, these composers/theorists would present 
“epistemologically secure musical discourse[s]” (Blasius 1997, xii), again, an 
appeal to scientific philosophy in the form of logical positivism.4 
As an example of the kind of discourse practiced by the 
composers/theorists before the Turn, in order to describe part of the music-
historical importance of this phase of Princeton Theory, and hence to situate and 
dramatize the Turn away, let us a read a formal definition followed by its 
                                                
4 I am reminded here of comments by Alexander Rehding (2003, 42) regarding 
how music theory could be used in the nineteenth century: “Theory played an 
important role in the agenda of the Neue Zeitschrift für Musik, one that was 
inextricably bound up with its own notion of progress…. The modernity of 
nineteenth-century music is inextricably bound up with its increasing reflexivity.  
And this reflexivity could be supplied by music theory.” 
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interpretations, from Boretz’s summa, Meta-Variations: Studies in the Foundations 
of Musical Thought: 
 
Df. 3.1:  ⊥(t) =df ( : Q) (∃i∃j ((i, j) ∈ Q ⊃ Ts(i, j) ∧ t = j – i)). 
   
 
(“The timespan interval t is the Q such that there exists an i and there 
exists a j such that if (i, j) is a member of Q then (i, j) is a timespan and t is 
(j – i).”) ([1969] 1995, 165) 
  
 
Boretz’s (Ibid., 126) further interpretation: “A time-span interval is the value 
assigned to a given time-span on the basis of the times of its earliest and latest 
moments.”  In other words, “A time-span is quantized as the difference between 
the integer assigned to its earliest and that assigned to its latest component 
moment” (Ibid., 164, emphasis original).  One of the contexts of Boretz’s 
construction is Babbitt’s ([1962] 2003) serialization of rhythm: of the differences 
between serializing durations by analogy with pitches or serializing durations by 
analogy with intervals between pitches (Dubiel 2002, 99).  This transition from 
duration sets to time-point sets, respectively, was a conversation of real moment 
in the 1960’s, and served to improve upon, as it were, Babbitt’s own earlier 
efforts and the those of Princeton Theory’s European counterparts in serializing 
dimensions other than pitch, thus Boretz’s discussion is important for 
formalizing the difference in a more complete and compelling manner than 
available previously.  Further, in the context of Boretz’s broader discussion, he 
locates the places where serial and tonal music share characteristics, and where 
they diverge, showing their identity at an earlier (“deeper”) level than thought 
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previously: that of time or ordered succession.5  This, in turn, helps locate the 
importance of his celebrated Tristan Prelude analysis, well-known in music 
theory circles ([1969] 1995, 253–313).  Metahistorically, this means that we 
interpret serial music as having arisen out of tonal music, not slicing off and 
appearing ex nihilo nor, even, as a response to Schoenberg’s “atonal” music. 
Whatever one thinks of the merits of this formalist history, one way—I 
would argue a crucial way—of characterizing Boretz’s overall goal in Meta-
Variations is on the model of Rudolf Carnap’s ([1928] 2003) Aufbau: to reconstruct 
the (possible) musical world as he then understood it, for himself, on the basis of 
musical experience.  The available term for this project is foundationalism, and 
let us recall that Meta-Variations’ subtitle is “Studies in the Foundations of 
Musical Thought.”6  We are each of us responsible for reconstructing our own 
(musical) worlds,7 hence Boretz’s radical relativism (Boretz [1969] 1995, 111). 
                                                
5 See Boretz ([1969] 1995, 125–27, 168, 177–95, 220–24 and 240–41). 
 
6 We shall discuss foundationalism in more detail in Chapter Three, but, quickly, 
“The main problem [of the Aufbau] concerns the possibility of the rational 
reconstruction of the concepts of all fields of knowledge on the basis of concepts 
that refer to the immediately given” (Carnap [1928] 1967, v).  For Boretz’s 
account, see Boretz ([1969] 1995, 88); for historical context of the Aufbau, see 
Galison (1990) and (1996), Richardson (1998, 1–30), and Friedman (1999, 89–162). 
 
7 The language of a musical “world” appears in a number of places in Princeton 
Theory both pre- and post-Turn, especially in the later writings of Boretz, and 
would appear to respond to Carnap’s Der Logische Aufbau der Welt (in which 
Carnap does not define what he means by Welt) and Goodman ([1968] 1976 and 
1978).  We might identify a musical world as a species of the world only after the 
Turn.  Before that, a musical world was perhaps a music-theoretical system, a 
formalist “world”: a set of musical entities and their interrelations, with rules for 
change.  Later, however, a musical world would seem to include musical 
behavior, dress, and a broader conception of sociality, perhaps as discussed by 
Maus ([1988] 1994).  We shall return to the Maus article.  As to clothing, Randall 
writes eloquently in his eulogy to Stravinsky: “Scuffed summer-colored shoes 
not quite tennis-shoes, collar open, gray summer-weight suit uniformly, 
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Once accomplished, however, once each of us has created the (our) musical 
world(s), a crucial question arises: where to from here?  Do we then simply 
inhabit it, move its furniture around from time to time?  One answer, the one 
seemingly taken, was to Turn, to question every answer previously supplied: in 
Boretz’s later words, “permanent revolution is the only imaginable intellectual 
policy for a magazine like Perspectives [of New Music]” (Berger and Boretz [1987] 
2003, 254). 
 Although there are others available, I have been using the phrase “high-
modernism” to mark this phase in Princeton Theory’s development.  In Georgina 
Born’s (1995, 40–2) groundbreaking work, modernism occasions a definition along 
six more or less expected lines of thought: it is, “a reaction by artists against the 
prior aesthetic and philosophical forms of romanticism and classicism…. [it 
shows] a concern and fascination with new media, technology, and science…. A 
third feature of modernism, implicit in those above, is theoreticism…. A fourth 
defining element of modernism concerns its politics and political rhetoric, its 
vanguard and interventionist aims.”  This fourth notion shades modernism into 
the avant-garde.  “A fifth characteristic of modernism, indicating both the 
differentiation and the complexity of the discourse, is its oscillation between 
rationalism and irrationalism, objectivism and subjectivism….  Finally, a sixth 
feature of modernism… is its ambivalent relations with popular culture” (Ibid., 
44).  
                                                                                                                                            
quintessentially wrinkled” (Randall 1971, 134).  Indeed, as Boretz ([1973–1974] 
2003, 360, emphasis original) says, “A musical work, while it may be thus taken 
to filter the world, and to be in the world as such a world-filtering thing, may 
also be considered as a world-like thing in itself.”  Wright (2005, 113–19) 
discusses musical worlds in the context of musical “systems.” 
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High-modernism would present a post-War intensification of these 
trends, which Born suggests produces a “generalization” of serialism into the 
total or integral serialism discussed above in relation to temporality.8  Born then, 
amusingly, refers to this as “the ’50s generation,” and, as to be expected, locates 
its centers and organs as East Coast universities such as Princeton and 
Perspectives of New Music in the U.S.A., and IRCAM and Die Reihe in Europe 
(Ibid., 51 and 53).  The 1950’s generation, then, presented an “intensified 
rationalism, determinism, scientism, and theoreticism” (Ibid., 55).  While that list 
includes many undefined “-isms,” I think Born is largely correct, although I also 
think she misses some of the remarkable insights, intensity of thought, musicality 
and interdisciplinarity avant la lettre of these post-War theorists. 
In 1962 Morton Feldman, whom we can take as representative of what 
came to be known as the New York School of experimental composers, 
recounted his first meeting with John Cage, but framed it in reference to a 
previous encounter with Babbitt: “Just a week before, after showing a 
composition of mine to Milton Babbitt and answering his questions as 
intelligently as I could he said to me, ‘Morton, I don’t understand a word you’re 
saying’” (Feldman 1962, n.p.).  We are obviously to take Babbitt’s statement as 
dismissive, but, also, that if language about music is not directly referential to a 
conceptual meaning that coalesces as meaning, then it is meaningless, and cannot 
give rise to understanding, knowledge.  A few years after, in 1966, Feldman gave 
a lecture later published in Source: Music of the Avant-Garde, which criticized 
                                                
8 (Ibid., 50–1). I refer to Born again because she presents a critique of high 
modernism from nearly twenty (!) years ago, thus allowing us to historicize her 
position.  Indeed, Heile (2004, 167–69) does so, but passes over her move to 
consider high-modernism, solely discussing her theorization of modernism. 
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“academic” composition along the familiar lines, but lines that accord with 
Born’s understanding of high-modernism: “In a certain sense it is a criticism of 
Webern and Schoenberg.  To take another man’s idea, to develop it, expand it, to 
impose on its logic a super-logic; this does imply an element of criticism.  
Perhaps the music can be described as academic avant-garde, a term already in 
some usage.”  More to our point: “Have you ever looked into the eyes of a 
survivor from the composition department of Princeton or Yale?  He is on his 
way to tenure, but he’s a drop-out in art.”  And further:  
 
The other night I received a telegram summoning me to Princeton.  I was 
expecting this.  Once again I made the monotonous trip over the Jersey 
flats, once again was charmed by the utterly lovely stretch from Princeton 
Junction to campus.  My old colleagues were all assembled, waiting to 
hear what I had to say.  I was perfectly prepared…. “The earth has become 
small, and on it hops the last man, who makes everything small.  He has 
something of which he is proud.  What is that something of which he is 
proud?  He calls it education.”  Thus spake Nietzsche. (Feldman [1966] 
2011, 273–75, emphasis original; Nietzsche [1883] 1954, 128 and 129, 
slightly modified by Feldman) 
 
This still upsets, as it should.  Feldman makes of academic musicianship a moral 
issue: what kind of life are we to live?  And implies we have each of us been 
living a life of ideology, in vain. 
 
 
2.  Princeton Theory’s Experimental Turn 
 
Modernism, the avant-garde, and especially high-modernism, then, could 
not seem further from, indeed occurs dialectically tense in relation to, the musical 
experimentalism that was theorized at least by Cage ([1961a] 1966 and [1961b] 
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1966).  Experimentalism has recently gained legitimacy as a topic of academic 
discourse,9 but any number of cultural conditions have created this change, and 
certainly around the time of Princeton Theory’s experimental Turn, it is 
impossible to imagine the performance of discursive experimentalism would 
have been welcome in the academy, tenurable.10  Although many studies of 
experimentalism exist, most problematize its definition as a condition of their 
inquiries.11  Because of this, I would like to list the symbols for high-modernism 
and experimentalism, respectively, as they occur in Born (1995, 63), a list which 
Born presents straightforwardly: if high-modernism features determinism, 
rationalism, scientism, universalism, is cerebral, complex, text-centered and 
teleological, and is based in East Coast universities and is state-supported; then 
experimental music features indeterminism, irrationalism, mysticism, 
sociopoliticization, is physical, performative and simple, is practice-centered and 
cyclical, repetitive, or static, and is based on the West Coast, and in art colleges.12  
                                                
9 As long as the discourse itself is not performative of experimentalism—an 
utterly prosaic surface of disinterested mastery must still reign.  This said, I am 
all-too-aware that merely to speak of experimentalism is to be perceived to take 
part in it, and to be treated accordingly—specifically to have one’s discourse 
always treated as never academic enough, far beyond the expectations for 
discourses which do not speak of performative discourses. 
 
10 Randall was awarded tenure at Princeton on July 1, 1967, before writing 
Compose Yourself; Barkin, tenure at UCLA in 1974; and Boretz, tenure at Bard in 
1976, during what we might call their transitions to frankly experimental writing. 
(personal communications) 
 
11 See, for example, Nyman ([1974] 1999), Benitez 1978, Lewis 1996, Mauceri 1997, 
Nicholls 1998, Broyles 2004, Cox and Warner 2004, Beal (2006, 3) and Goehr 
(2008, 108–35). 
 
12 As Boretz has said, “One [problem] that’s still bouncing off the walls of the 
modern music business is the relevant and irrelevant sense in which we 
[Perspectives of New Music] were regarded as partyline Princeton—specifically, as 
 40 
To this we should add that modernism was symbolized historically as taking 
place in uptown Manhattan (within the rationalized, imposed grid street plan, 
but not North of 125th Street on the West Side—indeed, not even the North side 
of that street—or North of 90th Street on the East Side), whereas downtown 
music identified itself as experimental (within the confusion of one-way streets 
occurring South of Houston Street).13 
I would like to address J. K. Randall’s own sense of a Turn by quoting him 
from a recent unpublished interview:  
 
Scott Burnham asked me whether I ever had the experience of sort of 
kicking the habit and going to something else.  Just, deciding I don’t want 
to do that any more.  And I told him, “no,” I said, “my life has been 
pretty” [indecipherable, but gesturing a straight line with hands].  And 
then, you know, I thought about it and I realized, well, wait a minute, at 
that conference in San Francisco [the Fall Joint Computer Conference, 
November 7–10, 1966, of the American Federation of Information 
Processing Societies] I remember skipping a couple of sessions and just 
walking around looking at San Francisco, and thinking about the point, 
“what the hell am I doing up here with these people?”  And so, I can 
remember very specifically the next conference for electronic what not 
was being arranged with a composer and a guy interested in [the] 
computer who had designed the computer to produce twelve-tone 
phenomena named Gus Ciamaga [1930–2011], a very nice fellow, a 
Canadian.  I described to him something or other that could be involved 
in the next get together and then I said to him, “and it’s all yours.”  I said, 
“you know, forget me.”  And he was a little bit hurt and offended I think, 
but that was it.  That was the end of that. (2011, disc 2, c. 36:00) 
 
We should pause for a moment to absorb Randall’s admission that at least the 
premonition of his Turn, his growing awareness of something changing within 
                                                                                                                                            
Milton Babbitt’s spokesthing, and as antimagazine to the other mainline avant-
garde: John Cage, Morton Feldman, Earle Brown, Harry Partch, West Coasters, 
Source” (Berger and Boretz [1987] 2003, 252). 
 
13 See, e.g., Gann 2006; Berger (2002, 100) attributes the mapping to music critic 
John Rockwell’s writings in The New York Times before he was the Sunday arts 
editor; see Rockwell 1973. 
 41 
him, took place in 1966, in San Francisco.  I have to wonder how far the 
conference was from Haight-Ashbury.  The mythological aspects of Randall’s 
moment are almost too good to be true, too perfect—Randall, a pioneer in the 
computer generation of electronic sound, leaving the computer conference, 
wandering the streets, smoking a cigar, the Fall before the Summer of Love.  The 
piece Randall read at that conference was the third of his “Three Lectures to 
Scientists,” published as Randall ([1966] 2003), which reads as a kind of proto-
Spectralist talk.  Given that Randall locates his turn away from computer music 
in 1966 and that he did not begin Compose Yourself until later (1970), we can begin 
to wonder if his discourse between those two dates showed the effects of his 
sense of kicking the habit.  Earlier, in 1964, Randall published a “review” of 
Convertible Counterpoint in the Strict Style by Serge Taneiev in The Journal of Music 
Theory (Randall [1964] 2003).  The “review” consists entirely of quotations from 
the text and other, Russian, sources.  Brilliant for its condescension and the 
manner in which it creates a kind of culture around Taneiev’s text, Randall’s is 
clearly an experimental text, and it is hard to believe the editors of The Journal of 
Music Theory published such an experiment, but they did. 
 Indeed, in prefacing Randall’s article on “Electronic Music and Musical 
Tradition,” which Music Educators Journal published in 1968, then editor, Charles 
B. Fowler, stated that, “the reader faces this one article as he would face the most 
inscrutable piece of electronic music.  He may comprehend on many levels by 
analyzing its intricate arguments, by absorbing the illusion [sic] of its rhetoric, or, 
perhaps most profitable, by letting it launch his mind into new consciousness.” 
(Randall [1968] 2003, 207) This sounds utterly of its time, trippy, mimetic and not 
at all high-modernist—I find it hard to believe that an academic publication 
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printed it, and absorbed the language of the youth culture of the 1960’s.  
Together with the Taneiev review and Randall’s epiphany in San Francisco, it 
implies a kind of transitional phase for Compose Yourself and the Turn, a process 
of coming to be, which, of course, the beginning of the Compose Yourself text itself 
dramatizes. 
As an example of the kind of discourse which appears in Princeton Theory 
after the Turn, let us read closely a section of Randall’s “How Music Goes,” 
([1977] 2003, n.p.) reproduced as Figure 2.1.  During this passage, Randall 
unfolds a metatext in the space of Tchaikovsky’s “Candide” dance (!) from 
Sleeping Beauty.  The first thing to note is Randall’s choice of repertoire: a high-
modernist, system-builder analyzing Tchaikovsky, in 1977?14  Globally—out of 
time—the next thing I notice about Tchaikovsky and Randall’s pieces is that time 
elapses over roughly the same span: roughly 1:30.  That is, it takes roughly 1:30 
to listen to Tchaikovsky’s score; likewise for Randall’s score (and the latter is as 
much a score to be—internally—performed as the former).  This mapping of 
piece-times strikes me as important for it heightens the sense of Randall’s 





                                                
14 Indeed, autobiographically, we might say that Randall here reverts in some 
sense to his childhood by studying Tchaikovsky, for that is when one of his 
teachers told him to study Stravinsky and Tchaikovsky, which, “goes back to 
orchestration; hearing each individual instrument as a whole with its own 
tessitura low to high” (Randall 2011, disc 2, c. 18:00). 
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Although taking place during one pass, one listen, “new now, is it” announces an 
intervention, specifies its temporal placement but only as an after effect, and 
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subsequently questions both the novelty of the preceding moment and its 
temporal placement: memory alive in the present, but of a past now no longer 
available.  “Ruminates” as this music does, as we are coaxed to do when 
analyzing this analysis: returns feature prominently in this music, directionless, 
the sense of Beethovenian goal-directedness, later in time, shattered beforehand.  
A pastoral scene, we spatialize time: we are in a place as much as during a time, 
thus alleviating our need to track closely the piece’s time.15  All of this is very far 
removed, indeed, from the type of discourse Babbitt imagined in his famous 
methodological articles on music theory, or from Boretz’s Meta-Variations, as 
discussed earlier.  (See, for example, Babbitt [1961] 2003 and [1972] 2003.) 
I am not the first to notice that something happened to or with Princeton 
Theory, of course.  Joseph Kerman, in his influential critique of music theory and 
musical discourse as he then surveyed it, signaled a kind of institutional backlash 
by historicizing the Turn as a return, comparable to Kretzschmar and Tovey, one 
that scandalized musical discourse in its high-modernist moment: 
 
Under Boretz’s continuing editorship [Perspectives of New Music, post-
1971] became in everything save bulk a typical avant-garde little magazine 
replete with amateur graphics, wildly fluctuating typefaces, spectacular 
personal effusions and—a fascinating new feature—poems in vers libre, 
generally printed a dozen lines or so per page, commenting on a few bars 
of some composition.  It was a full swing of the pendulum.  Keller’s 
Wordless Functional Analysis and Schenker’s near-wordless Urlinie-Tafeln 
had given way to an impressionistic criticism which would have left 
Kretzschmar and Tovey themselves, with all their purple rhetoric, 
speechless. (1985, 104) 
 
                                                
15 See also Randall (1967, 144–46), which evokes a pastoral scene to describe the 
“stuff” of musical analysis.  By way of contrast, see Randall ([1974] 2003), which 
repeatedly returns, thickening its temporality via multiple repetitions of various 
figures or motives, as it progresses forward. 
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Obviously, Kerman is here dismissing Princeton Theory’s little magazine, 
featuring impressionistic criticism in the form of personal effusions over a few 
bars of some random—it matters not—composition.  The condescension drips off 
the page.  The attack on Boretz, personal.  Kerman locates his sense of the limits 
of acceptable personal utterance in relation to music.  Music criticism is to be 
historical, not personal. 
What, under Kerman’s reading, caused such a dramatic Turn?  Kerman 
tells us that, “by 1971, when Stravinsky died at the age of eighty-nine, it was 
clear there was no credible successor.  Something died at the center of the 
ideology of organicism.  So in a deep sense, perhaps, Perspectives [of New Music] 
and all it stood for could not survive much longer” (1985, 104).  Citing Solie 
(1980), it is unclear how for Kerman a high-modernist publication—one which 
slices the undergrowth without mercy—could be conceived in organicist terms, 
but Solie’s article was influential.  At least circumstantially, Kerman has a point, 
as Perspectives of New Music’s cover emblem to this day reproduces Stravinsky’s 
representation of his serial music; issue 9/2 (1971) presents a one-hundred-eighty 
page “composers’ memorial” to Stravinsky; and Babbitt, at least, courted the 
Stravinskian legacy after Stravinsky’s own turn to serial composition.  (In The 
Collected Essays of Milton Babbitt (2003) there is only one passing reference to 
Stravinsky before 1964, at which point the discussions of Stravinsky increase 
dramatically.)  Something Kerman passes over, however, is the fact that Randall, 
for instance, wrote Compose Yourself beginning in 1970, before Stravinsky’s death.  
Babbitt, for one, consistently thematicized generations of composers in his 
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writings,16 implying that the future would hold promise—that is what the 
younger generations do: in addition to mollifying past grievances, they promise 
to extend the present into the future—and, indeed, if Babbitt was a modernist, a 
revolutionary, he would have no choice but to concern himself primarily with 
the past in the present for the sake of the future.  Was Babbitt not the fulfillment 
of Stravinsky’s tradition?  That is, was not Babbitt the credible successor of which 
Kerman speaks?  Further, a rather robust literature about Stravinsky by 
Princeton Theorists was indeed included in the journal, before his death.17  Odd, 
however, is the notion that Kerman in 1985 would pronounce the death of 
Perspectives of New Music “and all it stood for,” when the journal was still at that 
time publishing research that mainstream music theory considers innovative: 
similarity relations, new music studies, transformational theory, combinatoriality 
and the aggregate, etc. (a point which challenges the very notion that we can 
trace a drastic Turn in the institutional discourse).  The year 2012 marked the 
fiftieth anniversary of continuous publication of the journal, this even after the 
passing of Babbitt. 
In a counter-move to Kerman, Cook and Everist ([1999] 2001, vi) coalesce 
Princeton Theory’s high-modernist and experimental moments before and after 
the Turn into one moment, as a kind of pivot: Boretz’s Meta-Variations ([1969] 
1995).  In describing Princeton Theory, they state that Meta-Variations best 
captures, “the heady atmosphere of that world, which somehow managed to 
combine hard-edged scientific values with those of late 1960’s alternative 
                                                
16 See e.g., Babbitt (2003, 34–6, 335–37, 428–30, 472–74). 
 
17 See e.g., Cone 1962; Berger 1963; and Boretz ([1969] 1995, 332–41). 
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culture.”  John Rahn (2012, 35) seems to agree, recently characterizing Meta-
Variations as using symbolic logic (predicate calculus) to present a 
“phenomenological reconstruction” of music in the tradition of Carnap and 
Quine.  We discussed earlier the Carnapian filiation of this text, and we shall 
discuss it in further detail in Chapters Three and Four, but I want to mark here 
the revisionist history implicit in both Cook and Everist and Rahn’s 
characterizations: until Friedman (1999) and Ryckman (2007) the Husserlian 
filiation of Carnap’s Aufbau had been suppressed or lost.  Indeed, there is a 
difference—or at least mid-century there had been perceived to be—between 
Husserl’s phenomenological project and Carnap’s phenomenalist reconstruction 
of the world and the individual’s cognition.  This distinction survives in Blasius 
(1997, xii) where he states the following in characterizing Winham’s unfinished 
project: “I have also rather loosely used the work [sic] phenomenology in reference 
to certain explanations.  This is not a term Dr. Winham uses, and the locution 
phenomenalistic construction might be more accurate (inasmuch as these 
explications take as their subject musical phenomena and as their method 
Carnap’s axiomatic constructivism), yet I find the use of phenomenology less 
awkward.  No connection is to be drawn with the analysis of continental 
phenomenology” (emphasis original). 
I honestly find no evidence for Cook and Everist’s description in Boretz’s 
text itself.  I read Meta-Variations as a profoundly high-modernist text.  As Boretz 
([2001a] 2003, 444) himself later stated, “Typically for academe, the critical 
lessons of the Sixties were only then [in 1970, one year after the completion of 
Meta-Variations] beginning to be reflected in the [Princeton music] department’s 
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social and curricular configurations.”18  I can imagine floating a reading that 
demonstrates the tensions of experimentalism in the text as a kind of subtext, 
specifically on the problematic of the transition from the closed to the open work 
or the problematic of masterwork culture, but to rewrite it as otherwise 
experimental is to ignore its scientistic orientation, actual socio-historical 
location, and therefore, to rob it and the Turn of their respective powers.  Indeed, 
part of Ceely’s (1972, 258) complaint is the presence in Perspectives of New Music 
of Meta-Variations and the absence of any sense of “the Sixties” and the Vietnam 
War: “[Perspectives of New Music] is the only serious journal of the sixties that one 
may read and have no idea that the Vietnam War existed” (Ibid., 260).  Ironically, 
however, this same issue includes part of Randall’s Compose Yourself: the 
experimental Princeton text, the text responding, in part, to “the Sixties,” the 
Vietnam War, the Manson Murders, etc.19 
While introducing a reprint of the first “Stimulating Speculation” of 
Randall’s Compose Yourself, Cox and Warner (2004, 107) state that, “it presents a 
careful and articulate phenomenological description that refuses to separate 
listening (in this case, to Richard Wagner’s Götterdämmerung) from the totality of 
bodily and conscious experience.”  I think this is a pertinent (although 
incomplete) reading of the significance of Randall’s text, implying a figuration of 
the text as turning from structuralist to phenomenological concerns, which is 
partially responsible for the stir it caused.  But Princeton Theory is not 
                                                
18 Indeed, Boretz ([1987] 2003, 267) states that Meta-Variations was a reaction 
against both what we have been calling high-modernism and “The 1960’s.” 
 
19 In his drafts for Compose Yourself, but suppressed from the published version, 
Randall references August 8, 1969, the first night of the Manson murders. (1970–
71, b. 39 f. 4) 
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monolithic.  Writing under a discussion of a “theory of experience,” and hence 
theorizing the Turn as a turn to discussion of experience as opposed to “theory of 
piece” (standing objectively, outside the subject), Rahn critiques music-
phenomenological discourse based on its potential for regression: “A theory of 
experience may degenerate into the whining, mewling, and puking of a 
perpetually infantile and unformed analysis so pathetically fragile as to avoid 
potentially ‘disturbing’ intercourse with its peers, hiding behind the arrogance of 
an ad hominem self-justification” ([1979] 2001, 64).  I would suggest that Rahn 
does not take the issue far enough, specifically phenomenological analysis’ 
similarities to psychoanalysis.  
Staying with Rahn (1979] 2001) for a moment, on p. 51 he presents, “four 
sets of paired terms which loosely indicate some general, mutually 
interpenetrating conceptual areas,” areas which he uses to characterize Princeton 
Theory pre- and post-Turn.  Continuing, they are, “(1) analog/digital; (2) in-
time/time-out; (3) top-down or concept-driven/bottom-up or data-driven; (4) 
theory of experience/theory of piece.”  These are quite useful for meta-theory, 
and we could draw them out of any number of writings pre- and post-Turn.  But 
I want to mark the point that, at another level, for Rahn these are still modes of 
explanation.  Music theory, in 1979, still explains for Rahn, and so his 
metatheoretical pairings help explain how music theory does so.  The post-Turn 
writings are still music theory.  This point takes on greater significance when we 
consider work by Joseph Dubiel (2000a) which, although “within” Princeton 
Theory, challenges music theory’s explanatory claims.  From analysis to 
description; description could be the marker which Rahn, writing in 1979, was 
not able to articulate.  So we can read Randall, when he asks, “Would you agree 
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that a noun is just a placeholder for adjectives?” as articulating a difference 
between explanation—concerning nouns and being as expressed through 
propositional thinking—and description—concerning adjectives and the 
potential richness of shaping musical sounds via words. 
Indeed, Rahn later points to a Wittgensteinian filiation in Boretz’s work, 
from early to recent, implying a structuralist to a post-structuralist project: 
“Boretz’s later work… bears a relation to Meta-Variations similar to the relation of 
Wittgenstein’s [Philosophical] Investigations to his Tractatus [Logico-Philosophicus]” 
([1989b] 2001, 89).  A legitimizing motion, to compare Boretz to Wittgenstein—
that most enigmatic of figures—seems overwrought, yet can we recuperate a 
Wittgensteinian reading of Boretz’s texts?  There does seem to be a similar 
dialectic at work over the course of both of their careers: the tight, nearly 
axiomatic propositions of the Tractatus; the axiomatic reconstruction of cognition 
in the earlier Boretz of Meta-Variations.  The awe in the face of system-building in 
the earlier texts of both authors.  The influence of the Tractatus on Carnap’s 
Aufbau; the filiation of the Aufbau with both Goodman’s Structure of Appearance, 
and Boretz’s Meta-Variations.  More to our point, Meta-Variations cites the Logical 
Investigations on the inseparability of description and interpretation.20  Further, 
the late Wittgenstein and Boretz both mark the limits of language in relation to 
(musical) thought.  (We shall return to these issues throughout this dissertation, 
                                                
20 “Now even the discrimination of a physical concretum may be considered a 
‘first-level interpretive act,’ which distinguishes the perception of a ‘thing’ or an 
‘event’ as an act in which a seen color area, touched surface, or heard sound are 
‘interpreted’ as effects of physical objects and events, from the ‘zeroth,’ ‘raw-feel’ 
level of acts of ‘pure perception’ whose supposed further intervention can 
nowhere be cognitively isolated, nor even distinguished within the conceptual 
framework of our language (as much of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations 
is at pains to point out)” (Boretz [1969] 1995, 70, emphasis original). 
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but especially in Chapters Three and Four.)  But, within Princeton Theory, 
Dubiel seems a later Wittgensteinian theorist: both are concerned to spirit away 
cumbersome ideas and confusions in our use of language of which we were 
faintly aware but which impede our ability to think/hear music more fruitfully; 
the concern to clarify our notions of rule following; the overthrowing of 
explanation with description. (See, e.g., Dubiel 1990 and 2000a, and Wittgenstein 
[1953] 2009, §109.) 
As for metaphors for the Turn, Paul Fromm, the early principal financier 
of Perspectives of New Music, wrote in its first issue: “We hope that by offering 
composers the opportunity to discuss issues vital to them, and by encouraging a 
mutual interchange of ideas between composers, performers, and listeners, 
Perspectives of New Music will succeed in bringing music closer to the center of 
contemporary culture” (1962, 2).  Additionally, Fred Everett Maus (1993, 276 and 
278–80) figures the Turn as from the mainstream of music theory to the 
“margins,” occasioning a discussion of the gendered politics of such a 
distinction, suggesting centers and margins are metaphors for locations of music-
political power, leading ultimately to the utopian conclusion that “music theory 
should not have a center (nor, therefore, should it have any margins)” (Ibid., 278, 
emphasis original). 
Maus has twice sought to understand the Turn in print (Maus [1988] 1994 
and 1993), the first time from a pragmatic and social perspective, the second, 
from a gendered perspective.  In the earlier article Maus seeks to understand the 
Turn in terms of value and expression theories of art, from Collingwood to 
Tolstoy to Dewey (Maus [1988] 1994, 109 and 114).  Additionally, the Turn for 
Maus is toward process rather than product (Ibid., 109–10); the generalization of 
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art to the quotidian (Ibid., 110–11); the blurring of the distinction between 
specialists and non-specialists (Ibid., 111); and the placing of importance on 
personal experience over formal training (Ibid., 111–12).  In terms of our 
concerns, these are many of the markers of the experimental, but to my 
knowledge that notion has never been used to describe Princeton Theory’s Turn. 
Interestingly, the later Maus article locates the Turn21 around 1980, in 
Perspectives of New Music 17/2 (1979): the issue includes, “extended ‘literary’ texts 
by Barkin, Boretz, [Arthur] Margolin, [Marjorie] Tichenor, and Randall” (Maus 
1993, 269).  We recall, too, that Barkin (2012, 25) located the reification of the Turn 
in the same volume.  Maus acknowledges that his understanding of the Turn is 
conditioned by his own studies at Princeton at that time (Ibid., 268), thus while 
Kerman locates the Turn in 1971, with the death of Stravinsky, Maus locates it 
nearly a decade later, with his own experiences at Princeton, and with the onset 
of gendered understandings and critiques in academia more generally (Ibid., 
275).  Maus, then, declines to separate history from ethnography, from 
autobiography.  More generally, perhaps both are right: we can grow deep inside 
and yet be perceived as unchanged.  Less poetically, Randall could have made a 
Turn earlier, around 1970, which took some time to be absorbed by others, until 
it reached a critical mass around 1979. 
Returning to Maus, his point is to demonstrate that music theory can be 
gendered, but also to show that there was at Princeton at that time a bifurcation 
between, “mainstream music theory centered on Babbitt and Peter Westergaard; 
the significant alternative consisted of Randall and Boretz” (Ibid., 268).  Maus 
                                                
21 A word he uses, without capitalization.  Berger (2002, 147) also refers to the 
new “movement” as a turn. 
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further demonstrates that the writers of the Turn were gendered feminine (Ibid., 
270); he advocates on behalf of the authors of the Turn (Ibid., 276); and advocates 
on behalf of a feminine politics generally (Ibid., 276–78).  Extending Maus’ 
argument, I would argue that we must interpret the Turn as queer: as Maus 
discusses (Ibid., 277), these are mostly men performing women’s work, a 
traditional understanding of what constitutes the queer.22  Additionally, given 
that the Turn has occasioned so much discourse, it has obviously posed a 
problem for understanding, in a word, has been queer. (See Maus 2004, for a 
queer reading of Babbitt’s earlier denaturalization of music theory.) 
Let us recall that at nearly the same time as the publication of Randall’s 
Compose Yourself, Paul Fromm pulled funding from Perspectives of New Music, 
forcing the journal to reincorporate as a non-profit.  Follow the money: the 
motion from high-modernist, scientist, avant-garde to postmodern, artistic, 
experimental coincided with a motion turning its back on the traditional (read: 
European) sources of patronage of the arts.  Although no longer funded by the 
Fromm Music Foundation, Perspectives of New Music, as emblematic of Princeton 
Theory, after the Turn in fact entered the academy more thoroughly than it had in 
its high-modernist phase.  The academy is not a traditional European source of 
patronage.  After Fromm pulled funding, Perspectives of New Music secured 
funding via the academy more thoroughly: Princeton University, Bard College, 
and eventually the University of Washington, Eastman School of Music, and the 
University of California, San Diego. 
                                                
22 Hibbard (1985, 97) explicitly compares an improvisation recording by Boretz 
and Randall to sexual intercourse.  Boretz ([1994] 2003) queers gender in the 
space of music.  Scherzinger (2002) identifies Boretz’s (later) listening strategies 
with the feminine.   
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I have just now stated that the Turn was also about turning one’s back on 
European models of patronage, but I would like to argue further that the Turn 
was a turn away from especially German masterwork culture and toward 
presenting an uniquely American space.  As Elaine Barkin put it (note that she 
uses the language of having “turned away”): 
 
To be then: a Composer of Serious New Concert Music, a Composer of an 
Elitist Establishmentarian stripe whose Artistic and Intellectual fore-
everybodies were mostly Western (Teutonic) European, (born or 
converted-to) Gentile, and Male. (None of which I am or have been.) …In 
order to rediscover aspects of my inner and outer social and musical 
selves that had been suffering from neglect, I turned away from 
Composing as a Primary Way of Life to (try to) reinvent a world within 
which ambivalences could be comprehended, within which to live.  No 
way not to rupture to rebuild. ([1988] 1997, 122) 
 
Indeed, Barkin figures it as a rupture, we might say an epistemic shift: a rupture 
with the patriarchal, the Christian, the German, in order that she may rebuild her 
life in her own image.23  Randall puts the sentiment a bit more succinctly: 
“Germanoid bullshit,” ([1991] 2003, 333) or, more recently, “overstuffed teutonic 
pigs” (2006, 31). 
I would like to discuss now Taruskin 2005, which argues vehemently and 
at length against Princeton Theory, but crucially and unlike his predecessor 
Kerman, only the Princeton Theory of the high-modernist years—largely 
symbolized by Babbitt.  Taruskin papers over Princeton Theory’s Turn—the 
                                                
23 I am reminded here—completely devoid of drama—of the following thoughts 
regarding Celan, Adorno, the German language and the Shoah: “The ubiquitous 
poetological meta-reflection in Celan’s work is best understood as a 
problematization of the possibilities of poetry after Auschwitz.  This is obviously 
a particularly complex question for the literature of the German language, which 
for Celan was the mother tongue as well as the tongue of those who murdered 
his mother” (Englund 2008, 19). 
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experimental, postmodern, or poetic output we have been discussing during this 
chapter—and this lacuna locates Taruskin’s blind spot, his moment of ideology.  
For were Taruskin to acknowledge the Turn, the force of his critique would be 
mitigated, much of the content of his critique would have to be altered, and it 
would lose its universal status.  This said, he does present a compelling and 
fascinating reading of the entire history of Western music from the perspective of 
oral and literate traditions.  Our problem is that he cannot allow Princeton 
Theory to be a full participant in that history: he assumes the social isolation of 
which avant-gardists dream.  In some sense he is too close.  In quoting William 
Benjamin (1981, 170), who, although himself a Ph.D. graduate from Princeton 
(1976), criticizes Princeton Theory, and synthesizing many chapters of discussion 
of the post-War avant-garde, Taruskin states the following: 
 
The issues at stake go back to the origins of literate (i.e., notated) music.  
The “real-time” practices Benjamin invokes—improvisation, 
embellishment, creative play—are the practices, and reflect the values, of 
“oral” culture.  Their eclipse marks the full ascendancy of literacy—an 
ascendancy a full millennium in the making.  And indeed the values 
Babbitt’s compositional practices maximize—extreme (approaching 
“total”) density, fixity, and consistency of texture, maintained over a long 
temporal (= “structural”) span—are precisely the ones associated with the 
“spatialization” of music that literacy made possible. (2005, 169) 
 
While we should question Babbitt’s purported consistency of texture and fixity, 
we can perhaps grant much of this characterization.  Indeed, Babbitt’s students—
the authors of the Turn—would in this reading no longer associate their work 
with the mature Babbitt—the Babbitt of maximization—but there can be no 
question that Randall, Barkin, Boretz, etc. challenged the (their own) literate 
tradition, which Taruskin is here articulating via Babbitt, and turned precisely to 
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“the ‘real-time’ practices Benjamin invokes—improvisation, embellishment, 
creative play—[which] are the practices, and reflect the values, of ‘oral’ culture.”  
Taruskin is, unfortunately, caught discussing Princeton Theory’s high-modernist 
moment, long after the practitioners have moved on.  This said, he does imply an 
historicization of a much broader arch than I shall attempt for Princeton Theory 
within the context of Western music history, extending from the first notated 
music to now. 
In the second issue of Perspectives of New Music—before the Turn—poet 
John Hollander (1963) critically reviewed Cage’s Silence.  Insofar as that review 
represents pre-Turn Princeton Theory’s thoughts on Cage, the engagement with 
Cage post-Turn would seem to be a defining feature of its experimentalism.  But 
we hear little about Cage in Perspectives of New Music after the Turn—nothing, in 
fact, during the 1970’s—and nothing from the authors of the Turn until Boretz 
([1992] 2003, 362–64), the year of Cage’s death.  For our purposes, what is 
interesting in Boretz’s discussion, besides its insightfulness, is its own narration 
of Cage’s work moving from systems to sounds and silence, perhaps reading in 
Cage’s work a kind of turn. 
In 1988 Barkin, Boretz, and Randall founded Open Space, a composers’ 
collective, recording company, and publishing house, part of the notion being 
that, as discussed in Maus ([1988] 1994), experimental discourses demand 
experimental pedagogy demand experimental publishing demand experimental 
forms of co-existence, of being-together, community.24  The inaugural issue of The 
                                                
24 See Bayar (2005–2006) for a related discussion.  Additionally, from 1983 to 1994 
Boretz published a periodical called News of Music, which we might think of as 
transitional between Perspectives of New Music and The Open Space Magazine.  I 
have not seen copies of this periodical. 
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Open Space Magazine (1999) describes its mission: “For people who need to 
explore or expand the limits of their expressive worlds, to extend or dissolve the 
boundaries among their expressive-language practices, to experiment with the 
forms or subjects of thinking or making or performing in the context of creative 
phenomena” (Boretz and Roberts 1999, 2).  What kind of community?  As 
discussed previously, Maus ([1988] 1994, 110–11) offers an important set of 
answers (art becomes quotidian; coexistence of specialists and non-specialists; 
importance of personal experience over formal training), but in addition, the 
inaugural issue of The Open Space Magazine features articles discussing Deleuze 
and Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus ([1980] 1987).  The same book is discussed 
later, in Perspectives of New Music volume 46/2 (2008), within which Rahn (2008) 
discusses the book from a perspective rooted in May 1968, his own experiences, 
and those of Princeton Theory after the Turn.  A Thousand Plateaus, 
 
preaches and instantiates a rigorous devotion to the ideal of multiplicity, 
nonhierarchy, transformation, and escape from boundaries at every 
moment.  [A Thousand Plateaus] is concerned with subverting a mindset 
orientated around an identity which is unchanging essence, but equally 
subversive of the patriarchal move towards transcendence.  This has 
political implications….  [A Thousand Plateaus] is a brilliant and inspiring 
book that has been very influential, partly because these philosophers are 
practicing on us and on themselves. (Rahn 2008, 82, emphasis original) 
 
A Turn from hierarchical ascent, escalating systems, identity-thinking, 
patriarchy, to multiplicity, the rhizome, and persistence.  While no doubt 
referring to a capacious range of possibilities, Guattari was, of course, a 
psychoanalyst, so when we read of “philosophers… practicing,” we understand a 
code for a psychoanalytic practice.  Psychoanalytic practice is absolutely central 
to an understanding of the sociality or model of community practiced by the 
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Princeton Theorists after the Turn: given the reflexive character of their 
experimental practices, Boretz, Randall, Rahn, et al. are practicing on us and on 
themselves.  The practice is coded—one needs to know how to read for what is 
unsaid and resaid, for origins and references to ideas, rhetoric (crucially, the use 
of antonomasia) and to read for reflexive statements.  But the practice is real, and 
ongoing, and—once initiated—there is no escape, no line of flight. 
The two entities, Open Space and Perspectives of New Music, now coexist, 
suggesting the older journal retains its theoretical, high-modernist orientation, 
while The Open Space Magazine presents experimental output.  While a fair 
characterization as far as it goes, there exists more crossover than this implies.25  
If the center has always been compositional theory of the abstract yet empirical 
kind, then Perspectives of New Music could accommodate the center and margin, 
and The Open Space Magazine would represent the margin of the margin.  The 
experimental of the avant-garde, we might say.  After all, we can understand 
experimentalism as a kind of avant-garde of the avant-garde.26  From here we 
could read the Turn as from the avant-garde of traditional composition to the 
experimental of non-traditional forms of music making. 
And yet, we must in fact theorize two Turns in Princeton Theory: the first 
toward the experimental in discourse (as discussed), the second back toward the 
compositional.  That is, around 1980 Randall and Boretz discontinued creating 
traditional, score-based composition in favor of group improvisation, expressing 
itself in literally hundreds of cassette-tape recordings under the title 
                                                
25 For further discussion see Scotto (2004–2005) and (2012, 218). 
 
26 See Nicholls (1998, 517–34) for discussion of the avant-garde/experimental 
divide. 
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INTER/PLAY.  Here we can understand a Turn from a Eurological music to an 
Afrological music.27  So, while the critical discourse turns to performativity, 
composition turns to improvisation, with a nearly decade delay between the two.  
In the early 1990’s, however, Randall started composing the Greek Nickel pieces 
(1992) and the GAP series (1993–2002), in a Eurological manner again: for 
performers on scores with standard notation (Snyder 2012, ii and 1).  And around 
1992, Boretz started composing scores again (personal conversation).  A second 
Turn, yet the critical discourse remains performative.  How are we to read this 
second, unremarked, Turn, which was in fact a Return, on the compositional 
level?  A tertiary periodization, with the Return performing the function of a late 
style? 
Within music theory circles Lewin ([1986] 2006) is a much-discussed 
presentation of how music theory might instantiate and systematize 
phenomenology.28  Although we have read the motion toward phenomenology 
as a marker of the Turn, to my knowledge Lewin’s article has never been read in 
this way; the filiation between the two has never been made explicit.  But I read 
Lewin ([1986] 2006) as his own “freak out” piece, i.e., his own (response to) 
Barkin-Randall-Boretz essay(s) or the Turn.  Let us remember that Lewin earned 
his M.F.A. in 1958 at Princeton University under Babbitt, in the same class as 
Winham and Randall (Blasius 1997, ix), published consistently in Perspectives of 
New Music and was a board member: he could not have missed the Turn, even if 
he waited over a decade to respond.  After presenting a phenomenological 
                                                
27 See Lewis 1996, Randall ([1991] 2003), and Barkin ([1992] 1997).  Boretz ([1979] 
2003, 55–8), for example, is set in colloquial Black English. 
 
28 See Kane 2011 and Moshaver 2012 for recent and impressive readings. 
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preface, a general model, his famous Schubert “Morgengruß” analysis and a 
section on methodology, Lewin presents an extended critique of all that 
preceded, arguing that theory must be a deed, a series of actions, not reflections, 
that musical discourse should be post-Bloomian in that it creates.  Lewin even 
quotes Genesis, 1:9–11, from the first biblical account of God’s creation, as 
ultimate authority regarding the loop between perception and creation: we are to 
respond to perceptions by creating, either poems (in a loose sense) for music 
theory, or worlds, for God ([1986] 2006, 99).  Crucially, soon thereafter occurs a 
discussion of the authors of the Turn (Ibid., 101–102), and a claim that Randall et 
al. present a “search for poetics” (Ibid., 101).  Clearly a defense against Kerman’s 
(1985) critique discussed earlier, Lewin states that, “the issue is not whether there 
shall be poems, but rather what sorts of poems there shall be, and by what 
criteria they are to be valued” ([1986] 2006, 102, emphasis original).  Criticism is a 
species of poetry: an obvious position for composers theorizing music.  Randall is 
said to have described Compose Yourself (whose first word is, after all, compose) 
as an, “attempt to apply compositional concepts to words and to extramusical as 
well as musical issues and behavior” (Berger 2002, 146).  This prompts the 
question: to what extent can we treat the written texts of the Turn as themselves 
artworks?  We must concede that it is precisely the collapse of the meta-/object-
language distinction that encourages this problematic: what is the artwork, and 
what, the criticism of it?  How do we evaluate—which historically implies the 
maintenance of an aesthetic, detached, distance—when these productions 
involve us in their unfoldings, as a life unfolds?  When comparing artworks to 
lives lived, we are dealing with ethical considerations.  (Which we shall discuss 
in Chapter Five.) 
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3.  Meta-/Object-Languages 
 
 Lewin’s concern for poetics helps shed light on a discussion of real 
moment from the 1960’s to the 1980’s in linguistics, philosophical logic, and in 
music theory: the distinction between meta- and object-languages (see, e.g., 
Keiler 1981 and Nattiez [1987] 1990, 133–35 and 150–60).  Within a conception of 
science as explanation, the metalanguage explains without holding anything in 
common with, the object language—the object(s) being explained—which, 
indeed, are not any kind of language.  This is the position of early Princeton 
Theory, and indeed Boretz insists on the separation: “A related problem in the 
use of predicating terms is the frequent equation of their relations in the 
language (the ‘natural language’) in which the discourse is taking place with 
those in the domain about which it is taking place without consideration of the 
basis, or often even of the need, for specified correlation.  This problem arises 
from a fundamental, and classic, failure to observe the distinction between a 
metalanguage and an object-language.”  “In particular, both Cone and Krenek 
seem to undervalue the object-language/metalanguage distinction in their worry 
over whether terms introduced with all due definiential care are the ‘intuitively 
right’ ones, metalinguistically, for the phenomena defined” ([1969] 1995, 14 and 
18).  So a traditional music-theoretical discourse, written in verbal language, 
appears to hold nothing in common with music as heard—none of its sensed 
senses of motion, of register, completion.  However, if we can conceive of a 
certain crossover between the two, if they are to communicate at all, if, indeed, a 
Schenkerian sketch or a Functional Analysis can be said to take place within the 
object language, then it would be impossible for the meta-language not to share 
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some lived qualities with the object language.  While Brown and Dempster (1989, 
83) write off this possibility, it enables a conception of theory as composition, of 
which Boretz, at least, had been aware explicitly: “The invention of musical 
systems themselves becomes an act of composition rather than its invariant 
context” (Boretz [1971] 2003, 320; paraphrased in Kerman 1985, 99).  From proto- 
or precomposition to theory to composition and back again: all are 
compositional, creative, musical, activities.  As William Benjamin says of both 
what he terms rationalist (Lerdahl and Jackendoff) and empiricist (Narmour) 
readings of Schenker, “What they fail to give us are analyses which are artistic 
statements, in music, about music, and this is exactly what Schenker does give 
us” (1981, 160 emphasis original). 
 Recall Hollander’s review of John Cage’s Silence (1961), which criticizes 
Cage’s blurring of these distinctions: 
 
Mr. Cage’s writings in the last fifteen years have tended more and more to 
confuse systematically the musical and the meta-musical; they are as 
carefully arranged with respect to absolute running-time of aural 
reception, simultaneity of different messages, and frequent tedium as 
much of his recent music.  It is tempting to break down the conventional 
barrier between musical composition and critical or theoretical writing, 
and, in this case, refer to the total corpus of his work as Mr. Cage’s 
productions.  And so again, perhaps his book calls for some kind of 
production as a critical approach. (Hollander 1963, 137, emphasis original) 
  
A production Hollander does not himself produce.  More generally, the Turn 
would rest on this understanding between a conception of musical discourse as 
being at a remove—not sharing any qualities with the object language—to a 
situation where to talk of music in any sense—theory in its broad sense—is to 
partake of musical creation.  To collapse the creator/critic distinction is of course 
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central to the work of post-structuralist criticism generally.  Thus an important 
reading of the Turn is from a conception of musical discourse as holding a sharp 
distinction between the creative and non-creative discourses, to a conception 
where there exists crossover.  Where, to return to our Figure 2.1, Randall’s page 
implies its own creativity, gave rise to its own critico-creative response.  (I make 
only the most modest of claims for my reading, but the point is that my analysis 
of Randall’s text is more poetic than my surrounding discourse narrating the 
Turn.  This occurred without conscious intent or planning.) 
An insightful reading of the meta-/object-language Turn within Princeton 
Theory is Blasius (1996, 112 and 112–13 n 22).  After Boretz ([1978] 2003), Blasius 
terms the theorists of the Turn the, “‘language as a music’ theorists.”  The project, 
under Blasius’ reading, is to present, contra Kerman, “a true counter discourse to 
that of Schenker…. It would also problematize (or even re-problematize) 
language.  In fact, we might speculate it would mirror Schenker’s move, that 
where Schenker would arrive at a representational transparency in using music 
as a language or symbol system with which to speak of music, it would take the 
language used to speak of music as itself a music” (1996, 112).  Under Blasius’ 
reading the Turn presents a critique of Schenker: one of the foundational 
discourses of Princeton Theory in its high-modernist moment and music theory 
as a discipline to this day.  This critique is dependent upon a move where, in 
contrast to Schenker’s representational technology, which collapses the meta-
/object-language distinction by using musical symbols or notation to represent 
music, the Princeton Theorists of the Turn collapse the same distinction but fold 
it out on itself, inverting the motion of the collapse, such that language comes to 
represent music by becoming music.  Schenker, in this reading, makes music a 
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music, but the “language as a music” theorists make language a music.  
Interestingly, as with Maus ([1988] 1994 and 1993), Blasius later hypothesizes “a 
‘crisis’ in music theory in the late 1970’s,” about a decade after Compose Yourself, 
coinciding with the beginning of his own studies at Princeton, a crisis whereby 
the additional epistemological distinction he posits between a theory concerned 
with meaning and thus context versus a theory concerned with truth and hence 
the natural sciences “loses its authority.”  Blasius declines to offer a reason for 
this loss of authority, but nevertheless suggests two solutions: the first, a 
retrenchment into the sciences, represented by the founding of the journal Music 
Perception in 1983; the second, what we are calling the experimental Turn (Blasius 
1996, 113 n 22).  To this we could add the founding of IRCAM in Paris as another 
retrenchment into the sciences; Lerdahl and Jackendoff (1983); and the founding 
of Music Perception in 1983; but Blasius’ argument is a subtle one. 
Under-discussed until quite recently has been the influence and tension 
with another avant-garde or experimental journal/magazine, Source: Music of the 
Avant-Garde, published from 1966–1973.29  Already in a lecture before a concert of 
his music, which was published in issue number one, Harry Partch, apparently 
responding to journalistic criticism, could explain that, “there has been, at least 
since Aristotle, a certain strong tendency in the west toward explanation—a kind 
of syndrome.  The first and initial step is fairly innocent—to consider a verbal 
explanation of a certain art as necessary to an understanding of the art.  The 
second step is less innocent.  In this second step the explanation of the art 
becomes a substitute for the art.  But the third step is really something.  It is a sort 
                                                
29 For discussion of Source and Perspectives, see Berger and Boretz ([1987] 2003, 
252); Boretz (2012b, 11); Brooks (2012, 141–42); and François (2012, 158). 
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of apotheosis, where the explanation actually becomes the art” ([1966] 2011, 35).  
Apparently we are to take this as a loss for art and music, and we should mark 
the initially explanatory nature of discourse in relation to art, in Partch’s reading.  
But what is interesting about this thread in the unpacking of the ideation of the 
experimental Turn in Princeton Theory, is, of course, its literal economy: 
“nothing can be copyrighted unless it is the ‘writing of an author.’  To be 
regarded as a ‘writing,’ a work must contain at least a certain minimum amount 
of original, literary, pictorial or musical expression.  In all cases, it is only the 
particular manner in which the author expresses himself in his writings that can 
be protected by copyright.  The ideas, plans, systems or methods that he 
expresses, or that are embodied in his writings, are not copyrightable” (Healy 
([1966] 2011, 23).  These statements about the registration of theory (what had 
been called precompositional material) as composition, were written in response 
to experimental composer Robert Ashley’s “in memoriam” series (1963), by the 
Acting Head, Music Section, of the United States Copyright Office, published 
also in the first issue of Source (1966).  Precomposition, according to the US 
Copyright Office, is not creation—is not copyrightable.  So part of the 
problematic of Princeton Theory’s Turn to the experimental has to do with its 
lack of salability, its sources of funding, for the collapse of the meta-/object-
language distinction implies the collapse of aesthetic distance which enabled the 
U. S. Copyright Office to disregard precomposition or poetic criticism as 
expressive, as, “a writing.” 
How did Babbitt himself understand the Turn which his younger 
colleagues took but which he himself seems never to have taken?  (But note that 
after 1972 Babbitt stopped writing metatheoretical or methodological articles, 
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and the frequency of analytical articles slowed—around the same year he began 
teaching at the Juilliard School of Music—Babbitt’s own Turn?)  Babbitt, we 
might posit, must have sensed that one could take formalization only so far, 
before some kind of change had to take place.  In response to a series of articles in 
his sixtieth-birthday Festschrift, Babbitt responded in part: “In John Dewey’s 
words: ‘the test of the capacity of the (aesthetic) system… (is) to grasp the nature 
of the experience itself.’  For, as I read them, all of the analytical articles here, 
whatever their explicit relation to observationality, are concerned to attempt to 
do just that [i.e., to grasp the nature of the experience itself], the ‘formal’ ones no 
less than Jim Randall’s more graphically isomorphic one (Babbitt [1976] 2003, 359 
paraphrasing Dewey [1934] 1980, 286).  There is much here we may wish to 
unpack, but important is Babbitt’s understanding of Randall’s ([1976] 2003) 
trippy performance of sections of Tchaikovsky’s Sleeping Beauty, discussed 
earlier, as a kind of musical analysis, concerned with reporting observations, 
presented in a manner sharing the visual form of the original score—in a word, 
mimesis.  The notion here is that the Turn presents analyses, concerned with 
musical experience, yet in a form or metalanguage which shares the form of the 
(visual) score or object language.  The Turn, then, was toward analyses—
discursive texts—which are closer to the scores than previously imagined.30  But 
Babbitt in fact deemphasizes the radicalness of the Turn by pointing out the 
philosophical similarity to the traditional analyses presented, and he does not 
                                                
30 As Boretz (2004) says, “Katharine Norman has discovered that the most cogent 
and vivid way to render the sense of unusual original compositions in words is—
unusual original compositions in words.  Her texts create striking analogues of 
the expressive worlds of the musics she describes; each verbal episode is as 
distinct in style, structure and substance as are the musical issues that it 
addresses.” 
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seem particularly perturbed by the extravagance of the Randall text, or its subject 
matter.  My point here is that there may have been more communality and less of 
a schism between Babbitt and the authors of the Turn than much of the oral 
history of the Turn would imply.  (We shall return to similarities.) 
I have always taken one of the accomplishments of post-Turn Princeton 
Theory to be a certain virtuosic use of the mimetic faculty.  To the question as to 
why the mimetic faculty or performativity of these later texts would be 
important, I might argue that a mimetic performativity is precisely one of the 
defining features or further, achievements of Princeton Theory after the Turn; 
that while Princeton Theory in its high-modernist phase sought to understand 
music through theorization, in its postmodern phase, Princeton Theory sought to 
perform, in another medium, music.  According to Randall, in an unpublished 
interview: 
 
My writing looks peculiar, you know, like why did I do all this?  And I 
remember that in working to describe music well, and as I think I’ve said 
plenty I was a real fanatic for analyzing music but that at the same time 
feeling that, “gee wait a minute, I haven’t yet found a way that’s really 
getting at what this is going on,” so that caused me not only to write a 
little funny but to write sometimes with the conscious idea that, wait a 
minute, how about writing like music, instead of writing about music.  
Well there’s obvious mileage in that notion that others than me have also 
pursued with great results and I’ve pursued that from time to time. (2011, 
disc 3, c. 44:39) 
 
A precedent is Cage’s “Lecture on Nothing” ([1959] 1971, 109–27), which 
presents itself as a musical score using words as its entities, but there seems a 
certain unacknowledged tension between Princeton Theory and Cage.31  Indeed, 
                                                
31 For Randall’s thoughts on Cage, see Randall (2010–2011). 
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Boretz calls his text, “Language ,as a Music,” where language imitates/is a music 
(Boretz [1978] 2003), but Boretz ([1992] 2003) is Boretz’s only discussion of Cage 
of which I am aware. 
 
 
4.  Temporalized Being and the Critique of the Metaphysics of Presence 
 
 In the language of the early Martin Heidegger (the Heidegger of Sein und 
Zeit, 1927), we could read Princeton Theory’s Turn as from the investigation of 
entities to the investigation of being.32  In the initial English translation, the 
translators draw a distinction in which, “ontological [ontologisch] inquiry is 
concerned primarily with being [Sein]; ontical [ontisch] inquiry is concerned 
primarily with entities and the facts about them” (Heidegger [1927a] 1962, 31 n 3, 
emphasis original; see also, pp. 28–35).  Heidegger discusses the ways in which 
ontical inquiry regarding entities constitutes the specific sciences, whereas 
ontological inquiry—philosophy—inquires into, “the question of the meaning of 
being [Sein]…” (Heidegger [1927b] 2010, xxix, emphasis original).  Entities 
(Seiendes) have being, but are not identified with being.  Being, we might say, is 
the general state or structure of existence, in which entities share: it is that which 
makes entities be.  Ontology is the study of being; ontic, referring to individual 
existing entities.  “Ontological” studies concern being.  “Ontical” concerns the 
specific entities of the sciences: in music theory, the “fundamentals” or “stuff” of 
music: chords, melodies, rhythms.  In the words of Babbitt, in Meta-Variations 
                                                
32 I am aware of the difficulty of discussing Heidegger in the space of Princeton 
Theory.  See, for broader discussion, Rockmore (1991) and Wolin (1992). 
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Boretz, “penetrates and transcends thematic, motivic, and comparable facets of 
individuality to discover and uncover uniquenesses of process, internally 
analogous modes of progression, and means of cumulative containment which 
themselves yield the characteristic thematic, rhythmic, timbral, and other aspects 
of the surface, and which depend only minimally on communal attributes” 
([1979] 2003, 375).  Although Babbitt here attributes to Boretz the ability to dig 
deeper than the “stuff” of music—the ontic level—this is not the same as 
discussing being, the ontological, within a horizon of temporality: “The 
provisional aim is the interpretation of time as the possible horizon for any 
understanding whatsoever of being” (Heidegger [1927b] 2010, xxix).  For that, in 
other words, Boretz had to Turn. 
Princeton Theory, before the Turn, concerns the specific science of music 
theory and its justification as an object of scientific and scholarly inquiry.  After 
the Turn, Boretz especially inquires into being.  Indeed, there is a pronounced 
thematization of ontology in the Boretzian text after the Turn: Boretz and 
Randall’s collected texts are entitled Being About Music, for example.  As Boretz 
says later, “In music, as in everything, the disappearing moment of experience is 
the firmest reality” ([1985] 2003, 241).  In a Heideggerian context, “reality” reads 
as a stand-in for being, which is always already on the move, in flux.  “The 
meaning of being [Sein] of that being [Seienden] we call Dasein will prove to be 
temporality [Zeitlichkeit]” (Heidegger [1927b] 2010, §5, emphasis original).  If 
Dasein is defined as that being for whom being is continuously at issue, the 
problematic (Ibid., ¶79; Schalow and Denker, s.v. being-there), then Boretz’s 
constant concern for his, music, and others’ ontological status shows just how 
intensely he has felt this problematic of being, of Dasein.  Martin Scherzinger too 
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temporalizes the problematic: “As it is with Heidegger, we find in Boretz the 
language of privileged disappearance… and the systematic inflection of being 
with time” (2005–2006, 83).  In the words of Charles Stein, Boretz’s “ever-
widening resolution to keep the concept of ‘what music is’ an open question, is 
an action that has a sub-agenda (that is also perhaps a super-agenda), it seems to 
me, to keep the question of being open as well” (2005–2006, 126, emphasis 
original).  It is easy to read these statements into the overarching course of 
Boretz’s career, as Boretz moves from Meta-Variations, which we might say 
conceives of the being of music as a language, to “Language ,as a Music” ([1979] 
2003), which conceives language as a music, to “Music, as a Music,” ([1999] 2003), 
which conceives music as its own internal space, remote from language but 
susceptible to its influence.  The being of music in relation to language, then, 
shifts dramatically over time, remains open, but Boretz still chases after it.33  
Hence the unconcealment of being—a later definition of Dasein—occurs 
throughout Boretz’s texts (Schalow and Denker, s.v. being-there). 
Let us recall Boretz’s (re)construction of temporality from Meta-Variations 
discussed earlier in this chapter.  The resemblance to the Aristotelian definition 
of time in the Physics is striking, and, given the general resemblance in Meta-
Variations of defining music theory as a science to Aristotle’s definitions of 
science in the Posterior Analytics, important.34  More to the point, we find 
                                                
33 Read from the perspective of Adorno’s implicit critique of Heidegger, 
however, Boretz, although discussing the social in a number of pieces from the 
1980’s especially, seems to lose the social in considering music as solely a music: 
“Music is ideology insofar as it asserts itself as an ontological being-in-itself, 
beyond society’s tensions” (Adorno [1949] 2006, 100).  See also Scherzinger 2002. 
 
34 Derkert (2007, 235–47) argues an Aristotelian reading of especially Babbitt’s 
1946 dissertation, from the notions of teleology and unity. 
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Heidegger’s positioning of Aristotle’s conception of time at the center of the 
Western tradition of being recapitulated in Boretz’s account.  Aristotle: “For time 
is just this: The number of a motion with respect to the prior and posterior” 
(1969, 219b).  In Stambaugh’s translation of Heidegger’s translation: “This, 
namely, is time: that which is counted in the motion encountered in the horizon 
of the earlier and the later” ([1927b] 2010, §81).  This compares quite closely with 
Boretz’s definition of time-span interval given earlier in this chapter.  There is a 
striking correspondence, when read through the Heideggerian text, of Boretz’s 
project of reconstructing the world on the basis of time, with the Aristotelian 
definition of time at the seat of the Western logocentric tradition of presence.  As 
Heidegger says, “All subsequent discussion of the concept of time fundamentally 
holds itself to the Aristotelian definition….” (Ibid., emphasis original) From this 
standpoint, Boretz eventually Turns, rethinking time in a number of texts 
throughout the 1970’s (see, Boretz [1971a] 2003, [1973–1974] 2003, and [1977] 
2003). 
Heidegger famously called for, but did not himself fully carry out, a 
destruction of the Western tradition of being, from the perspective of its 
temporality, its historicity, because being, despite what we have been led to 
believe by the Western philosophical tradition, is always already on the move, 
never simply static being.  This deconstruction was, of course, Jacques Derrida’s 
self-appointed task in three writings from 1967.  As Heidegger ([1927b] 2010, §6) 
put it, “the task of a destruction of the history of ontology” involves, for Derrida, 
what we might call the assertion of the self-alienation of being at its origin, its 
beginning always already alienated from itself, never a simple origin.  “The 
formal essence of the signified is presence, and the privilege of its proximity to the 
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logos of phonè is the privilege of presence.  This is the inevitable response as soon 
as one asks: ‘what is the sign?,’ that is to say, when one submits the sign to the 
question of essence, to the ‘ti esti’” (Derrida [1967] 1976, 18).  And further, “As 
distinct from difference, differance thus points out the irreducibility of 
temporalizing” at the center/absence of presence, of this essence (Derrida [1967] 
1973, 130).  Martin Scherzinger (2004, 265–68) has read Boretz ([1971a] 2003) as 
evincing this conception of a rhythmicized differance of pitch in the moment of 
its being, in music generally, but occasioned by the music (or death) of 
Stravinsky.  We can read Randall’s ([1964] 2003) “review” of the Taneiev book, as 
discussed earlier, as presenting text without presence: all quotations, none of 
Randall’s own words.  The systematic effacement of the self, Randall’s self blurs 
into “new consciousness.”  The impression, especially of the last section of 
Compose Yourself, is of being and presence already split, cutting against itself, 
destroyed in multivalence. (We shall pursue a Heideggerian reading of Boretz’s 
ethics in Chapter Five.) 
 
 
5.  Tracing Continuities 
 
If a defining feature of the Turn was the questioning of everything that 
had preceded it, we, for our part, should question our own assumptions.  
Specifically, and radically, we should ask if the Turn itself ever actually occurred.  
We have reason to be doubtful, for in Boretz’s words, “I suppose I count as an 
apostate, despite my fervent protests to the contrary: there is no aspect of my 
work which isn’t colored deeply by Milton [Babbitt]’s looming spectre” (Boretz 
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2012a, 377).  Interestingly, Cook (2002, 91–9) historicizes a performative turn in 
music theory epistemology, beginning with Schoenberg and Schenker, extending 
to Babbitt and, implicitly, Boretz et al.  In this reading, Randall et al. would not 
present a Turn from but a continuation of Babbitt.  Further, Lewin (1986, 102) 
states that, “in a superficial view… Babbitt is ‘scientific’ and ‘objective,’ while the 
next generation is ‘poetic’ and ‘subjective.’  The superficial view is not exactly 
wrong, but it is very far from adequate to engage the critical issues at hand, 
issues which it hopelessly trivializes.  The writings of Babbitt are as much poems, 
in the broad interpretation of the post-Bloomian view, as are the writings of 
Randall.”  In Maus’ ([1988] 1994, 108) reading, “the change has been gradual, an 
evolution rather than a sharp break.”  Reading these statements makes the 
continuities seem more pronounced than the differences.  Robert Morris (2012, 
20), for example, complicates matters in this way: “The work of Benjamin Boretz, 
Jane Coppock, Joseph Dubiel, Fred Maus, and J. K. Randall takes Babbitt’s 
rhetorical forays in many directions, into texts that are aptly regarded as poetry, 
sound/text compositions, and/or musical graphics.”  But, Morris (Ibid.) also 
says that, “Babbitt’s influence is so far-reaching that writings by Benjamin Boretz, 
John Rahn, and J. K. Randall, for example, have taken the issue of musical 
discourse in directions far beyond those that Babbitt intended or envisaged,” 
implying both continuity and change. 
Indeed, as many have remarked, Babbitt’s writings and spoken discourse 
are performative: to understand his seemingly impenetrable written discourse, it 
helps to have heard him speak in person, which clearly demarcates clauses, 
asides, and the final thrust of a given utterance.  With Babbitt, then, there is a 
kind of extraordinary discursive performativity, perhaps matching his musical 
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performativity.  Given this, in comparison, the extravagancies of a Randall or 
Barkin text seem less extravagant.  Indeed, the Turn then seems a point of 
continuity, or an intensification of Babbitt’s practice, not a break nor rupture.  
Princeton Theory seems equally eccentric both before and after the Turn: at no 
point are its writings transparent.  Meta-Variations and Compose Yourself seem not 
too far apart: as Randall ([1991] 2003, 337) says, “Boretz’s Meta-Variations and my 
Compose Yourself [are] two works of screechingly disparate appearance and 
orientation which powerfully illuminate each other.”  Boretz tells us that Randall 
introduced Compose Yourself to him by calling it a, “fictionalized version of Meta-
Variations.” (personal communication) 
I would like to pursue further the continuities by addressing Randall’s 
youthful music education.  As a young person Randall studied piano with 
Leonard Shure (1910–1995), who was an assistant to Artur Schnabel.  Indeed, it is 
surprising to hear Randall talk in unambiguously Kunstreligion terms about 
music, for the sake of continuity across his discursive extravagancies, across the 
Turn.  As a young person, Shure, “brought this traditional high-cultural German 
attitude towards this music: perfectly comparable to some religious exercise.  I 
mean, this was the sacred stuff…. This never left me; that’s where it’s at and 
that’s where I want to be at….  If you’re not that way about music it’s a little 
obscure to me what you’re doing unless you’re just sort of materializing the way 
I started,” as a child, which was a “purely competitive relation” to others in 
which he “held them in contempt” (Randall 2011, disc 1, c. 38:00).  Taken 
together with Randall’s earlier comments about Teutonic culture, we see a 
pronounced tension in relation to Randall’s musical inheritance, but not 
necessarily an overthrowing. 
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Whether there occurred an actual Turn or continuation by other means 
(gradual change is still change; a turn is not a full stop; to continue after Babbitt 
is to do just that, to continue), I will leave to another time.  To continue tracing 
the continuities would require another chapter.  But surely something did 
happen.  Figuring that something, understanding it, has been the problem for 
forty years, and this writing has been an attempt to situate, to work through the 
reception of that something, to move us toward a more engaged understanding 
of the critical issues at hand.  This said, it would be ideological to force closure on 
this problematic or to talk about, while not also practicing, the Turn.  I believe in 
writing experimental discourse about experimental discourse.  We close this 
chapter, then, with an experimental reading of sections of Randall’s Compose 















Compose Yourself—i.e., “get it together”; don’t talk about composition,  
Go home.  Write.  Compose . (Williams [1948] 1992, 84) 
 
Am I young, anymore? 
 
I don’t care much for baseball, “get the water hot!” 
 










































*printed poem literally fills out in time and space while reading it. 




1—voice exchange lines 5–7: you/ours; I/mine 
2—voice exchange lines 7–8: mirroring/mirrors; thought/thought 
3—symmetries: 7: internal symmetry 
4—octave/12 divisions with axis point 
 
¯ ˘ / ¯ ˘ ¯ / ˘ ¯ ˘, ¯  a 
 
1            “wrapped in sound” 
 
or: ˘ ¯ / ˘ ¯ ˘/ ¯ ˘ ¯ 
 
or: ˘ ¯ / ˘, ¯ ˘ / ¯ ˘ / ¯ 
 
1—static; beginning without creation? axiom: here, now/space, time 




1—“now, here” accented, down, pauses; “arose”, rises 
 
up 







  filling-out of time from initial point (axiom): now/time 
 
6—“tongue”: body/only physical in a poem of ephemeral 
 
12—answering: present tense (?) 
 
13—*possible world, not this world; if this world, it is dying. 
 
—“death” but no “birth”; subject “arises” not born; the subject is a question: 
aporia.            “Das Gegebene ist subjektlos.” 
 
*“death” vs. “starting” qualified with arise/life–subject 
—anthropomorphized vs. non-natural 














5 you/arise: beginning microcosm 
6 talk/arises/close/wrapped/talk 




11 framing echo/arise/now & here 
12 things distant/arise/framed/answering 
















9: center of poem: 
up & down/ 
left & right/ 
time & space/ 































































expansion of first gesture 
 
time 
  juxtaposition of traditional dichotomy 
space 
 
































  juxtaposition of traditional dichotomy 
time 
 




not here/possible world 
starting from a possible world 
 81 
 
—from here, all possible: 
 if “most nicely” 
  —mirrors 
  —echoes 
     “most fully” 









Me, My, Mine, I: 
 
 —self-assertion: there’s a prelude, & towards  
 
the end of it 
 
  the curtain went up & then the 
 
   moon came out 
 





















    —sounds a standard Babbitt 
    ending in the face of 


































1: Focal for both 
    –([before for a  
      (& ~b) ∨ before 
2:   for b (& ~a)] 
      ∧ after for a 
      (& ~b) ∨ after 
      for b (& ~a) 
1 (with cycles of One lock Midcycle to cycles of the 
   Other, Focal for one was Focal for the other.) 
2  (—: each focaltime referential for Before in one & 
    for After in the other — ) 
3 (, —each mergingtime Referring To after in one & 
 To before in the other) 





Theories is formed from experience / never mysterious forces. 
—Dead Prez, “Psychology” 
 
There can be no doubt that all our cognition [Erkenntniß] begins [anfange] with 
experience [Erfahrung]….  But even though all our cognition starts [anhebt] with 
experience, that does not mean that all of it arises [entspringt] from experience. 
 
—Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Second Edition 
 
Experience as a ground of cognition was from the beginning a contested site, in 
which issues of passivity and activity, subjective construction and objective 
imposition, and the competing role of the individual and collective knower, were 
never laid to rest. 
 
—Martin Jay, Songs of Experience 
 
For a form of behavior [Verhalten] to be practical I must reflect on [überlegen] 
something or other.  If I have the concept of reflection, the concept of practice 
implicitly postulates that of theory.  The two elements are truly separated from 
each other and inseparable at the same time. 
 
—Theodor W. Adorno, Towards a New Manifesto 
 
If the Turn sought to introduce experience and experiential categories into 
the musical discourses of the Princeton Theorists via phenomenological 
descriptions, then the problematic of experience in Princeton Theory generally is 
that it appears in a tense relation with conceptual thought.  In its broadest 
outlines this chapter argues a dialectic in Princeton Theory between empiricism 
and idealism: between strong appeals to experience as foundation, goal, 
justification or evidence for theorizing, and motions away—abstractions—from 
musical experience, using primarily logical axiomatization, twelve-tone theory, 
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rational reconstructions of cognition and escape from that which may simply be 
heard.  On the more strictly music-theoretical level, we find both strong appeals 
to experience and a tendency in the opposite direction.  Within the logical 
positivism to which many of our authors appeal, experience is treated with 
reverential awe, a sense of obviousness, and yet forgetfulness.  Unpacking and 
situating historically the various appeals, the tensions within music theory’s 
relation to musical experience, is the main goal of this chapter.  Let me be clear: 
my goal is to demonstrate that Princeton Theory was both experiential and 
conceptual.  This is important primarily because, as I shall show throughout this 
chapter, this conception of music theory denaturalizes normal music theory—its 
assumptions, routines, convictions about how it should best function.  Further, 
given that we are discussing new music composers writing music-theoretical 
discourse, and that new music composition has been accused of some form of 
“intellectualism” since its inception, this chapter problematizes our assumptions 
regarding music theory and experience.1 
Although central to our concerns, it will become clear nearly from the 
beginning that experience and its close correlates or stand-ins—intuition, 
observation, practice—do not appear as a consistent concern for the 
composers/theorists themselves.  Through discussion of the writings of Babbitt, 
Boretz, Winham and Lewin, among others, we will find Princeton Theory not 
situated in a middle ground between experience and abstraction—the situation 
perhaps describing more directly the practice of Yale Theory (see Girard 2007, 
262–338)—rather, we will find an intense motion away from experience, a motion 
                                                
1 See, for problematizations in the German modernist tradition, Schoenberg 
([1946] 1975), and Adorno ([1949] 2006, 13–16) and ([1955] 2002). 
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that, I argue, through its very distance enables a renewed engagement with 
experience itself.  Abstraction vivifies experience. 
To capture something of Princeton Theory’s engagement with experience 
is to put our typical notions of musical experience under pressure.  As studies in 
music cognition gain further traction—funding—musical experience becomes 
reified as that which is most generally available and quantizable: the moving of a 
computer mouse at the same time as hearing contour purports to tell us 
something about the musical experiences of the listener—all listeners—as does, 
for example, the clicking of a mouse at the same time as a beat.  To determine the 
listening inabilities of a few in relation to, say, form, is purported to tell us the 
limits of the abilities of all.  Music theory as cognition, as science, tends toward 
generalization across listeners and pieces.  Princeton Theory, however, treats 
experience as individual and yet attempts to keep it available for theory.2  
Cognition, furthermore, presumes it knows what the “stuff” of music is, and who 
should be the experimenters, although Randall, for example, critiqued this 
position vehemently in the late 1960’s, arguing the experimenters must be 
composers (Randall [1967] 2003, 144–50).  Although Princeton Theory—
especially Babbitt and Boretz—made claims for the cognitivity of musical 
experience, this was never the gross experience that has become reified in music 
cognition experiments.3 
                                                
2 Morris (2007, 99) however, asserts that recent uses of mathematics in music 
theory has falsified this traditional verity: “The way we explore a given 
composition’s particularity is no longer different in kind from the way we 
associate and/or group different pieces, genres, and styles.” 
 
3 As Adorno says, which is multiply ironic given our concerns, “The regimented 
experience prescribed by positivism nullifies experience itself and, in its 
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Indeed, during Chapter Two we read the Turn as from science to 
experimentalism, and because some notion of experiment is at the heart of 
science, we could have conceived of the Turn as a radicalization of the scientific 
standpoint of the earlier Princeton Theorists.  Just what is experimental about 
experimentalism?  If we bracket the social aspects of experimentalism—which 
was our concern in large measure during the last chapter—then experimentalism 
seems simply to denote an openness of musical form, a spirit of exploration, and 
an indeterminacy as to results; in short, an attitude.  This conception could be 
applied equally well to Princeton Theory during its high-modernist moment, 
however.  As Henry Kyburg (1968, 89), in a reading recommended by Babbitt, 
has said, “A science claimed to be in its final form would not be science, but 
dogma; the crucial characteristic of science is its sensitivity to experience and 
experiment, its susceptibility to modification.”4 
As stated, during this chapter I shall be concerned primarily with the 
notion of experience, but as with every problematic we discuss—indeed in some 
ways more so—the historical sedimentation of the notion of experience is thick, 
difficult to excavate.  One place to begin digging is where Martin Jay has 
prepared the ground, in his masterful study, Songs of Experience, wherein he 
moves quickly to determine what experience is not.  Experience is not 
                                                                                                                                            
intention, eliminates the experiencing subject.  The correlate of indifference 
towards the object is abolition of the subject, without whose spontaneous 
receptivity, however, nothing objective emerges.  As a social phenomenon, 
positivism is geared to the human type that is devoid of experience and 
continuity, and it encourages the latter—like Babbitt—to see himself as the crown 
of creation” (Adorno [1967] 1976, 57–58; quoted in Jay 2005, 347). 
 
4 Mauceri (1997) unpacks some of the further ideologies and limits of the 
relations between music as experiment in a scientific sense and experimental 
music, especially as regards technological mediation. 
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abstraction, reason, dogma, method, theory, speculation, universals, analytic (as 
opposed to synthetic), ideas, the collective, science, mind, cognition, thought, 
general or logic.  Experience is, instead, raw, unmediated/immediate, it involves 
trial, proof, experiment (expérience is French for experiment; see Goehr 2008, 110) 
and is practical.  Experience comes in either active or passive forms, where 
experiment and practice represent the active side, whereas pathos or notions of 
suffering through an experience, to endure, represent the passive side (Jay 2005, 
10–11).  Jay further distinguishes two types of experience in the German 
intellectual tradition: Erlebnis and Erfahrung.  Erlebnis contains a life (Leben), 
implies a lived experience, a primitive unity before differentiation, the everyday 
world, the commonplace, immediate, pre-reflective, personal or individual and 
ineffable; Erfahrung, on the other hand, signifies a journey (Fahrt), danger 
(Gefahr), the external, sense impressions and judgments about them, a learning 
process, the integration of discrete moments of experience into a whole, a 
progressive movement over time, memory, wisdom and the public or collective 
(Ibid., 11).  To temporalize, we make “appeals” to experience in the past, whereas 
we “hunger” for experience in the future.  Lastly, to “have” an experience (as a 
noun) contrasts with, “to experience” (as a verb), which is something one is now 
doing or feeling (Ibid., 12). 
John Dewey ([1934] 1980, 36–59) considers the “having” of experiences, 
which will help us unpack this notion further. (I discuss Dewey because, as we 
recall from the last chapter, Babbitt has too.  We shall return to it later in this 
chapter.) Dewey says that, “we have an experience when the material 
experienced runs its course to fulfillment.  Then and then only is it integrated 
within and demarcated in the general stream of experience from other 
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experiences” (Ibid., 36–7, emphasis original).  The sense of an experience, “is so 
rounded out that its close is a consummation and not a cessation.  Such an 
experience is a whole and carries with it its own individualizing quality and self-
sufficiency.  It is an experience” (Ibid., 37, emphasis original).  This is a very 
aesthetic, we might say musical, description of experience, as Dewey further 
speaks of the rhythmic and aesthetic qualities of an experience in general (Ibid., 
and 39).  Thus, insofar as Princeton Theory makes appeals to experience under 
the sign of science, as a kind of empiricism, we can refine Princeton Theory’s 
empiricism as being a pragmatic empiricism, we might say a composerly 
empiricism. 
Having discussed the pragmatist Dewey, famous for his attention to 
experience, we should also discuss work by William James on the notion of a 
stream of experience or thought, for we shall find it contrasts with Dewey’s 
thoughts and is operative in an important precedent to Princeton Theory, Nelson 
Goodman’s The Structure of Appearance ([1951] 189–90).  As quoted, Dewey 
suggests a way in which to demarcate an experience from “the general stream of 
experience,” this latter being a locution owing to James ([1890] 1981, 219–78). 
James attempts to overcome the eighteenth-century empiricist emphasis on ideas 
or sensations as foundation for experience, and replace them with the full range 
of experiences we access upon introspection, as a “stream.”  James discusses the 
five characteristics of thought: it is part of personal consciousness; is always 
changing; is continuous; deals with objects other than itself; and is interested in 
some objects rather than others (Ibid.).  The continuity of the experience of 
thought within each personal consciousness means it contains no breaches, 
cracks, or divisions; that the experience feels as if it belongs to the same self; and 
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that moments are connected in time (Ibid., 231).  “Consciousness, then, does not 
appear to itself chopped up in bits.  Such words as ‘chain’ or ‘train’ do not 
describe it fitly as it presents itself in the first instance.  It is nothing jointed; it 
flows.  A ‘river’ or a ‘stream’ are the metaphors by which it is most naturally 
described” (Ibid., 233). 
What, then, do we normally mean by musical experience, alone or in 
conjunction with conceptualization?  Joseph N. Straus has come closest to 
articulating our normal expectations as to the phenomenal presence of musical 
experience, in the context of listening to some of Babbitt’s music, when he says, 
“It is probably no harder to conceive the transpositional equivalence of two 
dyads than that of two hexachords, but certainly, under most musical 
circumstances, it would be easier to hear the equivalence of the dyads in the 
direct, physical way that most people mean when they talk about hearing 
something” (1986, 10).  We shall return throughout this chapter to the admixture 
of concepts and perceptions in musical experiences, but we should keep in mind 
Straus’ notion of the physical immediacy in musical hearing—a certain 
roundedness to the feeling of the sound as it fills out both our hearing and 
conception of that hearing, perhaps based in performance situations—as it 
appears to be such a fundamental notion for our musical experiences as listeners, 
analysts, musical thinkers. 
As we can quickly see, such an array of meanings and associations for 
experience we cannot possibly cover in one chapter, let alone the myriad 
complexes these notions embody when instantiated in music-theoretical 
discourse generally.  But we can motion toward such coverage by returning to 
and extending Jay’s mapping: if on one side of discourse we find metatheory 
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representing the most abstract from musical experience, then moving to theory, 
methodology, to analysis, and finally to description, we approach the musically 
experienced.  In terms of historical analyses, we find on one side of the 
continuum notions such as style and genre moving to the individual piece and 
Babbitt’s contextuality.5  If the tonal (or content-determinate) system is the most 
general then the twelve-tone (or order-determinate) system is the most piece-
specific.6  These poles help us identify types of discursive tracings evident in 
what follows, which I shall for the most part leave resonant in the spaces beyond 
the surface of my discourse. 
In the discussion which follows I shall first use Princeton Theory’s 
discussions of musical experience as a window into the question, what is music 
theory for Princeton Theory?  Is it primarily concerned with explaining musical 
phenomena, describing musical phenomena, or, more radically, is music theory 
not in fact metatheory?  The next section of this chapter uses the optic of musical 
experience to discuss moments in the philosophy of science that influenced 
Princeton Theory’s challenge to our usual understanding of the stuff—the 
fundamentals, rudiments, or materials—of music theory.  I next discuss Babbitt 
on theory, practice, and experience, demonstrating his placing of importance on 
the intellectual or conceptual aspects of music, over and above the experiential.  
Lastly, I close this chapter by discussing David Lewin’s various uses of the 
experience/concept dialectic to denaturalize music theory. 
                                                
5 To which we shall return in Chapter Five; see, for example, Babbitt (1987, 67–8 
and 167–68) and (2003, 50, 83, 205, 214, 440–41 and 475). 
 
6 See, Babbitt ([1961b] 2003, 86) and Boretz ([1969] 1995, 177–95 and 220–24). 
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An important point regarding experience and conceptual thought which I 
would like to keep in mind in what follows is that, following the rationalism of 
many positions Babbitt articulates (as we shall discuss) and Boretz’s Meta-
Variations, if musical experience is thought, takes place during mental episodes, 
then the dialectic between what music theory takes as its data—experiences—
and mental phenomena cannot occur solely as a polarity of opposites.  While 
sometimes in what follows the motion toward thought will turn its back on 
experience, as precisely such a polarity of opposites, that motion is not the sole 
pattern occurring between experience and thought.  Furthermore, while in much 
of what follows we shall find experience as evidence for theory (such as in the 
verifiability criterion for logical positivism), at other times we shall find that 
theory influences experience.  Such is the nature of Princeton Theory as both an 
empirical and idealist pursuit.  Such is the problematic nature of musical 
experience for music theory. 
 
 
1.  What Is Music Theory: Explanation, Description, or Metatheory? 
 
By the turn of the millennium, the experiential could provide the terrain 
for a plenary argument between Allen Forte and Joseph Dubiel, representing 
their respective discourses; that is, the differences between Yale and Princeton 
Theory.  The precipitating event was Dubiel’s radical reversal of the hierarchy 
between analysis and description, now giving pride of place to description by 
denying the explanatory pretenses of analysis, showing the infinite regress of 
analysis qua explanation (Dubiel 2000a, ¶14).  Read with a concern for experience 
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in mind, Dubiel’s main point would appear in these statements: “The best thing 
we could do for ourselves in the world is get ourselves recognized as a fountain 
of sharp, attractive, useful concepts for grasping our experiences of music….  We 
ought to make our characteristic concern with ‘musical structure,’ or whatever 
we call it, recognizable as a source of stimulus for the invention and articulation 
of such experience-oriented concepts” (Ibid., ¶17).  And later: “Our main 
business as theorists of music will be elaborating, exchanging, and trying out 
vividly imagined, diversely formulated accounts of what and how we hear” 
(Dubiel 2000b, ¶11).  Although seemingly free of ideology, and pragmatically-
orientated because concerned with our disciplinary identity as a whole, these are 
normative claims: what music theorists should do.  And what we should do is 
concern ourselves with hearing, experience.  This is the crux of Forte’s 
perturbation, for Forte says, “I leave aside the questions of how ‘what we hear’ is 
determined, as well as how to account for individual variations in that regard, in 
order to make an observation based upon simple fact: many of the venerable 
figures in the history of music theory—Boethius, for example—would be 
disqualified as music theorists were Dubiel’s axiomatic criterion of audition to be 
applied indiscriminately” (Forte 2000b, ¶3.11).  It remains unclear, however, why 
the indiscriminate application of the request for the audibility of analysis was 
ever at issue.  Dubiel never presented this himself as an axiom, which Forte 
acknowledges, and where Forte reads requirement, demand, a slippery slope, we 
can read freedom of choice.  Stepping further back, the uproar seems less to do 
with Forte and Dubiel’s arguments, and more to do with their respective 
disciplinary and generational positions: Dubiel, concerned with how we 
represent ourselves as theorists to the broader academic community, Forte, with 
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the internal claims we make to one another, for our work; Dubiel, the 
phenomenologist, Forte, the system-builder; Forte, the founding father of Yale 
Theory, Dubiel, the chosen son of Princeton Theory. 
Read through this optic it seems all-too-obvious that Yale Theory is 
formalist, an idealist discourse, while Princeton Theory is empirical, aurally-
grounded.  We cannot help, it seems, but see them as different, divergent.  To a 
great extent I think this is a correct reading, for Forte and Dubiel’s positions carry 
a discursive history, historical precedents, but if we adopt a more circumscribed 
vision, focus solely on Princeton Theory or solely on Yale Theory, and examine 
their actual practices, we will discover that Princeton Theory was as ideal as 
experiential, as abstract as aurally concrete.  Complementarily, Yale Theory 
would appear as aurally real as it was theoretically abstract.  Princeton Theory 
might have represented itself externally as being solely concerned with the aural, 
it might have been taken to an extreme formulation by Dubiel (under the 
influence of Randall, I suspect), but throughout its history we will find the 
experiential to be a tense site of negotiation for Princeton Theory, a place where 
abstraction and idealism coexist in equal measure with empiricism, the heard.  
The specific manner of this coexistence, I argue, is dialectical. 
While after Princeton Theory’s Turn, Yale and normal theory would seem 
to hold fast to the scientific conception of theory, within Princeton Theory, 
certainly Dubiel thematizes a Wittgensteinian turn toward description: “It was 
correct that our considerations must not be scientific ones.  The feeling ‘that it is 
possible, contrary to our preconceived ideas, to think this or that’—whatever that 
may mean—could be of no interest to us.  (The pneumatic conception of 
thinking.)  And we may not advance any kind of theory.  There must not be 
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anything hypothetical in our considerations.  All explanation must disappear, and 
description alone must take its place” (Wittgenstein [1953] 2009, §109,%emphasis%
original).% Although introducing a notion of theory as hypothetical in relation to 
already existing pieces, Wittgenstein’s turn toward description can be made to 
accord with the phenomenological project as we find in Princeton Theory after 
the Turn.  The aim of phenomenology, after all, is to describe—to write down, 
away from the self, externalizing marks on a page.  “It is a matter of describing, 
not of explaining or analyzing.  Husserl’s first directive to phenomenology, in its 
early stages, to be a ‘descriptive psychology,’ or to return to the ‘things 
themselves,’ is from the start a foreswearing of science.  I am not the outcome or 
the meeting-point of numerous causal agencies which determine my bodily or 
psychological make-up” (Merleau-Ponty [1945] 1962, ix).  According to Husserl, 
“The so-called descriptive sciences are not substrata of the corresponding 
‘explanatory’ sciences” (Husserl [1913] 1989, 402).  The problematic from the 
perspective of Princeton Theory and music theory generally is, having taken the 
Turn, how does it conceive itself, or, how does it negotiate the two poles? 
In a kind of marker of the Turn, Boretz critiqued the purported audibility 
of theoretical discourse in relation to the lived qualities of musical experience, 
using two texts by John Rahn from the late 1970’s as his examples, which we can 
read as a kind of answer to this question: “Alongside this formalist fervor, there 
is in… [Rahn’s texts] a nascent, evolving awareness of the predestined shortfall 
of any formalized pitch-time theory in reaching its own music-explanatory 
aspirations, because of its essential indeterminacy with respect to the experiential 
ontology of perceived music—at minimum in the Wittgensteinian sense in which 
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the logicized rational reconstruction of cognition actually occupies a cognitive 
territory incoherent with respect to what it wishes to explicate” (Boretz [2001] 
2003, 445).  The Turn, then, was from notions of syntax, the general, networks of 
relations, formalism or structuralism, to meaning, the individual case, the 
specific, the cultural, or post-structural.  Concepts to experiences.  Explanation to 
description. 
Thus Dubiel (2000a) and the Turn attempt to reverse the received 
importance of analysis over description, but if experience was such a central 
concern for Princeton Theory, we should expect to find description treated with 
more respect.  If description is somehow closer to experience and if the 
discursive goal for these composers/theorists was to create discourses matching, 
arising directly out of, or being otherwise inundated with experience, we would 
expect description of musical texts to be the primary activity—the clarifying, 
intensifying, or sharing of experiences.  If experience was primary, so too would 
be description.  Importantly, however, “mere description” was denigrated as 
mere starting point,7 support, or even orthogonal to explanation—this latter 
discursive activity involving teleology, unity, and abstraction, usually on a 
scientific model, and hence valued.  Valued because properly theorized and 
theorizable, explanation, not description, was the venerated discursive mode.  
Description held too closely to journalistic criticism, the incorrigible purple prose 
Babbitt deemed inappropriate for the academy and, following logical positivism, 
                                                
7 Babbitt ([1950] 2003, 10): “[Leibowitz’s] analysis is merely description….” 
Babbitt ([1965] 2003, 191): “Whether one prefers to declare that a theory must be, 
should be, or is a mere symbolic description….” Similarly, in the words of 
Hempel ([1958] 1965, 173), “Scientific research in its various branches seeks not 
merely to record particular occurrences in the world of experience.” 
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non-cognitive, not knowable or a product of knowledge.  Because of this 
description was held to be further from experience.  Explanation was valued as 
cognitive, knowledge producing.  Explanation was valued too as a kind of armor 
or perhaps even Bildung for the modernist composer facing the disorientations 
and losses of modernity.8 
I think that the composers/theorists themselves, although working under 
the image or sign of an empirical science, understood implicitly that science in 
the space of music encouraged a motion toward the ideal.  In terms of Meta-
Variations, “Theoretical explanation asks basic music-epistemological questions 
(having to do with the notions underlying the use of such terms like ‘music,’ etc.) 
whose answers lie in particular orderings of empirical data, both ‘perceptual 
data’ and ‘conceptual data’ (the concepts governing the slicing of perceptual data 
into ‘musical structures’) in more or less formally articulated language” (Boretz 
1969, 18, emphasis original).  This is a fascinating statement, at least because it 
defines music theory as what we would normally take to be metatheory, 
collapsing the two.  That is to say, “basic music-epistemological questions” are 
rarely considered music-theoretical questions; rather, they are normally 
considered metatheoretical questions, a distinction Princeton Theory helped to 
invent.9  Here, then, is a definition of music theory as being both more conceptual 
                                                
8 Following conventional usage, “modernity” means the base problematic, 
whereas “modernism” means the superstructural problematic. 
 
9 To my knowledge the first use of “metatheory” in music-theoretical discourse 
was as a label for the first section of Perspectives on Contemporary Music Theory 
(1972), in which, interestingly, “Metatheory and Methodology” was contrasted 
with “Compositional Theory.”  In fact, Babbitt only uses the locution in the same 
year (see Babbitt [1972] 2003, 294), and Boretz only in Meta-Variations. 
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and more experiential than we would normally take it to be.  These 
(meta)theoretical questions, Boretz says, are to be answered not solely in the 
(meta)theoretical domain; rather, they are answered by appeal to empirical data, 
to musical materials or events, but also to conceptual data, which are not 
percepts.  This quotation concentrates the fundamental motion in Princeton 
Theory which I have been arguing: a strong motion to the ideal, answered by a 
complementary motion to the experiential. 
 But if we attend to the frankly Aristotelian quality of Meta-Variations—
comparing the Posterior Analytics, (71b) which discusses syllogistic 
demonstration as the path to knowledge in science, with Meta-Variations ([1969] 
1995, 49–60), which discusses the conditions for scientifically valid knowledge—
we can recall Thomas Christensen’s gloss on music theory and theoria in the 
Aristotelian tradition: “In its most fundamental sense, music theory is a science 
of final causes.  Strictly speaking, music theory is not concerned with ‘formal’ or 
‘efficient’ causes (how a piece of music is composed or performed).  Instead, 
theory is to concern itself with basic ontological questions: what is the essential 
nature of music?  What are the fundamental principles that govern its 
appearances?” (Christensen 2002, 3) This provides a striking correspondence 
with Boretz’s definition of theoretical explanation.  Indeed, if we read a little 
further along the history of music theory, into, “the Middle Ages, Guido of 
Arezzo could contrast a ‘musicus’ who understood the philosophical nature of 
music with the ignorant singer (‘cantor’) who could only sound the notes” (Ibid.). 
The cantor, who does without knowing, is comparable to a beast.  Having 
secured music theory’s role in the academy, Babbitt is reported to have said there 
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should not be an advanced degree in performance, because one does not give 
such degrees to typists. 
Alexander Rehding’s following remarks about Riemann’s distinction and 
yet interaction of speculative and practical music theory also appear operative in 
Princeton Theory:  
 
The complex power relations between the musical repertoire and the 
music theory can perhaps be best understood with the help of two terms 
that Riemann used to classify music theory: he habitually differentiated 
between “speculative” and “practical” aspects.  Speculative music theory 
was concerned with the metaphysics of musical phenomena, with the 
attempt to find the basis of what is harmonically admissible and what is 
not, whereas practical music theory sought to formulate rules and to 
present them as a theoretical system which would be used primarily for 
purposes of teaching…. On the most basic level, the interaction between 
speculative and practical music theory can be imagined thus: speculative 
music theory searches for the epistemological foundations of music, which 
practical music theory then perpetuates in teaching.10 
 
Princeton Theory, then, appears to share in this broader problematic, contorting 
its contours in its own specific ways, ways we are in the process of tracing. 
Speaking of Randall’s unpublished and withdrawn system of tonality, a 
system involving definitions, axioms, theorems and propositions, Blasius argues 
that, “Little in Randall’s sequence of propositions is phenomenological.  It is 
accurate and even interesting to define a triad as a maximal subcollection of non-
adjacent members within an ordered interval-7 chain in normal form, which has 
the property that in three transpositions it exhausts the pitch content of that 
                                                
10 Rehding (2003, 65); Albrecht Riethmüller has commented that the notion of 
“speculative music theory” is doubly redundant, for “music” in the medieval era 
already included notions of theory and speculation (Christensen 2002, 6 n 17).  
We might add that Riemann effects a double forgetting—a kind of remembering. 
 
 99 
chain-collection.  Yet, this definition maps a system rather than a perception” 
(1997, 27).  The requirement that definitions map perceptions may make up part 
of Randall’s rationale for eventually withdrawing the system, and may thus 
explain in part the Turn in Randall and Boretz’s output starting in the early 
1970’s, but if “perception” is a stand-in for experience, experience remains 
problematic as foundation for Randall’s system.  As stated in Chapter One, 
following Kerman, Randall’s definitions could give rise to their own 
compositional practice.  At such a point, it will be precisely the strength of the 
previous abstraction that will prove beneficial for experience. 
Blasius’ reading of Randall’s formalization puts us in mind of Blasius’ 
own mapping of possible music-theoretical discourses, as quoted and discussed 
in Chapter One.  Blasius (2002, 42–3 and 1996, 107–14) (meta)theorizes two types 
of music theory: a prescriptive and a priori music theory, identified with the work 
of Babbitt; and a descriptive and a posteriori theory, identified with that of 
Schenker.  Princeton Theory as a whole would appear to partake of both 
approaches; it sits uneasily between conceptual thought and experience; of an 
approach to the work of theory that speculates given musical structures and 
relations, and one that generalizes from a given repertoire.  As Blasius (2002, 43) 
says of the a priori approach, having given Babbitt’s ([1965] 2003, 195) deduction 
of the unique multiplicity of interval classes within the diatonic collection as an 
example, “This analysis stands before any particular empirically accessible 
mechanisms of perception.”  As with the Randall, this is a motion toward the 
ideal, toward the purely conceptual, within a discourse Babbitt otherwise would 
appear to conceive as an empirical and therefore experiential discourse.  Blasius 
further specifies the a posteriori theory as exemplified in the mature work of 
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Heinrich Schenker.  Princeton Theory will in many instances attempt to 
formalize, using axiomatization, the Schenker of Free Composition.  The emphasis 
was on formalization, which while of course based, in some undefined manner, 
on musical intuitions, was most concerned with the conceptual limitations and 
possibilities of making Schenkerian theory more rigorous.  Again, at this point 
the level of experiential saturation seems low. 
 
 
2.  Philosophy of Science and the “Stuff” of Music Theory 
 
As discussed during the last chapter, an important concept in philosophy 
of science—implicit in Babbitt’s writings and prevalent in Meta-Variations—is 
foundationalism.  In the words of Carnap’s later introduction to the Aufbau: “The 
main problem concerns the possibility of the rational reconstruction of the 
concepts of all fields of knowledge on the basis of concepts that refer to the 
immediately given.”11  I think in large measure the Princeton Theorists 
                                                
11 ([1928] 1967, v). Although we can trace the foundationalist project to Descartes 
(whom we shall discuss in the next chapter), Michael Friedman has argued 
against this version of the project of logical positivism.  “The positivists—so this 
story goes—were concerned above all to provide a philosophical justification of 
scientific knowledge from some privileged, Archimedean vantage point situated 
somehow outside of, above, or beyond the actual (historical) sciences themselves.  
More specifically, they followed the lead of the logicist reduction of mathematics 
to logic [most thoroughly, Principia Mathematica by Russell and Whitehead]…. 
The positivists attempted to justify empirical science and place it on a secure 
foundation by logically constructing the concepts of empirical science on the 
basis of the (supposedly more certain) immediate data of sense” (1999, 2).  (On 
logicism in the logical positivist tradition, see Carnap [1930] 1959.)  Friedman 
argues, however, that philosophy was dependent on the special sciences, with 
Einstein’s physics the striking example, and that the aim of the Aufbau was, “to 
fashion a scientifically respectable replacement for traditional epistemology” 
(1999, 5, emphasis original). 
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themselves accepted this view of the project of the Aufbau, for example, or 
Goodman’s Structure of Appearance—what I shall call the Received View of the 
positivist project—and absorbed it as their understanding of their own music-
theoretical project.  Again, Boretz subtitled Meta-Variations, “Foundations of 
Musical Thought,” and I think this is telling.  As he says, “The conceptual 
reconstruction of systems ‘from the ground up’ proposed here models itself on 
the constructions developed for the phenomenal world as a whole in Carnap’s 
Aufbau and especially, in its considerably more fully realized and less 
problematic successor, Nelson Goodman’s The Structure of Appearance” (Boretz 
[1969] 1995, 88, emphasis original).  Ayer explains: “Carnap, following Mach, 
James and Russell, after his own fashion, took as his starting-point the series of 
elements each constituting the whole of a person’s current experiences at a given 
moment, and attempted to show how the entire set of concepts needed to 
describe the world could be constructed stage by stage, by the application of 
Russell’s logic, on the basis of the single empirical relation of remembered 
similarity” (1982, 126). 
Although, as argued in Chapter Two, music theory for Princeton Theory is 
in large measure axiomatization, the reason for this axiomatization is not solely 
for the sake of abstraction and therefore explanatory power or systematic 
consistency (although these were of concern), the central reason, rather, was that 
it enabled one to construct the musical world on the basis of phenomenalistic 
axioms: axioms addressing musical experiences.  From this basis, using proper 
transformation rules, one could speculate: create new worlds.  This is, in one 
understanding, what composers do: they create musical worlds.  The Princeton 
Theorists, we should always keep in mind, were composers, which although of 
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course in part ideological, was also operative in important ways in their 
discourses.  Let me repeat: axiomatic formalization was undertaken by Princeton 
Theorists not simply for the purpose of understanding the (musical) world we 
already have, that which is given, but rather for the purpose of (re)constructing 
alternative worlds, that which may be created.  This is what composers/theorists 
in the Princeton tradition do, and this provides perhaps the best definition of the 
notion of a composerly theory or discourse.12 
 This said, in the context of discussion of the experiential and conceptual, 
Michael Friedman’s later contribution to this topic can illuminate an aspect of 
our problem: “As recent scholarship has made abundantly clear, the standard 
picture of the Aufbau as primarily a contribution to radical empiricist or 
phenomenalist foundationalism is at the very least grossly exaggerated.  I now 
want to argue that it is much better understood in the context of the issues we 
have just now been discussing—the problem of forging a new kind of relation 
between abstract mathematical structures and concrete sensory experience in the 
wake of Einstein’s general relativity theory” (2007b, 103–104).  The new physics 
posited entities that could not be immediately perceived by the senses, 
problematizing empiricism.  The goal of logical positivism or empiricism, as 
Friedman states, was to reconcile these two poles, which is stated explicitly by 
Russell, in what became known as Russell’s External World Problem.  Russell 
                                                
12 Furthermore, as I shall argue in Chapter Four, for Boretz at least the 
construction of the external musical world was necessary in order to overcome 
the solipsistic predicament to which his commitment to the mental character of 
music seemed, in turn, to commit him.  That is, Boretz’s commitment to 
introspection presents the problematic of how to get out of the self and to other 
minds, thus constructing a phenomenalist world was an attempt to reality test. 
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introduced a method or notion of logical construction in an attempt to overcome 
this problematic.  Physics was early in the century the model for all the sciences.  
The problematic of physics, however, was that it postulated entities that could 
not be observed by the senses.  Constructional methodology was the attempt to 
bridge this gap.13 
 
Among the objections to the reality of objects of sense, there is one which 
is derived from the apparent difference between matter as it appears in 
physics and things as they appear in sensation.  Men of science, for the 
most part, are willing to condemn immediate data as “merely subjective,” 
while yet maintain the truth of the physics inferred from those data.  But 
such an attitude, though it may be capable of justification, obviously stands 
in need of it; and the only justification possible must be one which exhibits 
matter as a logical construction from sense-data…. It is therefore necessary 
to find some way of bridging the gulf between the world of physics and 
the world of sense, and it is this problem which will occupy us in the 
present lecture. (Russell [1914a] 1993, 106, emphasis original) 
 
This is the relevant intellectual context—adjusted from Edwardian Britain to 
Great Depression New York—in which the early Babbitt—the Babbitt of 
Washington Square College (later, New York University) during the 1930’s—
found himself.14  Further, it is the relevant intellectual precedent for Carnap’s 
Aufbau, Goodman’s Structure of Appearance, and therefore Boretz’s Meta-
Variations.  The music-theoretical similarities are striking, the turn to logical 
                                                
13 This recapitulates in remarkable ways the situation the new chemistry’s 
discovery of the atom presented to philosophers of science (especially Hermann 
Rudolf Lotze, Riemann’s teacher) in the nineteenth century.  Rehding (2003, 83–
5) gives a précis. 
 
14 Russell’s lectures were delivered in Boston at the Lowell Institute.  Further, 
Boretz quotes from them in Meta-Variations ([1969] 1995, 35).  For Babbitt’s 
discussions of the Great Depression’s impact on his musical thinking, wherein he 
emphasizes the European diaspora of musicians and intellectuals, and the 
increased public funding of the arts, see Babbitt (2003, 265, 368, 428, 443, 468, and 
483–84); see also Brody 1993. 
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positivism for the early Babbitt, appropriate.  Music composition and theory at 
that time were positing rows and entities which stretched typical ways of hearing 
and imagining what could be heard in or as music.  If Babbitt or his successors 
could reconstruct the musical world on the basis of sense experience, of the 
music they could hear or understand, then they could unite speculation in the 
manner of theoretical physics and experience in the manner of the man-on-the-
street’s intuitions about space, time, and motion (musical or otherwise).15  This 
union would potentially unite audience and composer of new music. 
One way to carry this out is to create phenomenalistic systems.  
Phenomenalism is the philosophical position that constructs the reality of the 
external world from the individual subject’s own sense impressions, 
observations, phenomena, erlebs, qualia, or experiences.  This was the central 
project in the Received View of Carnap’s Aufbau.16  As I shall demonstrate in 
relation to Borez’s Meta-Variations, Lewin’s Generalized Musical Intervals and 
                                                
15 Babbitt ([1958] 2003, 51 and 53) evokes physics.  Brackett (2003) unpacks the 
relations between physics and Princeton Theory in a different although 
compelling manner, eventually arguing that an improvement over using physics 
as the model for music theory would be biology.  It is at this moment, of course, 
that we locate Brackett’s historical horizon.  Relatedly, Grant (2001, 22–7) 
discusses Heisenberg’s physics in relation to the Darmstadt School. 
 
16 There exists some controversy as to whether or not the Aufbau even assumes a 
phenomenalistic basis.  Clearly Goodman thinks so, as did the later Carnap 
himself, and the majority of commentators pre-Friedman (2007, 138), who claims 
that, “‘Phenomenalism’ refers to a standard reading of Kantian transcendental 
idealism in terms of a dualism between phenomena (appearances) and noumena 
(things in themselves).” Carnap in the Aufbau itself states that, “Construction 
theory and phenomenalism do not contradict one another at any point” (Carnap [1928] 
2003, 286, emphasis original).  Given that Goodman, Ayer, Putnam and others 
assume the Aufbau assumes a phenomenalistic basis, I will assume so for the 
history to come.  I do not think it would have occurred to the Princeton Theorists 




Transformations, Winham’s incomplete and unpublished project and John Rahn’s 
(1974) dissertation, Princeton Theory was largely phenomenalistic in orientation.  
The contrasting position attempts to construct the world as it exists or could exist 
on the basis of physical objects.  This position is called physicalism, and although 
Carnap turned to it in his work of the 1930’s, and the Princeton Theorist Michael 
Kassler (1967) presented a physicalistic system, we might identify physicalism 
with certain strands of music theory that take, for example, the overtone series as 
foundation for theorizing.  Despite the fact that Babbitt ([1960] 2003, 70), in the 
context of electronic music, had proclaimed that “music is, of course, sound,” we 
might argue that to assert physicalism as a music-theoretical basis would be to 
swap cause and effect.  For as Russell says while discussing the traditionally first 
presentation of phenomenalism—George Berkeley’s Three Dialogues between 
Hylas and Philonous ([1713] 1998)—“sound, as heard, cannot be identified with 
the motions of air that physics regards as its cause” (1945, 654). By the 1950’s, the 
issue for the philosophers between phenomenalism and physicalism was not one 
of “truth,” or some such notion, rather it was merely systematic expediency and 
which would be advantageous parsimoniously, an appeal to simplicity—indeed, 
certainly by Goodman ([1951] 1966, 136–42) this point is made explicitly.  As 
Boretz says, 
 
We choose for our system, first, a phenomenalistic basis, on the same non-
normative grounds as Goodman ([1951] 1966, 140), but we, additionally, 
are focusing on “things” whose “reality” is manifestly phenomenal and 
thus manifestly “non-physical,” although they could be described, by 
means of a cumbersome apparatus such as is employed in Kassler (1967), 
in terms of purely physicalistic predicates.  So I take “some perceptible 




This said, I think for the music theorists more was at stake between constructing 
systems based on phenomena or physical objects than simple systematic 
parsimoniousness or some other systematic concern.  Because of the history of 
the naturalization of music theory—appealing to the overtone series, for 
example—that had been critiqued in Babbitt ([1965] 2003), as late as by figures 
such as Schenker and Hindemith, and reignited in music cognition studies of the 
1980’s, the Princeton Theorists had continually to argue for phenomenalism as 
against physicalism in order to ensure the place of experience in music theory.17 
Part of Princeton Theory’s oral history tells us that Meta-Variations is a 
critique of the lack of experience in the preceding writings of Babbitt (See Forrest 
et al.).  Meta-Variations’ system (Boretz 1995, 98) follows Carnap ([1928] 1967) and 
Goodman ([1951] 1966) in being phenomenalistic: 
 
Choice of a phenomenalistic basis is usually argued for on the ground that 
since the phenomenal by its very nature comprises the entire content of 
immediate experience, everything that can be known at all must be 
eventually explicable in terms of phenomena.  A phenomenal system is 
thus held to constitute a kind of epistemological reduction of the 
predicates it defines; the definitions indicate the testable, empirical, 
pragmatic significance of these predicates; and definabilty in the system 
provides a criterion of meaningfulness.  To the phenomenalist, what 
cannot be explained in terms of phenomena is unknowable, and words 
purporting to refer to it are vacuous. (Goodman [1951] 1966, 136–37) 
 
Phenomenalism attempts to connect theory directly to experience: we have the 
experience, hook into it through a process of reflection or conceptualization, and 
                                                
17 Derkert (2007, 230–31) convincingly demonstrates what we might term a 
prehistory of music theory’s twentieth-century denaturalization in the 
axiomatization of geometry by Hilbert (from 1899), filtered through Krenek 
([1937] 1977, 81–2), and picked up in the work of Babbitt.  We shall return to this 
lineage in the next chapter. 
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define our terms such that they embody those observed particulars, sense 
impressions, or in Carnap’s language, Elementarerlebnisse (erlebs or elementary 
experiences).18  This solves the problem of cognitivity or meaning by addressing 
the verifiability criterion (which we shall discuss further in the context of 
remarks by Babbitt): I can verify that these direct experiences exist as facts by 
having the experiences, or (in later versions of the theory of verification) by 
reducing my theoretical terms to verifiable, direct, observational terms, hence I 
can create meaning, knowledge. 
“Experience” for philosophy of science is not undifferentiated, a mystical 
experience.  It is experience of, intended.  The experience of is the individual 
subject’s own sense impressions, observations, phenomena, erlebs, or qualia.  The 
Princeton Theorists conceived of their projects as using these notions to address 
what we would call the “stuff,” “fundamentals,” or “materials” of music—
Babbitt often speaks of the “musical event” which is inflected by or defined in 
terms of multiple dimensions, or, in the Darmstadt terminology which has 
become more widespread in music theory, parameters.  Emphatically not 
Platonic forms, which we access intellectually and contemplate intuitively, the 
stuff of music theory is experience(s).  The Princeton Theorists were explicit 
about this, and yet problematized it.  As one example, Godfrey Winham begins 
his dissertation—comprising the verbal half of the first Ph.D. in music 
composition at Princeton, accepted in 1964—with metatheoretical considerations, 
distinguishing between a musical system and method of composition, moving 
swiftly to define and implicitly privilege a system in the usual sense, but, 
                                                
18 For discussion of the latter, see especially Carnap ([1928] 2003, 107–11) and 
Goodman ([1951] 1966, 154–57). 
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importantly for our interests, leaving open the degree of concretion of the entities 
it addresses.  A musical system, “consists of a well-defined set of operations 
upon musical configurations.  The latter [musical configurations], however, are 
not necessarily fully specified musical passages, but may be specified only as to 
certain features” (Winham [1964] 1971, 261).  As examples of systems without 
fully specified musical passages in the empirical sense, excluding certain 
dimensions, Winham gives the tonal system’s exclusion of timbre and dynamics, 
and Schenker’s near-exclusion of rhythm (except for order).  Indeed, in these 
introductory comments Winham is explicitly far more concerned with systematic 
relationships between entities, not so much the entities themselves, and his 
rationale is, also explicitly, composerly. 
 
The configurations to which the system’s operations are applied need not 
all be of the same degree of concreteness.  Nor is it necessary that the 
configurations which are resultants of a given system of operations be less 
than all of the possible configurations of a given degree of concreteness, or 
even less than all possible configurations specified to any degree…. From 
the composer’s point of view, indeed, the most useful type of system 
would be one which did not involve any restrictions on ultimate 
resultants, but which on the other hand would define some fairly different 
kinds and degrees of relatedness among as many configurations as 
possible, in particular all those which the particular composer has reason 
to believe he would be likely to want to use. (Ibid.) 
 
Winham is quick to point out, however, that not simply any relationships are 
significant, useful for the composer, and thus worth including systematically.  
Winham implies significance via a negative example: contra-Schoenberg, music-
theoretical descriptions of identity of hexachordal pitch content do not specify a 
significant relationship.  Elsewhere in his unpublished material, Winham 
investigates musical significance (Blasius 1997, 3 and 12–13), but remarkably 
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open are the kinds of musical relationships and configurations which could be 
significant (Ibid., 5–6).  I want to emphasize the varying degrees of concretion 
Winham allows because it destabilizes the “stuff” of music theory, and point to 
the level of conceptuality Princeton Theory would generally allow within its 
music-theoretical practices. 
While discussing Winham’s phenomenalistic constructional system, his 
understanding of musical significance as an autonomous theoretical pursuit, 
Blasius articulates Winham’s ontology of the musical event as a sound event: 
 
Of course, this notion of a theory of sound demands immediate 
qualification.  Its subject must not be the musical phenomenon as 
distinguished not only from notations but also from both physical sound 
and sense-data….  In other words, the subject of analysis could be the 
tone, a phenomenal event, but could not be the sound wave, a physical 
event, or, in contrast, some subjective observational report.  …The 
phenomenal event occupies a sort of tangibly psychological but 
intersubjective middle ground between notational abstraction, physical 
event, and sense-data.  Also, though, Winham specifies that this 
phenomenological domain exists in a middle ground between 
logicomathematical and empirical domains (the latter represented 
musically by psychoacoustics).  This makes his definition of the field 
much more elusive.19 
 
Elusive too, then, is music theory’s grasp on musical experience for Winham.  
Music theory concerns not the notation, the physical, nor quite the 
autopsychological (the individual mind), because the significance of the musical 
event itself is to be found in none of these domains.  Music, let alone music-
theoretical discourse, pivots here uneasily between experience and conceptual 
understanding. 
                                                
19 Blasius (1997, 15 and 17) As quoted in Chapter Two, “No connection is to be 
drawn with the analysis of continental phenomenology” (Ibid., xii), but see 
Ryckman (2007), on Carnap and Husserl. 
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Rahn appears more certain about what he takes to be the “stuff” of music, 
showing that musical entities—the “fundamentals,” “facts,” or “materials” of 
music—had been understood in Princeton Theory to be theorized and 
theorizable, not simply given: “‘Single sounds’ are the ‘individuals’ of a theory; 
they are those musical entities which are not made up of other musical entities.  
In general, a theory will treat an entity as individual when nothing is gained for 
the purposes of the theory by recognizing in the theory the parts out of which the 
‘individual’ might be considered to be comprised” (Rahn 1974, 7).  These are the 
basic units or indivisible atoms (to be redundant) of music theory: single sounds.  
Rahn continues: “An attempt might be made to count as a single phenomenal 
sound that audible which has (absolutely) no discriminable parts.  Such an 
attempt would rely on a notion of absolute discriminability.  But music theory 
deals with what is not only discriminable but discriminated” (Ibid.).  We should 
mark the difference between the individual or atomic musical sound and its 
presentations, which include the typical dimensions or parameters of the musical 
event, as mentioned previously: pitch, duration, timbre, etc.20  But, importantly, 
as Rahn says, “By ‘sound’ is meant, initially, a phenomenal object rather than a 
physical one” (1974, 1).  It is unclear if Babbitt meant phenomenal or physical 
“sound” when he said that, as quoted earlier, “music is, of course, sound.” 
What Blasius was striving to articulate regarding Winham’s ontology of 
music (theory), and what Rahn partially articulates here (he is more explicit later, 
which we shall discuss further in Chapter Four) is the notion of qualia, 
introduced into modern philosophical discourse by Lewis (1929), discussed in 
                                                
20 This distinction between a thing and its presentations I am borrowing from 
Lewis (1929, 59–62) and Goodman ([1951] 1966, 128–30). 
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Goodman ([1951] 1966), and, to the best of my knowledge, first introduced 
explicitly into music-theoretical discourse in Boretz’s Meta-Variations.  A quale 
(Latin, of what kind) is the subjective “feel” of some experience, what that 
experience is like (where “is like” refers back to itself, that is, not compared to 
something external). 
 
In any presentation [of the given element in a single experience of an 
object], this content is either a specific quale (such as the immediacy of 
redness or loudness) or something analyzable into a complex of such.  The 
presentation as an event is, of course, unique, but the qualia which make it 
up are not.  They are recognizable from one to another experience.  Such 
specific qualia and repeatable complexes of them are nowadays 
sometimes designated as “essences.”  This term, with such a meaning, will 
here be avoided; the liability to confuse such qualia with universal 
[Platonic] concepts makes this imperative…. There are recognizable 
qualitative characters of the given, which may be repeated in different 
experiences, and are thus a sort of universals [sic]; I call these “qualia.”  
But although such qualia are universals, in the sense of being recognized 
from one to another experience, they must be distinguished from the 
properties of objects…. The quale is directly intuited, given, and is not the 
subject of any possible error because it is purely subjective. (Lewis 1929, 
59–60 and 121, emphasis original) 
 
In Goodman’s ([1951] 1966, 189) language, concerned as it is with the 
foundational status of qualia—i.e., whether they can serve as the atoms or 
indivisible units of the constructional system: 
 
If we divide the stream of experience into its smallest concrete parts and 
then go on to divide these concreta into sense qualia, we arrive at entities 
suitable as atoms for a realistic system.  A visual concretum might be 
divided, for example, into three constituent parts: a time, a visual-field 
place, and a color…. In some ways [however] it is psychologically more 
natural to begin with qualia and construct concrete individuals out of 
them than to take concrete individuals as indivisible and construe 
qualities in terms of these. ([1951] 189–90)  
 
 112 
The atoms of music theory for at least Boretz are qualia of pitch and time: “The 
two qualities I use for construction are pitch qualia and time-order qualia” (Boretz 
[1969] 1995, 99). 
Lacking this background causes Nicholas Cook (1987, 121 and 222–23) to 
misread Boretz on the role of sounds in music (theory).  Cook reads Boretz as 
denying that music theory concerns sounds at all—any and all sounds—such is 
Boretz’s (and Babbitt’s) supposed commitment to formalism and the “logical 
structure of a piece” (Ibid.).  That is to say, Cook implies formalism is 
unconcerned with sound, experience.  I shall shortly quote the Boretz discussion 
Cook misreads, but I want to cue the reader to the point that there is a difference 
between the physical, sound-in-the-world, which is of secondary concern for 
Boretz, and the sound-as-perceived, as qualia, which is Boretz’s primary concern.  
This is not an issue, as Cook reads it, of formalism versus psychologism, but 
rather of phenomenalism versus physicalism, of, indeed, qualia and music as 
experienced and cognized, versus music as necessarily determined by sound’s 
acoustic properties as displacements of air.  Boretz quotes Goodman ([1951] 1966, 
204), who states that, “‘A concretum is a fully concrete entity in that it has among 
its qualities at least one member of every category within some sense realm.  It is 
a minimal concrete entity in that it contains nothing more than one quale from 
each such category.’”  Boretz continues:  
 
“Sounds” are the concreta associated with music.  But we are here limiting 
our system to the description of relations among pitch and time-order 
qualia… rather than relations among the associated sounds themselves.  
This is why the members of our relation-classes, which may at first 
resemble particulars as, for example, “instances of the presentation of a 
particular pitch,” are actually just the qualia themselves without regard to 
any “sounds” in which they may actually occur.  We are thus occupied in 
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constructing “music” without “sound,” which may seem paradoxical, but 
is not.  For a “musical structure” “exists” in the mind’s ear of someone 
thinking of it (while looking at the score, for example), as explicitly and 
experientially as it exists by virtue of the perception of its concrete 
embodiment, in a sense quite different from that in which a physical object 
may be “thought about” or remembered. ([1969] 1995, 100–101, emphasis 
original) 
 
We are now in a better position to understand Boretz’s point(s) here.  Music 
theory constructs not sounds externally existing out there, in the world, but 
rather sounds as internally, subjectively construed.  It concerns not sounds as 
physical objects or things, such as might concern a psycho-acoustician, but sounds 
as internally, mentally, heard, in the ear, “the mind’s ear.”  Music theory 
concerns phenomena, not physical objects, and that which shows itself to us is 
that which we perceive via our senses.  The given in experience is constructed.  
Thus Boretz is exaggerating for effect when he says that, “we are thus occupied 
in constructing ‘music’ without ‘sound.’”  Music theory still concerns “sounds,” 
but sounds as construed by a musical thinker—heard internally.  The problem is 
that Cook reads Boretz’s philosophical categories as straightforwardly music-
theoretical ones, importing a language (“formalism”) which Boretz was not 
evoking in that moment of his text. (Indeed, we shall consider Lewin’s discussion 
of the cultural inflections of sounds/intuitions later in this chapter.) The upshot 
for us is that now we have a better grasp on the “nature” of entities with which 
Princeton Theory concerns itself, entities which are experiential but not naively 
so.  
Meta-Variations reminds us that we have been assuming a divergence 
between thought and musical experience in much of the preceding discussion, a 
difference which was precisely Boretz’s project in Meta-Variations to overturn.  
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Unfortunately, the section entitled “The Theoretical Character of Musical 
Entities: Music as Thought: the cognitive status of ‘a musical experience’” ([1969] 
1995, 26–29) is less direct in its discussion of the cognitive status of musical 
experience than we might hope, being directly concerned as it is with a critique 
of emotive language about music and discussing the cognitive status of 
experience only as a critique of emotive words about music.  But if we retrace 
Boretz’s steps we shall discover in what senses music is cognitive for Boretz, and 
therefore the ways in which a separation between experience and concepts is an 
historically constructed separation. 
Boretz begins this section with the question, “In what respects are musical 
compositions regarded in [musical discourse] as ‘objects of thought?’” (Ibid., 26) 
The answer is that it varies, but he asserts that prior to this question is a more 
fundamental statement, which asserts that in music, “we are confronted with an 
experiential domain that is not only thought about but also, apparently, thought 
in” (Ibid., emphasis original).  This is because musical objects are objects only 
because they are observed by “an author and a perceiver” (Ibid.).  “The view I 
propose is that when someone does not regard music as thought he is not 
regarding it as ‘music’ either—just in the sense that the relevant evidence for 
confirmation or disconfirmation of any of his assertions cannot come from 
observations of musical data or how it is perceived” (Ibid.).  “So what ends up 
happening is not that we encounter cognitive discourse about a more or less 
‘noncognitive object’… but rather discourse which itself has more or less 
noncognitive aspects, to the extent that it cannot securely be said to be ‘about’ 
anything—and it can in fact only be said to be about something just to the extent 
that it does treat musical data-arrays and their slices as intersubjectively 
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cognitive objects” (Ibid., 28).  Finally, we have in Boretz’s last clause a definition 
of cognitive discourse about music, and hence the relation between musical 
experience and thought.  Thought about music takes place in (we might say 
during) music, but also in discourse about music, and the only relevant 
observations about music come from how it is thought about or perceived.  
Emotive discourse about music seems to attribute emotions to music, and 
although this discourse is incorrigible, noncognitive, it attributes this status to 
music.  But musical discourse can only be about music to the extent that it 
considers musical objects to be intersubjective objects of thought.  Hence musical 
experience is of or takes place in (we might say during the motion of) 
intersubjectively available musical objects, forms.  By defining musical 
experience away from emotions and emotional discourse, Boretz is in fact trying 
to increase its intersubjectivity, its availability to be discussed and thought 
(about). 
 Throughout this section I have demonstrated that Princeton Theory 
orientates music theory to the experiential largely through conceiving its project 
as creating phenomenalistic systems, and that this experiential concern sits 
uneasily with a motion toward conceptual knowledge.  We have investigated the 
notion of musical fundamentals, materials, or the “stuff” of music theory within 
the Princeton theoretical tradition, giving a history of the philosophical and 
music-theoretical conception of qualia.  We find in Princeton Theory a 
composerly concern with potential as well as actual experiences.  Lastly, the 




3.  Babbitt on Theory, Practice, and Experience 
 
When considering Babbitt’s discourses, we should expect someone 
committed to philosophy of science to have articulated ideas about the relations 
between concepts and percepts, idealism and empiricism, theory and practice.  
Although having commented on theory and experience previously in his career, 
by 1966 Babbitt would publicly find abhorrent the distinction between hearing 
and theorizing, between theory and practice—music theory is an empirical 
science, a science directly related to, based on, bound up with, experience: 
 
I’m disturbed by what Lee [Finney] said about the lack of correlation 
between intellectualization—I take it that means some sort of theory 
construction of what we hear—and hearing.  Again we’re back to this 
terrible, terrible dichotomy between theory and practice… as if theory is 
some sort of useless speculation which we indulge in because we don’t 
have a theory of the practice.  And this concerns me deeply, Ross.  If your 
students are creating theories that are not based upon any kind of 
auditory experience, then I don’t know what this is as theory….  I would 
say it’s not theory.  It’s at best a hypothesis which manifestly collapses 
upon being confronted by auditory evidence….  After all, there are 
infinitely many things you can say about a piece of music, and the test, 
eventually, has to be an empirical test. (Westergaard [1966] 1968, 64) 
 
Here Babbitt wants to maintain that there is no distinction between theory and 
practice, and yet absorbs practice into theory, thus justifying an “intellectual” or 
learned approach to musical creation and discussion.  Interesting, however, is 
that Babbitt does not allow that theory could be speculation, divorced from 
musical actualities or materials, floating free of empirical grounding.  Use value 
is a pragmatic concern, and hypotheses that are not confirmed by empirical—
auditory—tests are meaningless, chatter.  With this last move, Babbitt, at this 
point in his career, emphasizes the discursive character of music theory and its 
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potential for meaninglessness, trying to establish some condition for meaningful 
utterance. 
As stated, theory is in large measure formalization, but formalization 
abstracts from experience.  And yet, experience is crucial, given phenomenalistic 
systems, and what Babbitt said to Ross Lee Finney, in defining theory as against 
conceptual thought, speculation.  Perhaps, then, we can reread Babbitt as leaving 
the status of music theory more open than we have perhaps been led to believe 
by the popular appeal to “scientism”:  
 
Whether one prefers to declare that a theory must be, should be, or is a 
mere symbolic description, or a structured formulation of statements of 
relations among observed phenomena, or a collection of rules for the 
representation of observables, or an interpreted model of a formal system, 
or still none of these, presumably it can be agreed that questions of 
musical theory construction attend and include all matters of the form, the 
manner of formulation, and the signification of statements about 
individual musical compositions, and the subsumption of such statements 
into a higher-level theory, constructed purely logically from the empirical 
acts of examination of the individual compositions. ([1965] 2003, 191) 
 
Part of what Babbitt can be read as achieving here is sensitizing us to how 
restricted or reduced our notions of the ontology of music theory qua science are.  
In addition to those listed by Babbitt, a science can do any number of things; it 
can lead to, “control of our environment, explanation of individual happenings, 
prediction of future events, or understanding of a general kind of phenomenon” 
(Kyburg 1968, 3, emphasis original).  “John Dewey takes problem-solving to be 
the key concept of science…. Among other authors who take the concept of a 
formal system as central, Rudolf Carnap is the most distinguished” (Ibid., 33).  
We lose as theorists when we restrict just what a theory is. 
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Returning to the Babbitt quotation, interesting is the opening’s openness, 
listing possibilities, the turn at “presumably it can be agreed,” the subsequent 
description of the process of abstraction, which draws theory away from 
individual pieces, and the final suggestion that a “purely formal” level of theory-
construction exists, derived in some sense from a corpus, but governed by its 
own systematic rules or at least principles.  The moment of that change-over, the 
moment of that flip from experience to concepts, from absorption in musical 
entities or materials which can be heard or otherwise related directly to some 
existing music to a level where concern for consistency of derivation and the 
systematizing moment takes over, must be charged, important.  Important 
because it locates the limit of music theory as an empirical pursuit, and instead 
indicates its idealism, its quest for the unheard (of). 
In response to a series of articles published in a 1976 Festschrift, Babbitt 
provides perhaps his most extensive thoughts on the question of experience qua 
experience.  He begins the conclusion of his response by quoting Dewey: “‘The 
test of the capacity of the (aesthetic) system… (is) to grasp the nature of 
experience itself.’  For, as I read them, all of the analytical articles here, whatever 
their explicit relation to observationality, are concerned to attempt to do just that, 
the ‘formal’ ones no less than Jim Randall’s more graphically isomorphic one.  
What other than experience can define not only what values the variables may 
assume, but what the variables are most valuably taken to be?”21  Babbitt quotes 
                                                
21 Babbitt ([1976] 2003, 359).  In the rhetorical question Babbitt is evoking Quine 
([1948] 2004, 187): “To be assumed as an entity is, purely and simply, to be 
reckoned as the value of a variable.”  And later: “The truth or falsity of a 
quantified statement ordinarily depends in part on what we reckon into the 
range of entities appealed to by the phrases ‘some entity x’ and ‘each entity x’—
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(presumably from memory) Dewey’s statement.  Dewey implies Hegel’s concern, 
for example, for grand, unifying systems, involving identity-thinking, here from 
the position of the system’s lapse in or sheer inability to experience aesthetic 
experiences: 
 
The work of art is thus a challenge to the performance of a like act of 
evocation and organization, through imagination, on the part of one who 
experiences it….  This fact constitutes the uniqueness of esthetic 
experience, and this uniqueness is in turn a challenge to thought.  It is 
particularly a challenge to that systematic thought called philosophy. …To 
esthetic experience, then, the philosopher must go to understand what 
experience is….  For this reason, while the theory of esthetics put forth by 
a philosopher is incidentally a test of the capacity of its author to have the 
experience that is the subject-matter of his analysis, it is also much more 
than that.  It is a test of the capacity of the system he puts forth to grasp 
the nature of experience itself. (Dewey 1934, 285–286) 
 
Artworks are inimitable, challenging thought.  Experiences are non-repeatable, 
thought—theory—demands repetition (apparently).  Here aesthetic experience, 
although the object of an individual philosopher, or filtered through the 
individual, is elevated to a profound level: aesthetics challenges the 
philosophical system’s ability to grasp, to comprehend or understand, experience 
itself, experience more generally or at all.  Incidentally, it is a test of the 
philosopher’s ability to experience the aesthetic herself.  Personal aesthetic 
experience, for Babbitt and Dewey, is of secondary importance.  Primary is the 
system’s ability to “grasp” the nature of the experience, not necessarily the 
experience, but its nature, its abstract-able, general, qualities.  Without 
experience, philosophy appears to be just so much idle speculation, armchair 
thinking, a problem for Dewey and Babbitt.  Without aesthetic experience, 
                                                                                                                                            
the so-called range of values of the variable” (Quine [1954] 1961, 103; see also 
Rahn [1989a] 2001, 79). 
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philosophy appears to have no access to lived experience generally.  With which 
Princeton Theory seems unconcerned until after the Turn. (Recall Maus’ 
discussion of the post-Turn Princeton Theorists as being concerned with aesthetic 
experience in general.  Babbitt, however, elsewhere speaks disparagingly of 
aesthetics; see 2003, 272–73, 275–76, and 454–55.) 
We should question Babbitt’s borrowed distinction between the grasping 
of the nature of experience itself and its relation to observationality.  What is the 
difference between experience and the ability to observe?  “Grasp” carries a 
Cartesian filiation, where we can know but not grasp God or God’s complete 
existence, God’s nature.  “The nature of experience itself,” although again 
borrowed from Dewey, is an odd phrase, for it implies concern not with any 
individual(s’) inimitable experience, but rather experience, presumably of pieces 
given the use of “analytical,” in general, in the abstract.  The obvious questions: 
how can a system grasp experience in general?  What is or how can we know an 
abstract experience?  Who is doing the experiencing here?  The system, but 
systems don’t experience unless hypostasized.  “The” listener, that still to this 
day underdefined, abstract category of musical existence?  The listener as a 
generalization, a logic which seems to run: I experience it this way, you are 
invited to do the same; but also a way out: I’m not committing completely to this 
hearing.  Elsewhere, Babbitt writes, as composer: “Either you run the risk of 
being too retrospective (which means too obvious), or you run the risk of being 
too predictive (and therefore being opaque or perhaps losing a reasonable 
listener).  I have to say reasonable listener although you know what kind of cop-
out that has to be” (1986, 72, emphasis original).  As Martin Jay suggests in his 
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epigraph which preceded this chapter, here is a struggle between individual and 
collective listener. 
Returning to Babbitt’s quotation of Dewey, Babbitt appears to be arguing 
more generally that the post-Turn Princeton Theorists (Randall, Boretz, et al.) 
believe that their later writings carry a greater fidelity to experience.  But since 
for Babbitt and the formalist phase of Princeton Theory, as discussed previously, 
all writing about music carries a filiation with experience (because of the 
verifiability principle espoused by the logical positivists which we shall discuss 
shortly), the authors of the Turn are mistaken in believing their extravagant texts 
are closer to experience.  We can read the following remarks of Randall as 
responding to Babbitt, for while the modernist Babbitt will conceive of music-
listening as perceiving, as a distanced, disinterested observation, and hence a 
form of experience susceptible to scientific discourse, the mature Randall seeks to 
involve himself, and implicitly us, in the music’s unfoldings: “In any case, a 
question ‘Can we perceive this structuring?’ never seriously arose, since I’ve 
never thought of music-listening as perceiving or identifying.  (A listener 
undergoes, or becomes, or simply is, the music, the utterance: is within, 
happening—not without, observing)” (Randall [1993] 2003, 372).  Randall here 
elevates Erfahrung over Erlebnis, conceives music-listenings as, “occasions for 
rather than of experience.” (Goehr 2008, 117–18 and 120 makes this point about 
experimentalism generally, and Cage specifically.) 
Complicating further the problematic of experience on the terrain of 
temporality, Babbitt, responding directly to Heinrich Schenker and David 
Epstein (1930–2002)—indirectly, I suspect, to Randall after the Turn—addresses 
the problematic of grasping discursively musical temporality: “To convey [the 
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real-time character of perceived musical consecution] in what cannot be, for it 
cannot be controlled to be, ‘real-time’ analytical prose or symbolism poses a 
problem of representation no less severe in degree than, though considerably 
different in kind from, that confronting the composer.  His creative mental 
imagery must persist in simulating such a real-time eventuality, while yet 
conveying these images in notational, transcriptional, nonreal time” (Babbitt 
[1979] 2003, 373).  Pieces, analysts, and discourse have their own separate times, 
alienated from each other.  One way to address this problem in the temporal 
domain has been to jettison the metaphysical language of traditional music 
criticism, turning to the directly observational language of Princeton Theory in 
its positivist moment: (“harmonic progression”) becomes (“harmony” and 
“progression”) becomes (“simultaneity succession”) (Boretz 1969, 16).  Thus we 
do not hear “motion” in our piece; thus we have no need for notational or 
transcriptional devices in the discursive economy of theory and analysis.  But 
this strikes me as an only apparent solution.  Princeton Theory, after Meta-
Variations, continues to problematize musical time: Babbitt’s foreword was 
written after that text; recall our discussion of temporality in Randall’s text and 
temporalized presence in Heidegger and Boretz from Chapter Two.  Experiential 
temporality is multivalent as between music and discourse, and Babbitt offers no 
solution to this problematic, but, as I have suggested, reads it out of the texts of 
the Turn. 
In 1962 Babbitt published a group of program notes regarding 
Schoenberg’s Violin Concerto, Book of Hanging Gardens, and Moses und Aron, 
reprinted as Babbitt ([1968] 2003), which are rather complicated as program notes 
go.  The following year George Perle (1915–2009) published a critique of these 
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notes and an article by David Lewin in Perspectives of New Music.  I would like to 
discuss Babbitt’s reply to Perle, because it is perhaps Babbitt’s most direct 
explanation of his conception of the relations between experience and conceptual 
thought, evoking a host of notions borrowed from philosophy of science.  In the 
midst of a long, winding defense of his admittedly compact program notes, 
Babbitt states that, “I not only proved nothing in the logical domain, but made no 
claims with regard to empirical verification or confirmation” ([1963] 2003, 142). 
Although understandable considering their status as program notes, and 
therefore not a report of scientific findings, it is striking to read Babbitt here 
denying having made claims as regards the empirical, seemingly bracketing 
what we have been led to believe would be Babbitt’s concern for science, and 
specifically logical empiricism.22 
Babbitt continues, however, by introducing terms drawn from the 
philosophy of science, specifically, logical positivism or empiricism.  Babbitt: “To 
the extent that I regard my introductory observations as explanatory ‘analysis’ at 
all, it is only as a selection from a rational reconstruction, whose protocol 
statements derive their relative incontrovertibility by virtue of their being 
statements of aural and conceptual capacities which appear to be acquirable” 
([1963] 2003, 142).  What is a rational reconstruction [rationale Nachkonstruktion]?  
What is a protocol statement [Protokollsatz]?  Let us take each in turn.  Coined by 
Carnap in the Aufbau, the notion of a rational reconstruction has taken on a life of 
its own, separating itself from Carnap.  We shall return to Carnap, but among 
many possible definitions, this one is ready-to-hand: “What epistemology 
                                                
22 The difference between the logical and empirical in logical positivism was 
foundational, and vehemently critiqued by Quine ([1951] 2004, 31–45) as one of 
the two dogmas of empiricism. 
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intends is to construct thinking processes in a way in which they ought to occur 
if they are to be ranged in a consistent system; or to construct justifiable sets of 
operations which can be intercalated between the starting-point and the issue of 
thought-processes, replacing the real intermediate links.  Epistemology thus 
considers a logical substitute rather than real processes.  For this logical 
substitute the term rational reconstruction has been introduced” (Reichenbach 
1938, 5; quoted in Babbitt 2003, 69). 
Rational reconstructions of musical cognition abstract away from at least 
the temporality of musical experience.  In Babbitt’s ambivalent words 
(ambivalent with respect to our broader question regarding experience): “A 
rational reconstruction of a work or works, which is a theory of the work or 
works, is, thereby, an explanation not, assuredly, of the ‘actual’ processes of 
construction, but of how the work or works may be construed by a hearer, how 
the ‘given’ may be ‘taken’” (Babbitt [1972] 2003, 301).  And: “It is not the 
presumed purpose of a rational reconstruction to propose the probable actual 
modes of construction, but rather the most satisfactory modes of construal”  
(Babbitt [1976] 2003, 355).  Or, according to Carnap in the Aufbau, “The fact that 
we take into consideration the epistemic relations does not mean that the 
synthesis or formations of cognition, as they occur in the actual process of 
cognition, are to be represented in the constructional system with all their 
concrete characteristics” (Carnap [1928] 2003, §54).  And, “the construction does 
not have to reflect the actual process of cognition, but that it is only a rational 
reconstruction which must lead to the same result” (Ibid., §81).  The historical 
actuality of composerly creation is not at issue in the formal modeling of the 
conceptual steps necessary for a rational reconstruction of musical cognition, the 
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conceptual steps necessary to arrive at, for example, the surface of a piece.  As 
historians, we will not, in discussing rational reconstructions, attempt to access 
the steps Schoenberg went through while composing his Violin Concerto, for 
example.  Rational reconstruction is not sketch study, it does not answer the 
question of the historical how.  It is decidedly not historical musicology; it writes 
an imagined past; it brackets composerly intention.  Important, instead, are the 
most musically profitable (read: interesting, “satisfactory”) ways in which we 
may construe theories, of how we might cognize music. 
Returning to Babbitt, let us now ask, what is a protocol statement 
[Protokollsatz]?  There is no single answer, as the logical positivists—especially 
Carnap, Otto Neurath, and Moritz Schlick—argued over a protocol sentence’s 
exact nature.  Introduced into logical positivist discourse by Neurath ([1932] 
1959, 199), a protocol statement was an attempt to answer the question of how to 
include knowledge of experience in science, via observation.  Protocol sentences 
are direct records of an observation, available to other scientists for confirmation 
or verification.  From here, however, disagreement emerges.  For Neurath, 
protocol sentences are the factual sentences of which science consists, which 
include a personal noun, “and a term from the domain of perception-terms” 
(Ibid., 202–3).  “A complete protocol sentence might, for instance, read: ‘Otto’s 
protocol at 3:17 o’clock: [At 3:16 o’clock Otto said to himself: (at 3:15 o’clock there 
was a table in the room perceived by Otto)]’” (Ibid., 202).  The problem with this 
account is that it makes protocol sentences subjective—how can such perception-
statements serve as the foundation for science?  Carnap’s rebuttal: “The view 
which holds that protocol sentences cannot be physically interpreted, that, on the 
contrary, they refer to something non-physical (something ‘psychical,’ some 
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‘experience-content,’ some ‘datum of consciousness,’ etc.) leads directly to the 
consequence that every protocol sentence is meaningful only to its author” 
(Carnap [1932] 1959, 192).  This raises the problematic of solipsism, which we 
shall consider during the next chapter, but we should note here that it was an 
unacceptable conclusion for the Carnap of the 1930’s, and so he conceived of 
protocol sentences instead as physical statements about objects in the world: 
“This wooden support is very firm” (Ibid., 170).  For Carnap, “the physical 
language is universal and inter-subjective” (Ibid., 166, emphasis original). 
Can we figure out to which sense of “protocol sentence” Babbitt was 
referring?  Babbitt seems to offer his interpretation of “protocol sentence” when 
he says that, “protocol statements derive their relative incontrovertibility by 
virtue of their being statements of aural and conceptual capacities which appear 
to be acquirable” (Babbitt [1963] 2003, 142).  Babbitt states his reason for the 
subjunctive (“acquirable”) nature of the perceptions which concern him: 
“Naturally, I cannot assume responsibility for what is ‘heard,’ but only for what 
can be learned to be ‘heard.’  Otherwise, I should be at the mercy of the 
inadequate training, knowledge, intellectual capacity, and dubious veracity of 
any listener offered as counterexample” (Ibid.).  This alone means that Babbitt is 
not using protocol sentences in the previously defined, logical positivist sense, 
and is instead introducing his own definition, adjusted for music theory.  We are 
left uncertain, however, as to the scientific status of Babbitt’s claims, and their 
experiential qualities.  Indeed, Babbitt draws the distinction between, “that mode 
of analysis which purports to be the representation of a reported hearing and 
that which is a rational reconstruction” (Ibid.).  Recall that he stated that his is a 
rational reconstruction, not, therefore, a report of a hearing in a direct sense, so 
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why state that his introductory observations were or included protocol 
sentences? 
 Again, Babbitt states that in his program notes, “I not only proved nothing 
in the logical domain, but made no claims with regard to empirical verification 
or confirmation” ([1963] 2003, 142).  Again, he need not have, because these 
comments refer to mere program notes, but it is striking that in Babbitt’s entire 
discursive corpus, this is the only explicit reference to verification of the sort 
discussed by the logical positivists who influenced Babbitt so strongly as to 
scientific outlook.  We should expect Babbitt, the self-proclaimed logical 
positivist, to subscribe to and offer examples of protocol sentences one could 
verify experientially.  Ayer ([1936] 1952, 5) describes verificationism this way: “A 
sentence had literal meaning if and only if the proposition it expressed was either 
analytic or empirically verifiable.”  “To verify” in the early theory meant to have 
the experience.  Misak (1995, 70) refers to this as the “strong version” of the 
logical positivists’ theory of verifiability and recall Dewey’s discussion of having 
an experience.  A number of problems arose, however, which included questions 
about theoretical entities postulated by physics, which explained experiences but 
which were not themselves verifiable via sense experience (recall our earlier 
discussion of physics); and questions about the past, counterfactuals, and the 
future (Ibid., 70–82).  Protocol sentences were one attempt to arrive at 
experiences which could be verified, and later verisons of the principle held that 
one need not have the experience, but rather reduce sentences to those which 
referred to experiences (Mises [1951] 1968, 95–6).  Carnap, for example, later says 
that, “A person S tests (verifies) a system-sentence by deducing it from sentences 
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of his own protocol language, and comparing these sentences with those of his 
actual protocol” (Carnap [1932] 1959, 166, emphasis original). 
 To repeat, Babbitt argues that, “naturally, I cannot assume responsibility 
for what is ‘heard,’ but only for what can be learned to be ‘heard.’  Otherwise, I 
should be at the mercy of the inadequate training, knowledge, intellectual 
capacity, and dubious veracity of any listener offered as counterexample” ([1963] 
2003, 142).  As stated, a curious feature here is that Babbitt appeals not to actual 
abilities on the part of informants or potential experimenters, but rather 
subjunctively, in principle, to one who could verify his claims.  This appears to 
be a social—better, pedagogical—problem, for Babbitt phrases it as such, and 
elsewhere discusses the poor state of music education in the U.S.A. (Babbitt 
[1991] 2003, 453).  Further, Babbitt has made this gesture before: “The limits of 
music reside ultimately in the perceptual capacities of the human receptor, just as 
the scope of physical science is delimited by the perceptual and conceptual 
capacities of the human observer.  But the recent history of both disciplines, by 
bearing witness to explosive and decisive extensions of these capacities, 
constrains us from venturing only into the realm of prediction” (Babbitt [1961] 
2003, 84).  In fact there is a precedent in logical positivist discourse for this move 
toward the future, the subjunctive, which is known, simply, as “verifiability in 
principle.”  As Mortiz Schlick says, 
 
It is obvious that verifiability is used here in the sense of “verifiability in 
principle,” for the meaning of a proposition is, of course, independent of 
whether the conditions under which we find ourselves at a specified time 
allow or prevent the actual verification…. The verification remains 
conceivable; we are always able to state what data we should have to 
experience in order to decide the truth or falsity of the proposition; the 
verification is logically possible, whatever be the case regarding its 
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Or as Carl Hempel puts it:  
 
As has frequently been emphasized in empiricist literature, the term 
“verifiability” is to indicate, of course, the conceivability, or better, the 
logical possibility of evidence of an observational kind which, if actually 
encountered, would constitute conclusive evidence for the given sentence; 
it is not intended to mean the technical possibility of performing the tests 
needed to obtain such evidence, and even less does it mean the possibility 
of actually finding directly observable phenomena which constitute 
conclusive evidence for that sentence—which would be tantamount to the 
actual existence of such evidence and would thus imply the truth of the 
given sentence. ([1950] 1959, 111 n 6) 
 
I cannot help but psychologize: the frequent statements of the obviousness 
of verifiability in principle betray a tension, cover a process of argument and in 
fact an uncertainty about the position.  For if the observation sentences never 
have to admit of verifiability in actuality, how can they be said to be true?  
Would not this continual delay, in principle, of verification render any statement 
potentially meaningful?  All that is needed is the imagination to conceive possible 
worlds in which the relevant conditions would hold that could prove or disprove 
the sentence under consideration.  As Misak (1995, 71) says, under this 
conception, “‘wait and see’ is a method of verification.”  And further, Schlick for 
one saw no problem with the hypothesis of immortality, since, “‘wait until you 
die’ is an appropriate method of verification” (Ibid., 73).  I quote yet another 
statement from Misak because she raises a difficult question about the audibility 
of music analysis, an issue which music theory has never truly settled, but rather 
has simply moved on from: “If the temporal, physical, and other restrictions on 
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verificationism are eliminated altogether, verificationism loses all appeal for the 
empiricist.  What empiricism is after all is a view of ourselves in the world which 
is down to earth, which does not appeal to anything beyond observation and 
inquiry.  If we do not have restrictions on the endowments of knowers, then we 
do not have something that is empirical enough for the empiricist” (Ibid., 142). 
W. V. O. Quine, on the other hand, marked post-positivism or analytic 
philosophy by arguing that we do not verify individual propositions, but rather 
we verify propositions holistically, as a “corporate body,” rearranging our 
conception of the theory/experience relation:  
 
Our statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense 
experience not individually but only as a corporate body…. The totality of 
our so-called knowledge or beliefs, from the most casual matters of 
geography and history to the profounder laws of atomic physics or even 
of pure mathematics and logic, is a man-made fabric which impinges 
upon experience only along the edges.  Or, to change the figure, total 
science is like a field of force whose boundary conditions are 
experience…. But the total field is so underdetermined by its boundary 
conditions, experience, that there is much latitude of choice as to what 
statements to reevaluate in the light of any single contrary experience.  No 
particular experiences are linked with any particular statements in the 
interior of the field, except indirectly through considerations of 
equilibrium affecting the field as a whole. ([1951] 2004, 49–50)  
 
I find it unsurprising how little traction this foundational critique of logical 
positivism has gained within music theory.  Theory still struggles with 
experience, even in the analytic or post-positivist writings of Babbitt’s students.  
Throughout all of this struggle, the appeal to experience is vexed but strong.  
While, as Dahlhaus says, “the alternative that an element of the composition be 
either audible or inaudible is too rigid and crude to be adequate” ([1970] 1983, 
55), we should expect greater discussion by Babbitt himself of the notion of 
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verification, and yet it is strikingly absent, seems inoperative in Babbitt’s 
discourses.  In terms of Babbitt’s work, his adjustment of logical positivism’s 
claims to experience may be understandable—may arrive via the problem of 
finding “suitably equipped receptors” to verify his musical claims—but the 
conclusion we arrive at is, if Babbitt consistently delays discussion of experience, 
brackets the physical status of musical objects via a denaturalization of music 
theory, and nowhere attempts to verify his experiences, in whole or in part, how 
is he a logical positivist? 
In his Madison lectures, however, Babbitt discusses the issue of audibility 
directly, but seems to overturn the importance of empirical considerations in 
music theory and analysis, implying cognition is far more important than 
experience:  
 
Let’s get back to [Schoenberg’s] Fourth Quartet and the relationship 
between hexachords.  When somebody says, “Can you hear these things?” 
the answer is that it’s not a matter of hearing.  Of course you can hear 
these different notes.  “Hearing” is one of those expressions that seems to 
represent a high degree of humanistic professionalism.  But it’s not a 
matter of hearing; it’s a matter of the way you think it through 
conceptually with your musical mind.  You can hear those six notes in 
example 1-8a.  You hear where they are in register.  You would certainly 
hear the contour difference if I played the hexachord in example 1-8b with 
the F an octave higher than it is written.  You’d hear everything.  So it’s 
not a matter of whether you hear it, it’s a matter of how you conceptualize 
it, how you conceive it.23 
 
 
If we identify hearing with experience, then experience is a secondary concern 
for Babbitt here.  Thinking music is far more important, for, as with the 
Carmichael experiments to be discussed shortly, how we think will influence our 
                                                
23 Babbitt (1987, 23).  Girard (2007, 252–56) has a different story to tell here. 
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perceptions, therefore thinking acts causal on perceiving.  To have knowledge is, 
in one sense, to know causes, thus the importance of causes for Babbitt and 
music theory generally.   
 
Example 3.1: Babbitt’s Example 1-8a: Schoenberg, Quartet No. 4, First Violin 
 
 




As Babbitt says elsewhere, tying perception and memory to thought and 
language: 
 
If we’re discussing the capacity to hear things and the capacity to identify 
them verbally, we’re into the whole question of associated verbal 
concepts….  The verbal concepts that you associate with what you 
perceive [are] obviously going to have a great effect in the whole 
memorative process.  We’re back to the old Carmichael experiments 
again….  We’re all talking about memory, about increasing memory span, 
and therefore we’re back to that question of verbal responsibility. 
(Westergaard [1966] 1968, 69–70) 
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In 1932 Leonard Carmichael and colleagues at Brown University reported on a 
series of experiments which attempted to determine the conditions which affect 
visual perception of form, in this case, language’s affect on visual perception 
(Carmichael, Hogan, Walter 1932, 73).  “In the investigation here reported an 
effort was made to direct experimentally the changes in the reproduction of 
visually perceived form by the use of language” (Ibid., 74).  A set of twelve 
ambiguous figures was presented along with one set of words to one group; 
another group of participants was presented the same images but a different list 
of words.  A control group was presented with images without words.  See 
Figure 3.1 for two examples.  The results showed that those presented with the 
curtains/diamond image and told the image resembled curtains, were inclined 
to draw an image that was unambiguously curtain-like, whereas when shown 
the same image but told it resembled a diamond in a rectangle, other participants 
were more apt to draw an unambiguously diamond-like figure.  See Figure 3.2.   
 
Figure 3.1: Images and Words (Carmichael, Hogan, Walter 1932, 75) 
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What was the major conclusion?  “Naming a form immediately before it is 
visually presented may in many cases change the manner in which it will be 
reproduced” (Ibid., 81).  Which shows that, “the reproduction of forms may be 
determined by the nature of words presented orally to subjects at the time that 
they are first perceiving specific visual forms” (Ibid., 82).  And further, that, “not 
the visual form alone, but the method of its apprehension by the subject 
determines, at least in certain cases, the nature of its reproduction” (Ibid., 83).   
Babbitt applies this to the aural case: “The verbal concepts that you associate 
with what you perceive [are] obviously going to have a great effect in the whole 
memorative process” (Westergaard [1966] 1968, 69–70).  This is only obvious in 
hindsight, because of Carmichael’s experiments.  Babbitt further draws the 
conclusion which Carmichael, at least in 1932, avoided, which is that language 
and therefore verbal thought acts causally upon aural and therefore musical 
perception.  Thus thinking music is more important for Babbitt than hearing it.  
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But further, we must exercise care with the words we use to describe or explain 
music (an issue to which we shall return in Chapter Five). 
Metatheoretically or philosophically, Princeton Theory seems at certain of 
its moments caught in the cross hairs of the dialectic of experience and theory, 
but even in its musical practices, its compositions, Princeton Theory cannot avoid 
the idealist implications of musical thought, of music theory as a rational pursuit.  
See Example 3.3.  After detailing the ways in which Babbitt’s Composition for 
Twelve Instruments (1948) instantiates P0 and RI2, Peter Westergaard closes by 
confessing that, as the piece unfolds, “I see no way for the ear to distinguish 
those attacks which define durations for P0 and those which define durations for 
RI2.  Thus, I see no way for the ear to perceive order or content” (Westergaard 
1965, 118; see also Taruskin 2005, 165–69). 
 
Example 3.3: Westergaard’s Example 13: Duration sets for Babbitt, Composition 




I thus see no evidence that experience was the sole or even ultimate authority in 
even Babbitt’s writings.  But perhaps we have been looking in the wrong place; 
COLLOQUY AND REVIEW 
as potentially perceptible when combinatoriality is applied to duration sets.11 
Others, however, cannot.12 Furthermore, some of these potentially perceptible ad- 
vantages are in fact imperceptible in Composition for Twelve Instruments. 
Consider the first combination of durational sets: 
Po 
R L 2 L' r Lr r r r L rfr r 
JLr LJrr rN^JJ-rN rI 
Ex. 13 
Suppose these two sets to be differentiated from one another by some factor 
(timbre, dynamics, pitch, etc.). As in pitch combinatoriality, content is controlled 
(the first six durations of one set exclude the first six of the other). As in pitch 
combinatoriality, order is only partially controlled (order within sets need not be 
altered to fulfill the content rule, but the total succession of durations for 
any combination is ordered only insofar as the individual sets are ordered-i.e., 
we know that 9 sixteenths will come before 5 and after 4 sixteenths, but we don't 
know where it will come in relation to 3 or 11 sixteenths). In any case, the order 
of these first twelve durations per se is not perceptible in the sense that the order 
of twelve pitches associated with them might be. 
11 Non-polyphonic structures, for example, like the secondary set formed by the last six 
durations of 15 and the first six of RI4. 
12 Choice of transposition levels of combined sets, for example, is determined as in com- 
binatoriality for pitch, but with one important further constraint: the transposition levels of 
P and RI forms are always even, while those of the I and R forms are always odd. The total 
length of the durational hexachord remains constant, avoiding such problems as follows: 
?< ~ first 6 durations = 33 J's > < 
PI,F~L^nJ JLJ JJ 
i-u_ L........ 9 ....___ 9 
3 _ r r r r r  r_ r r r 7 IL 
s~~< ~ first 6 durations =45 I's > 
second 6 durations = 45 's 
second 6 durations = 33 r' 
second 6 durations = 33 i's > 
* 117 
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perhaps we should not look to Princeton Theory’s music-theoretical writings but 
rather its compositions.  Following Quine, we may then judge the theory/practice 
relation as a corporate body, as embodied in the Princeton School’s pieces. 
In order to pursue this point within music theory, however, let us consider 
comments by Michael Schuijer, who has recently condemned pitch-class set 
theory for its purported lack of aural testability.  Although overstating this lack, 
and not pushing the issue far enough in another direction, Schuijer’s statements 
should cause concern for the scientifically-minded music theorist: 
 
Pitch-class set theory also stands condemned for its failure to explain how 
music makes sense aurally.  We often think that analyses of music should 
somehow reflect the way in which we hear it, or at least could learn to hear 
it.  This is a concern of the music theory teacher, who helps students 
develop their hearing skills.  But it is also a concern of those looking for a 
basis of scientific verification of analytical theories. A theory that tells us 
how we hear music can, in principle, be tested (that is, if we come to 
agreement about who “we” are); a theory that tells us how it has been 
conceived cannot.  Now, for a listener-based theory of music to be 
potentially testable, it should not merely produce interpretations of scores, 
but should also address the process through which such interpretations 
come into being. (2008, 23, emphasis original) 
 
It is less than obvious, however, that pitch-class set theory is not aurally testable.  
The motions between the learned, heard, and conceived are far more complicated 
than Schuijer would seem to allow, as we have discussed in this chapter.  I have 
always assumed that the Princeton Theorists were able to aurally perceive 
everything they discussed, not least because of the composerly closeness to their 
materials.  Further, entire pedagogies, as the author intimates, are devoted to 
such experiments.  And Babbitt, at least, long ago decided for himself who the 
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“we” are.24  But assuming Schuijer’s conclusions, if the theory’s propositions are 
not capable of reduction to observation sentences, or if we will not accept such 
propositions as theoretical terms, or if we will not accept the subjunctive motion 
toward the potentially testable, then not only does the scienticity of the theory—
any theory—lie open to question, doubt, but in the last analysis, the theory must 
be metaphysical.  This seems to be Westergaard’s threat: if the ear cannot 
perceive Babbitt’s theoretical entities then those entities are not testable, and if 
not testable, they lack cognitive content, are metaphysical.  As Misak said, 
quoted earlier, “If we do not have restrictions on the endowments of knowers, 
then we do not have something that is empirical enough for the empiricist” 
(1995, 142).  Music theory treats all aural problems as failures of the subject, but 
in this reading the problem would not be with the subject but with the test 
itself—the piece or example.  Babbitt, we imagine to his own great chagrin, 
despite himself, and to our great surprise, turns out to be a metaphysical 
composer.  High modernist music theory—despite its often scientific pretensions 
and by its own standards—turns out to be a metaphysical discourse, lacking 
cognitive content, neither confirmable nor falsifiable, neither true nor false, 






                                                
24 See Babbitt ([1958] 2003, 50), for mention of the listener as “a suitably equipped 
receptor,” and recall Babbitt’s (1986, 72) “reasonable listener.” Lewin ([1993] 
2007, 66–67) discusses Nicholas Cook’s use of the locution “the listener.” 
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4.  Lewin’s Denaturalization of Music Theory 
 
Early in his treatise Generalized Musical Intervals and Transformations, David 
Lewin implicitly dismisses physicalism (the assertion of physical objects as the 
primary building blocks for the system, to which Carnap will turn after the 
Aufbau and by the 1930’s) from the conversation to follow, asserting, again 
implicitly, phenomenalism in its place.25  During section 2.1.5, Lewin states that, 
“I do not think that the acoustics of harmonically vibrating bodies provide in 
themselves an adequate basis for grounding” intuitions of “distance” or 
“motion.”  He continues: “For instance, when we write int(C4, F4) = 45/32 ( = 2-5 
325), I do not believe that we are intuiting a common partial frequency F9 for 
both C4 and F4, a partial which is intuited forthwith in some harmonic space as 
both the 32nd partial of F#4 and the 45th partial of C4.  Nor do I believe that we 
intuit a path in harmonic space which corresponds directly to a compound series 
of individual multiplications and divisions by 2, 3, and 5” ([1987] 2007, 17–8). 
This argument by negation, as it were, accomplishes a number of goals for 
Lewin: it critiques the overtone follies (Babbitt [1965] 2003, 198), displacing 
acoustics as a foundation for music theory; critiques what would be an improper 
use of mathematics as model for music theory; and displaces in turn physicalism.  
Lewin will go on to describe and develop “an actual harmonic intuition” he has 
regarding C4–F4, during which he will implicitly assert phenomenalism as his 
                                                
25 Recall that although Lewin was appointed to Yale University (and eventually 
Harvard University), and achieved a certain disciplinary transcendence—his 
creation of his own theoretical tradition—he earned his M.F.A. in 1958 at 
Princeton University under Babbitt, in the same class as Winham and Randall 
(Blasius 1997, ix), and was an editorial board member of and published 
consistently in Perspectives of New Music. 
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philosophical foundation: the entities we discuss in music theory are not 
physical, they are aural/mental, and arrived at via intuition, intuitions which, 
importantly for Lewin, “are highly conditioned by cultural factors,” yet which 
are available to introspection.26  Lewin, due in part to his (over)use of the notion 
of intuition, would seem the most experiential of Princeton Theorists: by 
implicitly appealing to phenomenalism he builds experience into one of the early 
moves of his system, and time and again we are invited to hear, to actually 
experience, the results of his investigations. 
But it would be too quick a move to assert that Lewin’s discourse 
maintains itself at the level of experience.  While implicitly appealing to 
phenomenalism, his (proper) use of mathematics is highly abstract, and while we 
might usually conceive of the power of these abstractions as precisely that which 
enables him to return to musical experience in an enriched manner, with 
intensity, as Bo Alphonce has said of GMIT: “The cream of the [Webern Piano 
Variations, Op. 27] analysis, the important decisions, are altogether based on 
criteria from outside the GIS [Generalized Interval System] model, emanating 
from the experience of the analyst…. The specific GIS was triggered by an 
intuition that its particular properties would highlight relations the analyst 
would find interesting.  The formal apparatus guaranteed consistency; criteria 
for significance remained extrinsic” (1988, 173–74).  Mathematics as stand-in for 
conceptual thought, in Alphonce’s reading, stands outside of experience, both in 
the sense of a particular experience of a passage, and the analyst’s (Lewin’s) 
cumulative life-experience with music (analysis).  Erlebnis and Erfahrung, 
respectively. 
                                                
26 Lewin ([1987] 2007, 17).  Rings (2011, 17–19) outlines Lewin’s use of “intuition.” 
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Indeed, because theory and mathematics partially stand outside and yet 
gaze in on audible musical experiences, Lewin’s discourse often reenacts A. B. 
Marx’s pedagogical and analytical methodology.  That is, Lewin’s discursive 
motions (especially in GMIT) drift between what Marx would have called 
Anschauung und Tat: contemplation (intuition) and action, a process which 
presents, for Marx, an artistic not scientific consciousness.27  In Ian Bent’s 
description, “Marx’s detailed analysis [of Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony] 
constantly oscillates between subordinate detail and superordinate structure, and 
at the same time between objective technicality and subjective response” (1994, 
124).  This methodology, transposed to Lewin, often acts as a kind of pendulum, 
swinging gently between mathematical speculation and analytical experience, 
and in this sense the two mediate and transform each other, offering different 
perspectives on similar phenomena. 
A different model for how Lewin mediates the formal and experiential 
domains in music analysis from that proposed by Alphonce, and from this 
Anschauung und Tat, occurs during Lewin’s discussion of Figaro’s counting 
mistakes in the opening duet, “Cinque… dieci… venti… trenta,” of The Marriage 
of Figaro (Lewin [1995] 2006).  See Example 3.4, which reproduces Lewin’s 
Example 1.9 (Ibid., 15).  Arrayed as though a linguistic, indeed paradigmatic 
analysis, Lewin’s “passes” organize not only Lewin’s listening and 
understanding, but also Mozart’s music, for Lewin here projects onto Mozart and 
his music Lewin’s multiple passes through the music.   
                                                
27 Marx (1997, 19 and 31); see pp. 37–46 for an example of this process in action.  
On p. 7 of the same work, Burnham compares the process to Goethe.  Goethe in 
the space of Princeton Theory puts us in mind of Don (1996), which relates 
Goethe to Schenker to Boretz post-Meta-Variations. 
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Mozart here composes multiple passes through the same music, as if Mozart 
along with Susanna attempt not only to correct Figaro’s errors in reckoning, but 
to understand the original music more accurately: in Lewin’s analysis, the 
various motions from I to V and V to I, the recursive embeddings of multiples of 
five, until the breakdowns at 36 and 43.   
As stated, Lewin himself passes through this music, in music-analytical 
time, multiple times (I have not counted, but I would say far more than ten times, 
if we include the musical and textual examples).  But this is not a Schenkerian 
early to late, background to foreground or back again motion, rather here is a 
“left-to-right,” forward in chronological time, diachronic, performance-based, 
piece-time musical temporality, through each pass.  On nearly the last pass, 
while describing his example, Lewin says that his example, 
Example 1.9 Mozart, Marriage of Figaro, I, opening duet, Passes 0–2.
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beautifully illustrates Mozart’s virtuosity in projecting large-scale 
rhythmic complexities.  There are different time-systems on the example.  
In one system, we count the passing of time by the progress of the bass 
line; this is the system that controls the underlay format of the example.  A 
second, different, system marks the passage of time by the Newtonian or 
Kantian time-flow of the measures; in this system, Passes 0 and 2 contract 
the longer time-flow of Pass 1, presumably reflecting Figaro’s anxiety.  A 
third and yet different time-system marks the passage of time by the 
numbers 5, 10, and so forth of Figaro’s measuring series; this is the time-
system in which Figaro’s “Cinque” of Pass 2 is judged as one and a half 
measures too soon, rather than a half-measure too late. ([1995] 2006, 18) 
 
Lewin here assigns three different and successive temporalities to Mozart’s 
music, but it becomes difficult to separate out Lewin’s subjectivity from Mozart’s 
(or that imputed to Mozart): who composed this example, which “beautifully 
illustrates Mozart’s virtuosity?”  Is Lewin saying that his own example is 
beautiful, or that Mozart’s temporalities are beautiful?  Who created these 
multiple temporalities?  Mozart or Lewin?  Mozart, through his virtuosity?  
Lewin, through his multiple passes through this music?  Mozart, through his 
multiple passes through this music?  Lewin becomes so enthralled by 
temporality here that he loses not only his grasp on musical experience, nor 
solely the origin of “the” music, but indeed his own subjectivity as an individual 
person.  Recall that Lewin starts and ends the article by discussing Freud on, 
“erroneous performance, such as misspeaking, misreading, mishearing, and 
mislaying” (Ibid., 5; see also, Freud [1916] 1966).  All of this is not to mention the 
evocation of both Newtonian and Kantian (!) means of reckoning time within a 
single temporal system.  There are so many temporalities at play here, so many 
ways of reckoning time, so many implicit histories, the effect is dizzying.  If I 
may project myself, I would suggest this was precisely Lewin’s intent, his 
peroration creating this effect.  In comparison, the Schenkerian sketch Lewin 
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then offers emphasizes teleology, cutting across the circularity of the passes.  
This does capture a certain musical experience: Figaro’s tense, expectant, anxiety.  
Further, the superimposition of passes 0–3, which are rotational or cyclical, onto 
the linear Schenkerian sketch nicely conveys the multiple temporalities—linear 
and non-linear—of the duet.  But the notion that we are to experience in any 
given moment or in any straightforward sense all that Lewin discusses seems 
fantastical.  In fact, precisely the multiple “passes” through this music, although 
perhaps representing a kind of learning process, remove one from the typical, 
rounded experience we ideally attribute to our musicalities.  A discussion of 
music, then, can inform experience without itself being a one-to-one mapping or 
narration of that experience.  As Kofi Agawu says of his own Beethoven Op. 18, 
no. 3/1 paradigmatic analysis, “We have heard it, however, not in Beethoven’s 
temporal or real-time order but in a new conceptual order” (2008, 196).  The 
nature of the experience of that conceptual order is complex, underdetermined, 
and under-discussed in Lewinian discourse. 
Given Lewin’s general silence regarding methodology—unique amongst 
Princeton Theorists, whose project was in large measure meta-theoretical, 
epistemological—when he does mention it explicitly we tend to grasp onto the 
parcel, repeating it frequently as if a mantra, though perhaps not critically.  (This 
is especially apparent in the many reviews of GMIT.)  For instance there is the 
following, often quoted, “point”: “This is the methodological point: It is unfair to 
demand of a musical theory that it always address our sonic intuitions faithfully 
in all potentially musical contexts under all circumstances.  It is enough to ask 
that the theory do so in a sufficient number of contexts and circumstances.  
Perhaps, too, it is fair to ask that the theory be potentially able to address our 
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intuitions in any given musical situation, provided that the situation develops in 
a suitable musical manner” ([1987] 2007, 85, emphasis original).  Yet after the 
Chopin B-Minor Sonata analysis that, as Lewin intends, proves his point, he 
repeats himself, now reintroducing the theme as a normative “claim”: “To repeat 
my methodological claim: One should not ask of a theory, that every formally 
true statement it can make about musical events be a perception-statement.  One 
can only demand that a preponderance of its true statements be potentially 
meaningful in sufficiently developed and extended perceptual contexts.” (Ibid., 
87, emphasis original)  Why should Lewin take us through this process, this 
argument?  Why should Lewin appeal to intuition?  “Intuition” here defined 
with the help of the predicate “sonic,” thus “intuition” here meaning something 
like perception or experience.  Or, phrased discursively, perception-statement.  
Again, why should Lewin appeal to intuition? 
 An answer is that music-theoretical discourse often betrays an anxiety 
when confronted with its own abstractions from the auditory reality of musical 
phenomena, which demonstrates just how far our discourse is from assuming a 
kind of musica mundana or metatheoretical, speculative basis, as discussed 
previously.  Lewin’s work constructs itself as at once theoretically advanced, 
abstract, mathematical, and musically real, phenomenological, grounded, in a 
word, intuitive.  Thus, it is the situating of Lewin’s work within a tense, at times 
contradictory realm that leads to his desire to comment on the roles of perception 
statements and formally true statements within a methodological point/claim.  
But it is not merely that, for Lewin, music theory is conceptual, in deference to 
lived musical experience, nor thoroughly experiential: it is that musical discourse 
must be both situated in the middle of, and held fast at, these two extremes of 
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register.  Within the consideration of musical discourse more broadly construed, 
Lewin’s comments have a real payoff.  Lewin’s writings are both musically 
abstract and concrete, and it is both the accordance of these two domains and 
their strictly held dichotomy that is fruitful for him.  Lewin equivocates on the 
reality of music: it is at once both concrete and abstract; but he equivocates 
further: theory may both mediate between these two poles and keep them at a 
distance. 
 Lewin’s point/claim sounds remarkably similar to Quine’s critique of 
logical positivism, quoted earlier.  As Quine has said, “I characterized science as 
a linguistic structure keyed to experience here and there…. Theory is empirically 
under-determined” ([1975] 2004, 298–99).  While Lewin does not appeal to a 
“corporate body” or holism of theory/experience, and in addition adds Babbitt’s 
move to the potential, nonetheless Lewin posits a similar relaxation of the 
demand for the audibility of theoretical postulates.  Dubiel (2007) has spoken of 
Lewin’s, “intense concern with every construction’s relation to hearing (which 
need not mean anything so simple as that every construction is heard).”  
Let us recall that for Lewin, our intuitions “are highly conditioned by 
cultural factors” ([1987] 2007, 17).  Why would Lewin be concerned to point this 
out?  One answer involves the history of music theory.  At the beginning of a 
reading of François-Joseph Fétis’ story describing his discovery of the laws of 
tonalité, Lewin moves swiftly to isolate three “theses”: 
 
1. Tonalité is an Anschauung whereby human cultures perceive, articulate, 
and organize their various relationships among tones, whether the 
tones be successive or simultaneous. 
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2. “Nature” does not provide us with the ratios of small, whole numbers, 
to be validated by philosophy, mathematics, or physics, as a basis for 
one and only one “true” tonalité.  Rather, “Nature” provides 
humankind with only a raw continuum of pitches (timbres, durations, 
intensities, etc.). 
 
3. From this musical State of Nature, different human cultures, with 
different Anschauungen, perforce perceive, articulate, and organize 
tonal relationships in different systems, projecting a wide variety of 
tonalités both geographically and historically. (Lewin 1987, 1 and 3, n 2) 
 
Reading intuition into the dawn of the notion of tonality, although Lewin here 
admits that for Fétis’ certain raw acoustical stimuli lie anterior to human 
intervention through culture, Lewin’s purpose is to denaturalize music theory.28  
To restate Lewin’s appeal from GMIT, discussed earlier: “Personally, I am 
convinced that our intuitions are highly conditioned by cultural factors.  In 
particular, I do not think that the acoustics of harmonically vibrating bodies 
provide in themselves an adequate basis for grounding those intuitions” ([1987] 
2007, 17).  Read against our earlier comments regarding physicalism and 
phenomenalism, Lewin is arguing that although musical materials begin in the 
physical realm, it is only through acculturation, as phenomena, that they acquire 
what we might describe as their musicality.  If music theory was solely 
concerned with perception statements, experience, it would reduce music to a 
corpus for music cognition, thus naturalizing music and the discipline of music 
theory.  (Recall Lewin’s implicit critique of music cognition in his 1986 
phenomenology article.)  Alternatively, if music theory was identified with 
mathematics, it would be solely speculative, thus naturalizing music and the 
                                                
28 I would argue that Lewin performs history of theory in what Nietzsche calls 
the monumental mode of history, which is the mode in which that which was is 
construed as might be, again—a kind of presentism; see, Nietzsche ([1874] 1997). 
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discipline of music theory.  Lewin holds the two extremes in tension in his 
writings.29 
As a final example of Princeton Theory’s motion toward the conceptual, 
the non-empirical, let us consider another of Lewin’s famous methodological 
points/claims: “We must conceive the formal space of a GIS as a space of 
theoretical possibilities, rather than as a compendium of musical practicalities.”30  
Lewin goes on to back away from this claim, hedging the ideal or subjunctive 
quality of theoretical possibilities with discussion of “actually stated musical 
material,” (Ibid.) but the methodological point stands, maintains its status as a 
declaration, and in turn points us away from that which may simply be 
experienced: “On the other hand, in other compositional or theoretical contexts, 
the space S of a GIS might be pertinent as an entirety only to the extent it is 
suggested or implied by the actually stated musical material, plus the 
characteristic relationships actually employed” (Ibid.).  Ultimately, then, perhaps 
for Lewin music-theoretical experience is in fact unproblematic: as stated, it 
fluctuates between Anschauung und Tat.  Tracing that fluctuation, its movements, 
is the problem. 
 The reason that Lewin would want to denaturalize music theory at such a 
late date is that music cognition had gained traction, but also that the alternative 
                                                
29 Recall too the seemingly endless “Nature vs. Nurture” debates prevalent 
during the 1980’s, to which Lewin is clearly here responding. 
 
30 ([1987] 2007, 27).  Lewin’s understanding of the GIS as a space of potentialities 
recalls the Riemannian Tonnetz.  Recall, too, that Hugo Riemann studied with the 
philosopher Hermann Lotze (1817–1881), for whom, “the common 
understanding of ‘reality’ as an empirical existence of things was… subsumed 
under the much broader reality of ideas, as a network of logical relations” 
(Rehding 2003, 84). 
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to the musical hearing of a trained, charismatic theorist, seems to be an appeal to 
the basest of musical abilities, “natural,” beyond our control.  There is an utopian 
moment in these texts, a moment where the music theorist breaks the bonds of 
nature—of what must be heard—and hears music anew, imagines that which 
could be heard, and changes her life.31  This is freedom for the music theorist, an 
issue to which we shall return in Chapter Five. 
 Throughout this chapter I have argued that “experience” is a problematic 
notion for Princeton Theory, given that the tradition recognizes both the 
importance of the trained, charismatic theorist’s ability to aurally perceive 
musical entities, but also precisely the conceptual motion in thinking 
theoretically about music.  Along the way I have argued that Princeton Theory 
problematized the notion of what music theory is—whether it is explanation, 
description, or metatheory; that it problematized the “stuff” of music theory—its 
most fundamental entities; that Babbitt problematized the role of experience in 
an empirical science about music; and that Lewin sought to denaturalize music 
theory by problematizing any notion of a simple relation between experience and 
conceptual thought.  Sometimes Princeton Theory holds fast to either experience 
or conceptual thought; sometimes it seeks to mediate the two extremes; 
sometimes it appears uncertain of where it stands as regards the two; at other 
times it (meta)theorizes the distinctions and relations, if at times inconsistently.  
Precisely such inconsistency, I would argue, rather than robbing music theory or 
Princeton Theory of its scientific or humanistic pretenses, makes the discourses 
more robust, interesting, and problematic. 
                                                
31 Recall that in his virtual debate with Nicholas Cook, Lewin (mis)quotes Rilke 
to the effect that changing one’s musical life is the goal of music theory (Lewin 
[1993] 2007, 53–67).  We shall return to this in Chapter Five. 
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You’re perfect / Yes it’s true 
But without me / You’re only you. 
 
—Faith No More, “Midlife Crisis” 
 
 





I have never felt further away from humans than now.  Every word that escapes 
my mouth is a solipsism.  Every move I make is solipsistic.  Solipsist.  Look it up, 
insect…. See my face?  It’s part you, part what you made me.  I have disappeared 
into you.  You are the Solipsist, I am nothing but an extension of you…. Solipsist, 
motherfucker.  Yeah, the world is an extension of me.  You’re living in my vision. 
 
—Henry Rollins, Solipsist 
 
 
Solipsism binds us together. 
 
—David Foster Wallace, “Westward the Course of Empire Takes Its Way” 
 
 
But the experimental Turn and theorized experience carry a further 
problematic, and that is the problematic of how musical experience could ever be 
shared, at all, let alone in something approaching its totality of richness and 
uniqueness.  One answer to the question is simply to deny that experience can be 
shared: to assert no possibility of intersubjectivity.  Another related yet more 
extreme position, is that of solipsism. 
I would like to quote definitions of solipsism from a text read at Princeton 
some time around October 25, 1961, during a course given by J. K. Randall 
(Randall 1961, b. 41 f. 4; see also Snyder 2012, 8).  This text was commonly 
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referred to as “Runes’ Dictionary,” i.e., the Dictionary of Philosophy edited by 
Dagobert D. Runes (Runes 1960).  While Randall assigned entries to his students 
by Alonzo Church (1903–1995, who was professor of mathematics and 
philosophy at Princeton during this time) on everything from descriptions, 
function, and formal logic to number, fellow Princeton professor Ledger Wood’s 
(1901–1970) entry on solipsism was also included in this volume, and while not 
specifically assigned, would have been a valuable reference source, and is 
illuminating for its historical texture, providing an entry point into the topic as 
was available to Princeton Theorists at that time: 
 
 Solipsism: 
 (Lat. solus, alone + ipse, self) 
 
 (a) Methodological: The epistemological doctrine which considers the  
individual self and its states the only possible or legitimate starting point 
for philosophical construction. See Cogito, ergo sum; Ego-centric predicament; 
Subjectivism. 
 
(b) Metaphysical: Subvariety of idealism, which maintains that the 
individual self of the solipsistic philosopher is the whole of reality and 
that the external world and other persons are representations of that self 
having no independent existence. (Woods 1960) 
 
Wood’s entry puts us in mind of the Cartesian lineage of modern philosophy’s 
problematic of solipsism: it cross-references Cogito, ergo sum; Ego-centric 
predicament; and Subjectivism. (We shall return to these related issues.) Solipsism, 
then, comes in many forms, but in its most extreme, metaphysical or ontological 
form, it asserts that only I exist—in the context of music theory, the listening or 
theorizing “I.”  Its complementary negative motion presents the skeptical 
argument that doubts the existence of others or other minds.  Despite the 
 151 
definition here given, we shall see that methodological solipsism as understood 
in the lineage of Carnap’s Aufbau makes no claims to necessity, merely to 
methodological expediency, and additionally makes no ontological nor 
epistemological claims, but uses a solipsistic basis—the foundation of the 
experiencing or remembering “I”—as the basis for the construction of its system, 
musical or otherwise.  Woods defines methodological solipsism here as an 
epistemological position, which asserts that I can only know the contents of my 
own sense impressions.  This shades into metaphysical solipsism because if you 
do exist, you cannot share these sense impressions, and I cannot share yours 
(again, if you do exist). 
Solipsism may seem a non-issue, a position that no one truly holds, an 
argument from extremes, or a chimera.  But we will discover that certain 
members of Princeton Theory do indeed hold to this position and yet attempt to 
exorcise it; that Princeton Theory accuses its own practitioners of sliding toward 
it; that four important influences on Princeton Theory—Russell, Wittgenstein, 
Carnap and Goodman—assumed or problematized it; that although solipsism 
appears as a problematic during Princeton Theory’s high-modernist phase, it 
becomes especially pronounced after the Turn; and that indeed, not only has 
Princeton Theory been accused of it, but all formalism has met this charge.  I 
argue that its critics have been more correct than they realize, but not because 
musical formalism or Princeton Theory somehow simply “is” solipsistic, but 
rather because the solipsistic problematic hangs over Princeton Theory’s 
discourses, eventually representing the most extreme form of modernist 
alienation.  But further, I show that if, for example, Boretz’s Meta-Variations can 
be regarded as solipsistic, then its creation of the external (musical) world is a 
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necessity—a need arises to create the external world to prove (to himself) that he 
is not all that exists, musically. 
This chapter seeks to accomplish a number of goals: to show that 
solipsism is an issue not just for the critics of Princeton Theory, but also for the 
Princeton Theorists themselves.  I argue this by unpacking the problematic of 
solipsism primarily in the writings of Russell, Wittgenstein, the Carnap of the 
Aufbau and Nelson Goodman’s Structure of Appearance, showing how these 
writings served as important historical precedents for substantial music-
theoretical writings by the Princeton Theorists Winham, Boretz, and Rahn.  
Further, I trace the problematic of solipsism from Descartes, show its revival in 
Husserl, and situate the post-Turn writings of Princeton Theory—particularly the 
later Boretz—against this phenomenological solipsism.  I show how Boretz’s 
later radical relativism entails solipsism.  I discuss a subtype of solipsism, the 
“solipsism of the present moment,” which in one sense temporalizes solipsism.  
And lastly, I discuss a Babbitt quote which accuses Marion Guck (who classifies 
her own work as sitting uneasily within the lineage of Babbitt and Princeton 
Theory [see Guck 1997, 53 and Guck 2012, 101]) of sliding close to a “private 
language” (Babbitt 1997, 135), showing it to be a problematic and far from 
obvious accusation, because the argument against the possibility of a private 
language, so named, was carried out by Wittgenstein in his Philosophical 
Investigations.  Chapter Five, then, investigates the ethical implications of a 
solipsistic position, among other ethical problematics surrounding Princeton 
Theory. 
As stated, at times solipsism represents the furthest extension of 
modernist alienation, which I take to be the insight provoked by skeptics such as 
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Taruskin, Kerman, and McClary, whose positions appear fairly widely held 
within musical academia generally.  But there exists a certain naiveté to the 
critics’ positions, and normal music theory in general, when both assume 
experiences are (simply, mechanically, grossly) sharable: this is the insight 
provoked by Princeton Theory.  The problematization of the publicness of 
experience should motivate us to think more deeply about our assumptions and 
goals.  This is not the same as saying some music-theoretical or programmatic 
entity is “not hearable.”  It is saying I can hear it, but I have no access to whether 
you can hear it, even if you behave as if, say that, you do.  Solipsism within 
Princeton Theory puts pressure on musical discourses of all types, because the 
critics of Princeton Theory forget that solipsism was problematic both after the 
Turn, when it engaged phenomenology and first-person reports of experiences, 




1.  Solipsism and Communication 
 
The critics of Princeton Theory accuse it of solipsism: either individual 
members or in toto—solipsistic in their beliefs, or solipsists by implication of a 
sometimes subjectivist stance vis-à-vis analysis, invoking sensation language.  
Furthermore, Gary Tomlinson, in a classic of the New Musicology, argues that 
musical formalism in general, and by extension Princeton Theory in particular, is 
solipsistic: “[Lawrence Kramer] offers as the goal of musicology the continuance 
of the ‘dialogue of listening,’ but he gives little hint as to how we might begin to 
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reconceive this dialogue in postmodern terms.  Indeed, from his example we 
could only guess that his ‘dialogue’ comes closer to modernist solipsism than to 
true conversation—to a ventriloquist’s monologue in which the critic reacts to 
the music by throwing his/her voice into the body of the faintly imagined 
composer/other.”1  For “modernist solipsism” we can read modernist, formalist 
and epistemological solipsism, for Tomlinson is here accusing Kramer of falling 
back on precisely such a formalism, a formalism born, Tomlinson argues, of the 
bifurcation between language and music, enabling either the description of 
musical contexts or texts themselves, assuming the transcendent power of the 
authorial voice of the composer, reinscribing an aesthetics of mastery and 
colonizing, terrorizing power relations (Ibid., 18–19, 21, and 23).  Formalism, 
criticism, description, for Tomlinson, if carried out in modernist guise, create, not 
simply the tendency toward solipsism, but solipsism itself.  Not simply 
subjectivity or subject-formation, but a discourse of subject-formation at the 
expense of community building, incapable of communication, of being shared: 
monologic, imperial. 
Kevin Korsyn brings all of this closer to home, pointing to Princeton 
Theory after the Turn: “Unconventional genres can also tend toward 
monologism.  Perspectives of New Music, for example, has published a number of 
experiments with unconventional modes of music analysis, some of them in the 
form of free verse, which seem hermetic and solipsistic” (2003, 185).  “Seem” is 
an important caveat, but the entire sentiment figures as a kind of warning: 
Korsyn himself pushes and advocates pushing discourse far, but not too far.  
                                                




Hermeticism and monologism here coincide with solipsism.  It must be said that 
Korsyn projects an ambivalence here, because more generally he is advocating 
and himself performing discursive dialogism, so Perspectives of New Music would 
seem to be precisely the model within recent music theory he would like to 
emulate.  Indeed, he analyzes approvingly Lewin ([1986] 2006), but as discussed 
in Chapter Two, I read that article as Lewin’s own “freak out” piece, i.e., his own 
Turn.  Korsyn is correct, in my view, to suggest the tendency in Princeton Theory 
toward monologism, but we might suggest a dialectical counter-tendency 
toward the dialogic. 
 In their critique of Princeton Theory generally and Boretz’s Meta-
Variations particularly, Brown and Dempster (1989, 76) historicize the 
problematic of solipsism as a necessary component of phenomenalistic systems: 
“Phenomenalism carries with it the threat of solipsism and the problems 
Wittgenstein and others have associated with so-called ‘private languages.’”  
Again, as discussed in Chapter Three, phenomenalistic systems construct the 
world on the basis of experience.  The “threat” of solipsism is that they might not 
be able to get out of the single subject’s experience.  Rahn (1974), at the least, was 
aware of this possibility, anticipated it, and even argued against it.  Additionally, 
as stated, Babbitt (1997) accuses Guck (1997) of creating something close to a 
private language by using metaphors to discuss music.  We shall discuss these 
aspects of the problematic in more detail later in this chapter.   
 In responding to a loosely phenomenological article by Joseph Dubiel 
(2004), Rose Rosengard Subotnik asks, “when Dubiel advocates, for instance, that 
‘the main value of [one’s] analyses… be something like responsiveness,’ what 
warranty can he offer that the scholar’s responses will have a claim on anyone 
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else?  Is his casual afterthought, that ‘a related value is frankness,’ intended to 
provide such a warranty?  Is frankness sufficiently rigorous to prevent the 
collapse of the individual into the solipsistic?” (2004, 291) Although Dubiel’s 
hearings are concerned or begin with introspection, I would argue that if readers 
can hear or even approach, imagine, hearing the “whats” he describes, then we 
share at least that much.  Solipsism is an issue not of agreement, which Subotnik 
implies, but rather of shared accessibility, a more fundamental level.  Hence 
solipsism is not an actual argument or position here, but rather voices Subotnik’s 
own discomfort with the all-too-personal, of actually having to comment on 
what she hears: the legalistic, contractual language of the repeated “warranty” 
giving this away, as an escape to formality.  I want to emphasize my admiration 
for Subotnik’s work, but also mark its limits, and ask: when or by what means 
does the individual avoid the collapse into the solipsistic?  What would an 
alternative discourse that still respects the individuality of the musical listener 
look (better, sound) like?  In lieu of an answer, the fear of solipsism remains, and 
in each of these cases (Tomlinson, Korsyn, Brown and Dempster and Subotnik; 
both before and after the Turn) it appears to be a metaphysical solipsism that 
represents such a threat to communality as represented by (presumably, plainly 
public) discourse. 
Randall seems most guilty (if we conceive of it thus) of this charge.  In 
fact, he seems to violate frankly public discourse intentionally, as a kind of 
stylized warning: the impenetrability of the surface of his texts acts as a kind of 
armor, indemnifying his individuality.  Just when you think you have pinned 
him down, his meanings, he gives you the slip.  At play here is a composerly 
withholding of meaning: precisely the anti-historical musicology stance.  
 157 
Meaning is far too personal, too interior, to be brought into discursive space, 
light.  He would seem the most hermetic, if not solipsistic, of these 
composers/theorists, yet even here we can reconstruct meaning.  Perhaps, it is 
not the texts which defy communication, but the reader’s interaction with 
Randall’s texts.  Indeed, communication still exists.  Randall, in the “Prefatory 
Note” which begins the mammoth two-volume collection of his and Boretz’s 
writings from 1960 to 2003, Being About Music, figures communication as 
problematic, not along the usual lines of, will you understand the signal I have 
sent out?, but rather, once filtered through you and repeated back to me, will I 
understand the signal I had sent out? (Randall 2003, 1) The fear of this inability, 
(and ability is a kind of catchword that needs to be interrogated, yet seems 
appropriate) raises the very real question: why, then, write (in either a linguistic 
or musical sense) at all?  Why attempt to communicate?  Boretz is more explicit 
and seemingly solipsistic.  Others may exist, but they are secondary to the music-
experiencing self: “The core problem of intersubjectivity is: how can I know my 
own experience?  What means of mental exertion or interior formulation can I 
invent to acquire compositional and performative access to what I have already 
undergone, but not, as I wish it, fully experienced?  Communication with others 
is a fringe benefit” ([1992] 2003b, 312).  It seems, then, for the sake of one’s self 
that one communicates, but further, “Thinking in music, the creative-relative do-
it-yourself ontology-making ascribing activity is fully liberated, and fully 
determinate, if terminally occluded from the verbal-cognitive kind of 
intersubjectivity by its untranslatable, unparaphrasable selfhood” (Boretz [1993] 
2003, 351).  Communication—translating and paraphrasing in the hope of 
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intersubjectivity—seems doomed.  In lieu of communication, solipsism seems the 
fallback position. 
This said, Randall would probably argue that his means of 
communication are just that: means of communication, for the benefit of all 
parties involved.  They take on radically altered and non-conformist, non-
academic styles, but so much the better, more appropriate, for communicating 
the lived qualities of musical motion, for example.  To return to our earlier 
suggestion of a monologic/dialogic pairing in Princeton Theory after the Turn, 
Boretz’s ([1982] 2003) Talk: If I Am a Musical Thinker seems profoundly monologic: 
it features Rorschach inkblots; but the last section of Randall’s ([1970] 1995) 
Compose Yourself, for instance, is profoundly dialogic: so much so that it becomes 
difficult if not impossible to separate the multiple voices, multiple subjectivities 
presented.  Indeed, we can detect a tension between communication and 
solipsism, self and other, for while discussing his composing after the Turn, 
Randall says that, “with MIDI I’m working directly on sound like a sculptor and 
I guess it has that nice solipsistic feel to it” (Randall 2011, disc 3, c. 42:50).  But, he 
continues: “I think my satisfaction with it goes back to something which I’ve 
always believed and said, which is, okay, I’m simply… concentrating on what I 
want this to be and how I want this to sound.  I’m not concerned that this is or 
isn’t of some fashion or some style.  I’m not concerned with that…. And my 
justification for that was not that I don’t give a shit about anybody else; that’s not 
the point, the point is I have no reason to think I’m unique” (Ibid.).  Randall here 
articulates a desire for solipsism as a space apart, a safe space for self and 
composing, and listening, removed from fashion, style, and triviality—surface 
change.  As we shall discuss in Chapter Five, there is an ethical consideration 
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here for Randall, because the other option for the composer—projecting herself 
out into the world, as “somethin’ special”—seems blatantly unethical, 
destructive both to music and the self. 
Earlier, however, there was a time when communication and 
communality seemed not only possible, but important, if begrudgingly.  Babbitt: 
“The composer who insists that he is concerned only with writing music and not 
with talking about it may once have been, may still be, a commendable—even 
enviable—figure, but once he presumes to speak or take pen in hand in order to 
describe, inform, evaluate, reward, or teach, he cannot presume to claim 
exemption—on medical or vocational grounds—from the requirements of 
cognitive communication” ([1965] 2003, 192).  Meta-Variations is all about 
communication, music as communication: “Anyone who does make the musical 
data-field his pasture, but still maintains a view of musical ‘being’ as something 
other than a form of cognitive communication is actually not in a position to 
carry out such a program cognitively.”2  Cognitivity, in this reading of Meta-
Variations, then, takes on a secondary importance to the problematic of 
communication. 
                                                
2 Boretz (1969, 22).  At issue here is the notion of cognition or the cognitive.  
Erkenntnis (cognition/knowledge) is the German that the logical positivists and 
others are using.  In the epigraph that appears before Chapter Three, Kant uses 
Erkenntnis (from the Critique of Pure Reason).  In 1925 Mortiz Schlick published 
Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre (translated as Schlick [1925] 1985).  In the 1930s the 
Vienna Circle starting publishing a journal called Erkenntnis.  In brief, for the 
logical positivists, that which is verifiable through sense experience, or reducible 
to observational terms, is cognitive, knowable, so that the goal of our projects, 
musical or otherwise, is an intersubjective Erkenntnis.  For further discussion, see 
Hempel ([1950] 1965), and Scheffler (1963, 127–222).  It would be interesting to 
read the latter two against Blasius (1997, 1–13), which discusses Winham on the 
problem of musical significance, and to which we shall return. 
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For Fromm, the rationale for the founding of Perspectives of New Music had 
been precisely its ability to enable communication, communication between a 
select but wide group of people, with a very specific, very general end: “We hope 
that by offering composers the opportunity to discuss issues vital to them, and 
by encouraging a mutual interchange of ideas between composers, performers, 
and listeners, Perspectives of New Music will succeed in bringing music closer to 
the center of contemporary culture” (Fromm 1962, 2).  This is very far removed 
from Babbitt’s ([1958] 2003) vision.  Even for Boretz and Berger, Perspectives of 
New Music was, “a forum in which to evolve linguistic modes for 
communication” (Berger and Boretz 1962, 5).  It is as if once communication, 
communication and therefore communality, was firmly established, by the early 




2.  Logical Positivism, Methodological Solipsism, and the Self 
 
We can approach the problematic of solipsism from another angle, 
however, and that is from logical positivism.  A main tenet of logical positivism 
in what I have called the Received View, was that the knowledge science 
generates should be or potentially be grounded in or tested against experience: 
experientially verified by someone having the experience.  This is the famous 
criterion of verifiability, as discussed in Chapter Three.  I quote A. J. Ayer at 
length, because by the time he was writing (1959) the issue of solipsism as it 
relates to verifiability had seemed to be settled: 
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The prevailing view [among the logical positivists] was that [elementary] 
statements referred to the subject’s introspective or sensory experiences…. 
For in the last resort it is only through someone’s having an experience 
that any statement is verified….  Though physical objects might be 
publically accessible, sense-data were taken to be private.  There could be 
no question of our literally sharing one another’s sense data, any more 
than we can literally share one another’s thoughts or images or feelings.  
The result was that the truth of an elementary statement could be directly 
checked only by the person to whose experience it referred…. If each of us 
is bound to interpret any statement as being ultimately a description of his 
own private experience, it is hard to see how we can ever communicate at 
all.  Even to speak of “each one of us” is to beg a question; for it would 
seem that on this view the supposition that other people exist can have no 
meaning for me unless I construe it as a hypothesis about my own 
observations of them, that is, about the course of my own actual or 
possible experiences.  It was maintained by Carnap and others that the 
solipsism which seemed to be involved in this position was only 
methodological; but this was little more than an avowal of the purity of 
their intentions.  It did nothing to mitigate the objections to their theory. 
(1959, 17–18) 
 
In his earlier popularization of the Vienna Circle, Language, Truth, and Logic, Ayer 
([1936] 1952) went to great lengths to argue that the principle of verification does 
not entail solipsism, this despite his later problematization of the privateness of 
experience here.  (We shall return to the problem of other people later in this 
section and in Chapter Five.) 
The Vienna Circle of logical positivists spent months studying 
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.  “Logical positivism combined 
Wittgenstein’s emphasis on an explicit test of meaningfulness with Russell’s 
logical techniques and his emphasis on sense experience and observation” 
(Soames 2003a, 259).  Furthermore, the Tractatus includes a famous, if perplexing 
and seemingly mystical, account of solipsism, which I would like to outline here.  
David Pears (1987, 5) traces the Tractatus’ solipsism to the opening axiom and 
extension of Schopenhauer’s The World as Will and Representation:  
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“The world is my representation”: this is a truth valid with reference to 
every living and knowing being, although man alone can bring it into 
reflective, abstract consciousness.  If he really does so, philosophical 
discernment has dawned on him.  It then becomes clear and certain to him 
that he does not know a sun and an earth, but only an eye that sees a sun, 
a hand that feels an earth; that the world around him is there only as 
representation, in other words, only in reference to another thing, namely 
that which represents, and this is himself. (Schopenhauer [1818] 1969, §1)  
 
Cartesian and Kantian filiations apparent, the notion expressed is that I do not 
have access to things in themselves, rather only my representations of them, and, 
since the that out there is only my representation, I only have access to my own 
self (and its representations, the world).  Wittgenstein picks up this theme but 
alters it to accord with the notion that the “I” of the solipsist is not in the world: 
“The self of solipsism shrinks to a point without extension, and there remains the 
reality co-ordinated with it” ([1921] 1974, §5.64).  Wittgenstein next nearly quotes 
Schopenhauer: “What brings the self into philosophy is the fact that ‘the world is 
my world’” (Ibid., §5.641).  Earlier, Wittgenstein declared that, “the world is my 
world” (Ibid., §5.62).  Indeed, the entire set of propositions beginning with §5.6 
read as an elaboration upon Schopenhauer’s insight: “The limits of my language 
mean the limits of my world.”  Pears (1987, 158) argues that unlike earlier 
treatments of the problematic of solipsism, Wittgenstein is less concerned with 
the solipsist’s experiences than with the purported identity or ego behind those 
experiences, denying the knowability or existence of such an ego.3  We shall treat 
                                                
3 As with seemingly everything Wittgenstein, disagreement exists as to whether 
he affirms or denies the validity of solipsism.  I believe he affirms it.  Here is one 
discussion of the matter: “In The False Prison volume I (1987) David Pears (to 
simplify drastically) regards solipsism as a theory refuted in the early work by 
showing that the supposed subject does not exist and rendered totally harmless 
in later discussion by showing that the supposed private objects of such a subject 
cannot exist either.  One difficulty with this account is that in the earlier work 
Wittgenstein does not refute but affirms solipsism” (McGuinness 2002, 131). 
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the same theme in discussing Carnap’s denial of the necessity of the self at the 
earliest stages of his (re)construction of the world. 
We turn, then, to Carnap’s Aufbau because it served as the locus classicus of 
the early movement of logical positivists and was the text most readily serving as 
a model for the construction of an axiomatic music-theoretical system.  As 
mentioned by Ayer, in this text solipsism was announced as a methodological 
position, following from the phenomenalism of Carnap’s construction.  Carnap 
([1928] 2003 §64) explicitly borrows the notion of methodological solipsism from 
Hans Driesch, a quotation from whom will aid our understanding and provide 
historical context for this admittedly difficult notion.  “The totality of immediate 
objects, then, are my objects, and their order is my order….  I have not said: ‘the 
world of my objects, both immediate and mediate or natural, is only my world.’  
But I have said: ‘it is my world in any case,’ or, in other words: ‘this it is that I 
know: it is my world’” ([1905] 1914, 232–33, emphasis original).  Driesch here 
presents what he calls a critical method (Ibid., 233), because the method only 
assumes that the objects of the world are my own objects, and withholds 
judgment as to the status of these objects for others, for you.  The difference with 
Carnap is that Driesch assumes a subject as foundation from which others and 
the world are to be constructed, while Carnap does not. 
Unlike Driesch and Wood’s definition quoted earlier (Woods 1960), it is 
precisely Carnap’s point that methodological solipsism does not necessitate the 
experience of the individual subject, but rather takes that solipsistic standpoint as 
the methodological start for the system: 
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The autopsychological basis [the psychological occurrences within the 
individual self] is also called solipsistic.  We do not thereby subscribe to the 
view that only one subject and its experiences are real, while the other 
subjects are nonreal [metaphysical solipsism]….  Since the choice of an 
autopsychological basis amounts merely to an application of the form and 
method of solipsism, but not to an acknowledgement of its central thesis, 
we may describe our position as methodological solipsism. (Carnap [1928] 
2003, §64, emphasis original) 
 
Carnap constitutes the “I” at a later level of the system (Ibid., §163), following 
from his commitment to a solely methodological solipsism.  As he says, 
 
The expressions “autopsychological basis” and “methodological 
solipsism” are not to be interpreted as if we wanted to separate, to begin 
with, the “ipse”, or the “self”, [“Ich”] from the other subjects, or as if we 
wanted to single out one of the empirical subjects and declare it to be the 
epistemological subject.  At the outset, we can speak neither of other 
subjects nor the self…. In our system form, the basic elements are to be 
called experiences of the self after the construction has been carried out…. 
Egocentricity is not an original property of the basic elements, of the given. 
(Ibid., §65, emphasis original) 
 
This characterization forms a crucial difference with Husserl’s phenomenology, 
which starts from the assumption of the self as experiencer of its world.  (Carnap 
makes exactly this point at Ibid.  We shall return to Husserl shortly.)  But in the 
Aufbau’s constitutional system, the given in experience at the first levels of the 
system has yet to be experienced by some Cartesian subject as the seat of 
awareness and knowledge.  That must be constituted at a later level.  As Nelson 
Goodman says in the most in-depth exposition and critique of the Aufbau, 
“Carnap has given notice that his system would be phenomenalistic and thus in 
one sense solipsistic; but he has pointed out that strictly the ground elements 
(i.e., the basic units) are subjectless, since such terms as ‘subject,’ ‘subjective,’ and 
‘objective’ have to be defined at a later stage of the system” ([1951] 1966, 154).  
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The system of the Aufbau begins simply with the basic relation of remembered 
similarity: “x and y are elementary experiences, where a recollected 
representation of x is compared with y and found to be part similar to it.”4  But 
whose recollected representation has yet to be constructed: memory without a 
subject.5  Ayer summarizes thus: 
 
The use of the word “methodological” was somewhat disingenuous: it 
was intended to forestall discussion of the epistemological problems 
which the choice of a solipsistic basis might be thought to raise.  The basis 
was solipsistic inasmuch as Carnap, following Mach, James and Russell, 
after his own fashion, took as his starting-point the series of elements each 
constituting the whole of a person’s current experiences at a given 
moment, and attempted to show how the entire set of concepts needed to 
describe the world could be constructed stage by stage, by the application 




The denial of the self historically originates in a passage by David Hume 
([1737–1740] 2000, §1.4.6, emphasis original) excerpted here: 
 
                                                
4 Carnap ([1928] 2003, §108; see also §78).  Carnap defines “part similarity” as, 
“the approximate agreement of two elementary experiences relative to some 
characteristic of two constituents.”  Further, “two elementary experiences x and y 
are called ‘part similar’ if and only if an experience constituent (e.g., sensation) a 
of x and an experience constituent b of y agree, either approximately or 
completely, in their characteristics” (Ibid., §77). 
 
5 Carnap even quotes Nietzsche’s The Will to Power on the linguistic basis of the 
notion of a self, denying its necessity: “It is merely a formulation of our 
grammatical habits that there must always be something that thinks when there 
is thinking and that there must always be a doer when there is a deed” 
(Nietzsche 1968, §276 quoted in Carnap [1928] 2003, §65; see also, §163). 
 




There are some philosophers, who imagine we are every moment 
intimately conscious of what we call our SELF; that we feel its existence 
and its continuance in existence; and are certain, beyond the evidence of a 
demonstration, both of its perfect identity and simplicity…. Unluckily all 
these positive assertions are contrary to that very experience, which is 
pleaded for them, nor have we any idea of self, after the manner it is here 
explain’d.  For from what impression cou’d this idea be deriv’d?  This 
question ’tis impossible to answer without a manifest contradiction and 
absurdity; and yet ’tis a question, which must be necessarily answer’d, if 
we wou’d have the idea of self pass for clear and intelligible…. If any 
impression gives rise to the idea of self, that impression must continue 
invariably the same, thro’ the whole course of our lives; since self is 
suppos’d to exist after that manner.  But there is no impression constant 
and invariable.  Pain and pleasure, grief and joy, passions and sensations 
succeed each other, and never all exist at the same time.  It cannot, 
therefore, be from any of these impressions, or from any other, that the 
idea of self is deriv’d; and consequently there is no such idea…. For my 
part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble 
on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love 
or hatred, pain or pleasure.  I never can catch myself at any time without a 
perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception…. I may 
venture to affirm of the rest of mankind, that they are nothing but a 
bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other 
with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement. 
 
 
This said, how could Carnap could base his system on any form of solipsism—
which asserts a self—and yet construct the self at a later stage of the system?  The 
way out of this contradiction is to assert that the self can be identified with its 
sensations, so that while the methodological solipsist lacks a “self” as a unified 
seat of experience, outside of its experiences, the solipsist identifies itself with the 
experience of, in Carnap’s case, remembered similarity: “The ‘self’ is the class of 
elementary experiences” (Carnap [1928] 2003 §163, emphasis original).  It is not, 
that is, prior to those experiences, but constituted during those experiences, 
identified with those experiences, which is what a Humean solipsist would 
argue, as per above.  Carnap’s system is solipsistic, and as we shall discuss, other 
people are not constructed until much later. 
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Until Chalmers (2012),7 Goodman ([1951] 1966) was the most 
thoroughgoing attempt to reconstruct the world in the manner of the Aufbau.8 
Furthermore, Goodman’s work was a direct precedent to Boretz’s Meta-
Variations: Boretz quotes from it liberally, although not blindly (specifically on 
the issue of classes).  Also presenting a phenomenalistic basis, Goodman touches 
on the issue of solipsism: 
 
Speaking from outside a phenomenalistic system, [i.e., from the 
perspective of a physicalistic system] one may describe its basis as 
solipsistic, may say that its basic units are comprised within a single 
stream of experience.  But speaking from the point of view of the system 
itself, this is an anachronism.  For the basic units of such a system are not 
taken as belonging to a subject and representing an object.  They are taken 
as the elements in terms of which must be construed whatever objects, 
subjects, streams of experience, or other entities the system talks about at 
all…. The constructions of a phenomenalistic system are discussed and 
tested quite as intersubjectively as those of any other system. (Goodman 
[1951] 1966, 141–42) 
 
The crucial point for Carnap’s constructional system in the Aufbau is that we 
must construct the external world, other people, as well as their worlds, others 
and their objects of experience (their sense impressions or sense data), within our 
own systems: “From the indicated way of constructing the ‘world of M,’ it 
follows that, between this world and ‘my world,’ there exists a certain analogy; 
more precisely, the analogy holds between the constructional system as a whole 
(S) and the ‘constructional system of M’ (SM).  It must be remembered, however, 
                                                
7 Which ignores the issue of solipsism, and indeed seems more concerned with 
problems of self-doubt; see pp. 171–76. 
 
8 Everything old is new again.  I do not think this is at all random; indeed, the 
utopian dimensions are striking: Carnap reconstructs the world post-WWI; 
Goodman, post-WWII; Boretz, during the Vietnam War; and Chalmers, in the 
post-9/11 and Great Recession world. 
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that SM is only a partial system within S; the world of M is constructed within my 
world; it is not to be considered as formed by M, but as formed by me for M” 
(Carnap [1928] 2003, §224).  You are simply a construction within my world.  If I 
construct you within my world, there appears to be no external principle or 
experience that could confirm your existence outside of my world.  As stated, 
Ayer ([1946] 1952, 128–33) goes to great pains to establish that methodological 
solipsism does not entail an epistemological solipsism, nevertheless, here it is in 
the Aufbau.  The problem is that although Carnap provides a construction of 
other people (Carnap [1928] 2003, §137 and §140), if he does not succeed, he falls 
back into solipsism.  As Ayer said, quoted earlier: “It was maintained by Carnap 
and others that the solipsism which seemed to be involved in this position was 
only methodological; but this was little more than an avowal of the purity of 
their intentions.  It did nothing to mitigate the objections to their theory” (1959, 
17–8). 
The problem of getting out of myself may thus remain, but it may seem 
less pressing for music theory.  This depends on the foundations for the music-
theoretical system and its goals.  As to foundations: if the music-theoretical 
system assumes, say, Carnap or Goodman’s system as foundation of the world, 
then the music-theoretical system will be a branch within that larger system, thus 
the musical component will shed responsibility for constructing the non-musical 
world.  As to goals, it is less than obvious that it is the responsibility of music-
theoretical systems to construct other people’s listenings, let alone other people.  
The assumption by music theorists is or was usually—especially for the 
Princeton Theorists—that each of us is responsible for constructing our own 
systems, for ourselves.  One significance of this position is that it denaturalizes 
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music theory, resting responsibility for the musical world upon each 
composer/theorist.  These issues we shall discuss in greater detail in Chapter 
Five. 
Before then, I would like ask how one music-theoretical system treats the 
issue of solipsism, experience, and other people.  Does Godfrey Wiham’s 
unfinished project construct a self, assume a self, or withhold comment?  In 
Blasius’ reading of Winham’s project, music theory’s, “subject must be the 
musical phenomenon as distinguished not only from notations but also from 
both physical sound and sense-data…. In other words, the subject of analysis [or 
the constructional system] could be the tone, a phenomenal event, but could not 
be the sound wave, a physical event, or, in contrast, some subjective 
observational report” (1997, 15).  These statements define Winham’s music-
theoretical system as phenomenalist, but have yet to assume a subject. (For our 
purposes it would have been clearer if Blasius has used “object of analysis” 
instead of “subject of analysis.”) When Winham then moves from the meta-
theoretical level to the theoretical level of constructing a musical system, his first 
primitive description is a relation, “lower in pitch”: 
 
A1. (L2 ⊂ L) • (L ⊂ ~I) 
 
Which Blasius interprets as: “If there is an x which is lower than a y, there is a z 
which is lower than both x and y; and if there is an x lower than y, then y cannot 
be lower than x” (Ibid., 19).  Where, here, is the subject?  This axiomatic 
construction of music seems not to have constructed the subject yet (which 
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would have provided an observational report), nor the world (of which the 
musical work and its basic units are a member) (see also Ibid., 21).  Rather, it 
constructs the foundations of music without yet constructing an experiencer—a 
subject, or self—of that phenomenon, thus before the question of solipsism.  
Music exists, without a perceiver, for the sake of the systematic construction. 
 
 
3.  Rahn’s “Epistemological Problem” of Intersubjectivity, Solipsism, and Objectivity 
 
Within Princeton Theory, Winham’s system is not unique in this regard: 
Randall’s “Tonality” (Randall 1963; see also Blasius 1997, 23–6) builds its system 
without discussing meta-theoretical issues such as solipsism, as does Kassler 
(1967).  Even Babbitt, in his dissertation, avoids the problem of who does the 
experiencing, such as might entail solipsism.  Babbitt: 
 
All historical and empirico-analytic considerations have been forgone.  
The former, because any examination based on such considerations must 
either degenerate into a formal recounting of facts easily obtainable from 
other sources, or involve one in complicated questions of stylistic sources 
and esthetics in general, which is not the province of this paper; the latter, 
because the approach dominated by this point of view already makes up 
the greatest part of the literature of the [twelve-tone] system. ([1946] 1992, 
iv)  
 
Babbitt’s deductive theory of the twelve-tone system stands anterior to 
experience: empiricism or music analysis.  It assumes no subject, but also no 
experience.  Perhaps what makes Boretz’s Meta-Variations unique is that it does 
discuss these issues (as we discussed during Chapter Three and will discuss later 
in this chapter), as does John Rahn (1974, 5–11) in his dissertation.  Rahn in fact 
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pushes the issues we have been discussing by arguing around an 
“epistemological problem” (Ibid., 5), which is the problem of the intersubjectivity 
of experience, with the assertion of solipsism as one possible answer.   
Earlier, having defined music theory as the study of musical objects, Rahn 
specifies that by “object” he means a phenomenal object—“sounds-as-perceived” 
and their interrelated qualities —not a physical one: the language of 
phenomenalism versus physicalism, respectively, familiar from Chapter Three 
(Ibid., 1 and 2).  He continues: phenomenalism, “immediately raises difficulties, 
for it is in the realm of the physical that objects are most clearly defined 
intersubjectively, especially for any kind of science.”9  Indeed, while Rahn seems 
to bypass the problematic of solipsism altogether by assuming a subject but 
framing the epistemological problem as one of intersubjectivity, as we have 
discussed, for any phenomenalistic system the prior, more foundational question 
is that of solipsism and how the sole self constructs other minds, people, and 
their experiences. 
 Given the long historical context of the solipsism of such private 
experiences (as discussed in the preceding section of this chapter), Rahn 
acknowledges the problematic of solipsism but then quickly passes it by: “the 
private nature of phenomenal objects” immediately raises the question of 
whether only the private I exists.  Solipsism and the problematic of 
intersubjectivity are thus intimately connected.  Wittgenstein, in the following 
quotation, unpacks the relations, which become more pressing if we substitute 
sonic acts and objects for his visual ones while reading: 
                                                
9 Ibid.  Recall Brown and Dempster’s criticism regarding phenomenalistic 
systems mentioned earlier, which Rahn here anticipates by twenty-five years. 
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The phrase “only I really see” is closely connected with the idea 
expressed in the assertion “we never know what the other man really sees 
when he looks at a thing” or this, “we can never know whether he calls 
the same thing ‘blue’ which we call ‘blue.’”  In fact we might argue: “I can 
never know what he sees or that he sees at all, for all I have is signs of 
various sorts which he gives me; therefore it is no unnecessary hypothesis 
altogether to say that he sees; what seeing is I only know from seeing 
myself; I have only learnt the word ‘seeing’ to mean what I do….”  
 The difficulty which we express by saying “I can’t know what he 
sees when he (truthfully) says that he sees a blue patch” arises from the 
idea that “knowing what he sees” means: “seeing that which he also sees”; 
not, however, in the sense in which we do so when we both have the same 
object before our eyes: but in the sense in which the object seen would be 
an object, say, in his head, or in him.  The idea is that the same object may 
be before his eyes and mine, but that I can’t stick my head into his (or my 
mind into his, which comes to the same) so that the real and immediate 
object of his vision becomes the real and immediate object of my vision 
too.  By “I don’t know what he sees” we really mean “I don’t know what 
he looks at,” where “what he looks at” is hidden and he can’t show it to 
me; it is before his mind’s eye. ([1933–35] 1958, 60–61, emphasis original) 
 
Objectivity may exist, but intersubjectivity is the problem.  Indeed, Rahn himself 
takes up Wittgenstein’s question, if not its extension: 
 
We shall explore the following epistemological problem: if two listeners 
(called “A” and “B”) of comparable physical capacities are in the same 
auditory situation, e.g. sitting side by side in a concert hall listening to 
Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony, to what extent and in what ways are they 
hearing the same music?  This breaks down into two sub-questions: 1) are 
they hearing “equivalent” sets of “phenomenal sounds,” that is do they 
use similar or identical sets of “sounds” to refer to their possibly disparate 
experiences, and 2) given identical sets of “sounds,” are A and B hearing 
the referents of those sounds as being associated and related in 
comparable, similar, or identical constructs? (1974, 5) 
 
Rahn asks if, given the same conditions, listeners A and B hear the same music, 
inquiring as to the status of equivalence, identity, and, earlier, isomorphism as 
descriptions of the listeners’ referent—eventually inquiring into the status of the 
musical work itself.  In a footnote, Rahn glosses the word “equivalent” thus: 
“‘Equivalent’ to within our common theory of sounds…. The private nature of 
 173 
phenomenal objects makes it necessary to talk in terms of their intersubjective 
‘equivalence’ rather than in terms of an identity which, even if it existed, would 
be incommunicable” (Ibid., n 1).  For Rahn, “equivalence” does not ultimately get 
us out of the problem of the intersubjectivity of experience—that one can never 
know whether or not when she hears Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony her friend 
sitting next to her hears the same Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony—in a sense 
suggesting an answer to his question in the footnote before he has answered it in 
the body of his text.  Before discussing Rahn’s answer and the issues of identity 
and isomorphism, I would like to develop the possibility that equivalence most 
accurately describes his referent.  That is, I would like to discuss Rahn’s 
possibility that the intersubjective relation should be characterized as one of 
equivalence rather than identity, while keeping in mind that he will ultimately 
take it back later.  I would like to do so because it promises one solution to the 
problem of solipsism.  If we can hear the same music, if we can communicate, 
then not only I exist, musically or otherwise. 
What does Rahn mean, then, by “equivalence?”  Let us recall that he refers 
to equivalent sets of phenomenal sounds.  Thinking of sounds as being related 
sets amenable to mathematical analysis and logical representation would have 
been quite natural for Rahn and Princeton Theory in its high-modernist moment, 
and yet it is a striking move.10  In mathematical set theory, as developed by 
Richard Dedekind, Georg Cantor, Ernst Zermelo and Abraham Fraenkel, “a 
                                                
10 See Schuijer (2008, 84–129) for extended discussion of equivalence within 
musical set theory, beginning with Babbitt ([1946] 1992, 8–9) and extending to 
work by Forte, Lewin, John Clough, Randall, other work by Rahn, Fritz Heinrich 
Klein and Robert Morris. 
 
 174 
relation which is reflexive, symmetric, and transitive in a set is an equivalence 
relation on that set.”11  Or, in logical symbolism: 
 
R is an equivalence relation ↔ R is a relation & R is reflexive, symmetric, and 
transitive. (Suppes [1960] 1972, 80) 
 
We can read this as: R is an equivalence relation if and only if R is a relation and 
R is reflexive, symmetric, and transitive.  This definition had been in place at 
least since the 1910’s, and indeed, in Carnap’s Aufbau he defines equivalence in 
the same manner.12 
What, then, are reflexive, symmetric, and transitive relations?  Suppes 
([1960] 1972, 69) defines them as follows: 
 
 
                                                
11 Suppes ([1960] 1972, 80, emphasis original). I use this text because Rahn refers 
to it elsewhere in his dissertation. 
 
12 ([1928] 2003, §73).  Later, Carnap ([1954] 1958, 120) defines an equivalence 
relation in the same manner (as reflexive, symmetric, and transitive), but 
provides a different formalization.  He gives examples of reflexive such as 
contemporary, equally-long, smaller-or-equal.  “Parallel is a symmetric relation.  
Examples of other symmetric relations are similar, contemporary, sibling” (Ibid., 
119).  And examples of transitive relations include parallel, equal, less, less-or-
equal, ancestor (Ibid.; See also Suppes 1957, 208–28 which provides other formal 
definitions for these basic definitions and many practical examples).  Blasius 
paraphrases thus: “A relation is symmetrical if it is identical with its converse: 
the relation ‘contemporaneous’ is symmetrical…. Two events that within their 
field are always fulfilled are reflexive: ‘contemporaneous’ is reflexive…. A 
relation is transitive if it holds for the next member of a class but one: ‘ancestor’ 
is transitive (1997, 18).  Interestingly, Blasius paraphrases Carnap here because in 
the Winham archive, so Blasius argues, these three relations taken together 
provide Winham with “the ability to specify a priori what constitutes a significant 
relation, and hence what constitutes (at this level) ‘musical structure’” (Ibid.). 
Music-theoretical or analytical significance is here defined as equivalence 
between two musical sets; significance likewise defines the notion of musical 
structure, therefore, thinking transitively, equivalence defines musical structure. 
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Definition 10. R is reflexive in A ↔ (∀ x) (x ∈ A → x R x). 
 
Which I read as: 
 
R is reflexive in A if and only if for every x if there is an x that is an 




Definition 12. R is symmetric in A ↔ (∀ x) (∀ y) (x,y ∈ A & x R y → y R x). 
 
Which I read as: 
 
R is symmetric in A if and only if for every x and every y there is an x,y 
that is an element of and A and if x,y is an element of R then y,x is an 




Definition 15. R is transitive in A ↔ (∀ x) (∀ y) (∀ z) (x,y,z ∈ A & x R y &  
y R z → x R z). 
 
Which I read as: 
 
R is transitive in A if and only if for every x and every y and every z there 
is an x,y,z that is an element of A and if x,y is an element of R and y,z is an 
element of R then x,z is an element of R. 
 
When Rahn suggests the intersubjective equivalence of phenomenal sounds, he 
appeals to this kind of axiomatic modeling of this relation, available for decades.  
But why does Rahn ultimately reject this notion as a description for his 
epistemological problem?  Why are listeners A and B not listening to equivalent 
sets of phenomenal sounds?  Rahn asserts, “In their original listening A and B 
have not heard equivalent entities, and so have not heard the same musical 
things at all.  They may have falsely assumed that they have heard equivalent 
things, and they may after some discussion come to hear equivalent things in the 
future, but the original two assimilations of experience were too radically 
different to be called equivalent” (1974, 9). 
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 Rahn eventually settles on the intersubjectivity of the two listeners’ 
experience as being describable via the notion of fuzzy isomorphism, which 
Rahn defines as follows:  
 
Two sets of sounds C and D are (fuzzily) isomorphic IFF there exists a 
one-to-one correspondence R matching sounds between them so that for 
any two sounds a∈C and b∈C, if a’∈D and b’∈D are respectively the 
images of a and b under R, the measures of the time and pitch intervals 
between the time points and pitches of a and b are quantitatively the same 
to with given limits L1 and L2 as the corresponding measures between a’ 
and b’, and a is louder than b IFF a’ is louder than b’, and a and b belong 
to the same instrument class in C IFF a’ and b’ belong to the same 
instrument class in D; and the pitch interval between a and a’ falls within 
limits L3, and the difference (or ratio) between the time intervals between 
a and b and between a’ and b’ is within some limit L4, and a and a’ belong 
to some instrument class. (1974, 10–1) 
 
Rahn points out that, “‘fuzzy isomorphism’ is as a relation itself precise.  The 
‘fuzziness’ appears only in the fit that the relation provides between two sets of 
sounds.”13  Rahn borrows for his approach to this isomorphism Apostel (1960), 
which concerns models.  Rahn’s use of “image” is odd, for Apostel (Ibid., 128) 
states that the relation of model to prototype can be images, perceptions, 
drawings, formalisms (calculi), languages, of both physical systems.  Why would 
Rahn not state that the relations being compared isomorphically are perceptions 
or perception-statements?  The problem with these is, again following 
phenomenalism, that they seem to be purely subjective.  “Image,” as something 
                                                
13 Ibid., 10 n 2.  Ironically, Rahn in another time and place says that, “if an analog 
communication ever does connect perfectly, so that the communicate has 
precisely the experience intended by the communicator, or, to avoid the 
intentional fallacy, so that all communicates have precisely the same experience, 




out there, in the world, and evoking Riemann, seems more objective.  Images of 
sounds are representations of sounds, not sounds themselves. 
What, then, is the general significance of this discussion?  It locates the 
traditional problematic of intersubjectivity and solipsism as being answerable by 
mathematical set theory, extending set theory from the mathematical to the 
musical to the, in Carnap’s language, “heteropsychological” or cultural domains.  
As with experience and theory, the personal and public for Princeton Theory 
seem remarkably polarized, and yet because of this polarization they are able to 
communicate, to be dialectically mediated.  Let us recall that Rahn is writing 
during roughly the same time of cultural relativism that led Fred Lerdahl, for 
example, to search for musical universals.14  Rahn is writing after Compose 
Yourself and at least Randall’s Turn.  Rahn is trying to define, using the armature 
of modern set theory, the objectivity or intersubjectivity of listening in the face of 
the solipsism of phenomenalism, on the one hand, and cultural relativism of the 
late 1960’s, on the other.  So when Rahn moves on to say that, “what is needed is 
a single standard set of sounds to which each other set in a composition would 
be isomorphic; but this we do not have” (1974, 11), he is accepting the collapse of 
objectivity into relativism and/or an intersubjectivity of listening definable by 
fuzzy isomorphism.  As he said earlier, “We take it as established that 
discrimination [between phenomenal sounds or the individuals of the theory] 
varies with the physical equipment and ‘mental set’ of the ‘subject’” (Ibid., 7). 
Rahn is defining—rather explicitly—his audience of qualified listeners, varying 
physiologically and culturally, all under the sign of two listeners, sitting side by 
                                                
14 Lerdahl 2003; recall that Lerdahl earned the M.F.A. in composition at Princeton 
in 1967. 
 178 
side, listening to Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony.  Rahn’s epistemological problem 
is therefore also a social one, the attempt to use formalism to solve the 
epistemological problematic a stand in for the social problematic, a process of 
mediation which Fredric Jameson termed the political unconscious.15 
 
 
4.  Boretz’s (Anti-)Solipsism 
 
Before Rahn (1974) was Boretz’s Meta-Variations.  In a virtual argument 
with Leo Treitler, Boretz in that work discards metaphysical solipsism as its 
foundation: “Treitler’s effort to attain a radical relativism actually reverts, 
because of his failure to recognize some vital distinctions, to a metaphysical 
solipsism, as impossible of realization as the ‘objectivity’ it purports to supplant” 
(Boretz [1969] 1995, 12–13 note 2).  Metaphysical solipsism is here a threat to be 
avoided, but what led Boretz to this writing this footnote?  The note glosses this 
argument in the body of the text: “This inseparability of the ‘fact’ from its 
relational description is perhaps the principal contribution of twentieth-century 
philosophy to all fields whose domains consist of phenomena of experience of 
any kind, and its recognition makes it impossible to sustain an intellectual 
attitude that ignores conditions, standards, or characteristics of discourse in 
confronting ‘objects of thought’” (Ibid., 12).  This evokes Sellars ([1956] 2000), 
which Boretz cites later in reference to Meta-Variations (Boretz [2000] 2003, 459). 
To paraphrase the point, all experience comes to us theoretically-inflected, 
observation comes theory-laden, so we should be intellectual rather than 
                                                
15 See Jameson (1981, 17–102) and Drott (2005). 
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mystical or celebratory in our approaches to musical discourse.  Music is no less 
theory-laden than other domains about which we can be cognitive.  The “given” 
in experience is not so much given as created, taken.  Boretz, contra-Treitler, 
continues: “In his rejection of an ‘objectivity’ based on an elusive empirical 
Given, he seems unaware of any middle ground worth considering short of a 
complete retreat into ‘subjectivity.’  What he declines to take account of is the 
possibility of intersubjectvity” (Ibid., 12–3, n 2, emphasis original).  Theory-
ladeness seems to commit us to subjectivity—to “radical relativism”—which 
seems to collapse into metaphysical solipsism.  Hilary Putnam unpacks the logic 
thus: 
 
First-person relativism sounds dangerously close to solipsism.  Indeed, it 
is not clear how it can avoid being solipsism…. If you and I are not the 
first-person relativist in question, then the truth about me and about you 
and about the friends and the spouse of the first-person relativist is, for 
the first-person relativist, simply a function of his or her own dispositions 
to believe.  This is why first-person relativism sounds like thinly disguised 
solipsism. (Putnam 1992, 75–76; quoted in Mosteller 2006, 12) 
 
The relativist, like the metaphysical solipsist, in a sense projects herself and her 
truths out into the world, creating others and their truths for them.  As Woods 
said, “the external world and other persons are representations of that self 
having no independent existence” (Woods 1960).  Intersubjectivity, however, 
perhaps as defined by Rahn, intervenes as a reality principle. 
Just three years after Boretz’s argument with Treitler, however—at the 
same time that Meta-Variations was still being published serially in Perspectives of 
New Music—Boretz (with Edward T. Cone) would claim radical relativism as his 
own position: “An even more radical relativism, in which standards of musical 
 180 
cognitivity are still further detached from universals—among others, from those 
extramusically invoked standards of ‘unified science’ themselves—is suggested 
in the writings of some younger composers (cf. the essays by Randall and Boretz 
in the present volume).”16  It is unclear whether the two radical relativisms refer 
to the same thing—the former could be a relativism as regards the given in 
experience, the latter, a relativism about universals; and the given does not have 
to be a Platonic universal—but if they do refer to the same relativism, then it is 
also unclear how this avoids the metaphysical solipsism Boretz had unpacked 
and warned about just three years earlier, and the line of thought Putnam 
discusses.  I would argue that this moment implies a realization on Boretz’s part: 
the move from the demand for communication to the problematization of 
intersubjectivity to the solipsistic, another indicator of the Turn. 
For the Boretz of Meta-Variations, and long after, music is thought.  
Further, we saw in Chapter Three how Babbitt privileged the intellectual over 
heard aspects of music.  If music is thought, and thought is internal, within the 
individual mind, then the assertion of solipsism seems the only tenable position.  
I am alone, with my music, which I hear in my own mind.  Boretz knows that 
solipsism is untenable, however, but he must start there because he starts from 
the position that music is (his own) cognition.  The question of how to get 
outside of the individual mind then presents itself.  In fact, the motion to 
externalize his thoughts is not simply because he is a composer creating musical 
worlds—as stated, that seems ideological or at least rhetorical—but rather, 
Boretz builds his (re)construction of music in order to prove that the external world 
                                                
16 Boretz and Cone (1972, ix).  The quotation refers to Boretz ([1970c] 2003) and 
Randall ([1967] 2003]). 
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actually exists, in spite of his commitment to his own mind and solipsism.  The 
goal of Meta-Variations, then, the reason for writing it in the first place, arises 
because of the threat of solipsism and its both seeming necessity and yet 
absurdity.  Boretz’s goal is to create the external world in order to prove to 
Boretz himself that he is not alone (with his musical thoughts, his music).  The 
external world intervenes as a reality principle, for, once objectified, out there, it 
reflects back at him and shows that other musics and people really exist.  While 
similar to the Other in the phenomenology of Emmanuel Levinas, which proves 
to the self that the self exists, the difference is that Boretz starts from his own self, 
projects it out into the world of his own creation, receives a signal in return, and 
returns, whereas for Levinas the self constitutes itself in its confrontation with 
the Other. (We shall return to Levinas in Chapter Five.) 
Indeed, despite the earlier discussion in Meta-Variations, a metaphysical 
solipsism seems to be exactly Boretz’s later position. (As represented, for 
example, in Boretz 2005–2006 and 2008.) For Boretz, in Martin Brody’s words, 
“there’s no liminal zone, no wiggle room in the space between solipsism and 
alienation” (2005–2006, 426).  Either we engage the “real world” that is not so real 
after all, hence alienation, or we sink into our seats, alone: “Music fills me full of 
things to say, which I can not have a way to say; I am, ineluctably, completely,… 
on my own: alone with music” (Boretz [1999] 2003, 483).  While Boretz’s oracular 
tone here sounds a note of existentialist dread, music seems not to suffer so.  
Earlier in the same piece: “…the suigeneric language of music.  ‘Suigeneric’ does 
not signify ‘isolated,’ or even insulated, just relatively discrete in the total 
cosmology of consciousness” (Ibid., 481, emphasis original).  The self (Boretz) 
may be alone (with music), but music is unique without being so isolated.  
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Returning to Brody, and thinking reflexively, we might posit that Boretz’s 
solipsism is self-alienating: the “self” in Boretz’s writing takes on an alterity to 
the experiencing self.  Boretz’s inkblots, ([1982] 2003) rather than presenting an 
immediacy of the self, instead project that self onto the page almost literally, in 
fact distancing us and Boretz himself from his self-expression, that which seemed 
otherwise so close.17 
While in this later text (“Music, as a Music” [1999] 2003) Boretz reduces 
others and discourse about music to music itself—music, as a music—it is 
precisely his existentialist dread, however, that marks his distance from a 
Husserlian reading of the reduction of others to the self—the reduction of 
transcendental experience to the “sphere of ownness.”  In Paul Ricoeur’s reading: 
“Essentially, it is a question of transforming the objection of solipsism into an 
argument.  I decide to abstract from all that is given to me as alien.  This does not 
mean that I remain alone in the ordinary and non-phenomenological sense, as if 
the empirical solitude of an isolated or solitary man did not already assume 
association with other men.  In the transcendental sense this means, rather, that I 
decide to take into consideration only ‘what is my own’ (das mir Eigene)” ([1967] 
2007, 118).  As Husserl says: “If I ‘abstract’ (in the usual sense) from others, I 
‘alone’ remain.  But such abstraction is not radical; such aloneness in no respect 
alters the natural world-sense, ‘experienceable by everyone,’ which attaches to 
the naturally understood Ego and would not be lost, even if a universal plague 
had left only me” ([1931] 1999, 93, emphasis original). 
                                                
17 Indeed, Boretz told me in personal conversation that Naomi Boretz created the 
inkblots, not Boretz himself. 
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This quotation comes from the fifth of Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations, 
which prompts us to examine the Cartesian legacy of the problematic of 
solipsism.  In his Meditations on First Philosophy, written during the Thirty Years’ 
War, Descartes begins by stating that he, “realized it was necessary, once in the 
course of my life, to demolish everything completely and start again right from 
the foundations if I wanted to establish anything at all in the sciences that was 
stable and likely to last” ([1641] 1998, 76).  From here Descartes sits “quite alone” 
(Ibid.) and doubts his senses, body, God, his former beliefs, mind, extension, 
geometry and arithmetic and the world.  Descartes then asks, “Does it now 
follow that I too do not exist?”  His answer?  No.  I am, I exist (Ibid., 80).  After 
retelling his tale of doubt, Descartes then asserts that what he is, is an entity that 
is thinking: “At last, I have discovered it—thought; this alone is inseparable from 
me.  I am, I exist—that is certain.  But for how long?  For as long as I am 
thinking…. I am, then, in the strict sense only a thing that thinks” (Ibid., 82). 
Indeed, Boretz ([1982] 2003), entitled “Talk: If I am a Musical Thinker,” 
emphasizes primal musical self-expression but begins from the premise of 
musical thinking.  Featuring Rorschach inkblots, the text begins with Boretz and 
his musical thoughts: “We need to think sensitively and introspectively and 
consciously—like expressive people—about our thought, our silence, our sound 
in music and talk” (Ibid., n.p.).  And more recently, Boretz begins his reflections 
on the fiftieth anniversary of Perspectives of New Music thus: “Composers are 
thinkers.  Composing is thinking” (Boretz 2012b, 9).  At the moment when he 
asserts with clear certainty that he is a thing that thinks, the egocentric 
predicament presents itself, for Descartes has confined himself to his own ideas, 
subsequently finding it difficult if not impossible to move to the external world. 
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(Runes 1960, s.v. ego-centric predicament) As Descartes says, “the chief and most 
common mistake which is to be found here consists in my judging that the ideas 
which are in me resemble, or conform to, things located outside me” ([1641] 1998, 
88–9).  The question of solipsism now intervenes: if the project is to (re)construct 
all that exists, after having demolished everything and starting with the firm, 
unshakeable foundation of the thinking I, how do we construct the world, the 
rest of existence?  If we fail at this project, the threat is that only the self exists: 
solipsism. 
Johnstone (1991, xvii and 15) helpfully catalogues the types of solipsism 
he finds following in the wake of Descartes’ solipsistic moment. 
 
Internal World Solipsists: the world of one’s own representations  
is all that exists. 
 
The Sensa Solipsist, for whom what exists is the private world of one’s 
own sensations or representations. 
 




Observed World Solipsists: the world exists only in as much as it is  
perceived by oneself. 
  
 The Ephemerata Solipsist, for whom any portions of the world not  
  actually perceived by oneself do not exist. 
 
The Monopsyche Solipsist, an Ephemerata Solipsist whose sole concern is  
to deny the existence of other minds. 
 
 The Sense Data Solipsist, a radical Ephemerata Solipsist who also denies  
the existence of all properties and relations not actually perceived. 
 
 
It would seem that recently Boretz presents either the position of an Ephemerata 
Solipsist or a Sense Data Solipsist (it is difficult to say), given his following 
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remarks: “And as to the question—it’s been raised—‘if music is brought into 
being by my hearing (“composing”) it, does that mean it doesn’t exist before (or 
unless) I hear it?’—well, doesn’t for me, anyway” (2005–2006, 469).  In fact, 
Boretz here seems to combine features of both the Internal and Observed World 
Solipsists, if we assume, as he may very well not, that music is an externally 
existing entity—external to the subject’s mind.  If he does not, then he presents 
the position of the Internal World Solipsists: music in no way exists out there, in 
the world.  It is taken, not given.  Later, Boretz would seem to endorse these 
same positions, but given his use of the words “world” and indeed “universe,” 
in the following quotation, specifying his exact position is difficult.  In other 
words, Boretz here seems to accept the notion that music exists in some ways, at 
least, external to the cognizing subject.  If so, he would here seem ambivalently to 
present the position of the Monopsyche Solipsist: “Does it seem, then, that an 
almost self-inscrutable singular ‘I’ looms as the natural citizen of a musical world 
whose only determinacy is the feel of experience?  Does it get down to 
subjectivity?  Or to solipsism, for those who really dislike the implications? 
Musical universes, perforce, of one inhabitant each?” (Boretz 2008, 73) As stated, 
Boretz here seems to argue for the Monopsyche Solipsistic position, and yet also 
assumes the existence of other minds: while the rhetorical questions raise the 
very real possibility that Boretz accepts this position—we all inhabit our own 
musical universes, with presumably no interaction—given that this is stated in 
the plural, we share at least this much.  (“Solipsism binds us together.”)  Where 
we might read a position denying the existence of others—Boretz does not have 
access to other minds, therefore those other minds do not exist—nonetheless 
there exist multiple universes.  Importantly, Boretz rhetorically moves from the 
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general, ontological/epistemological case, to the specifically musical case, the 
latter occurring only after the introduction of the word solipsism.  Ontologically, 
we may be dealing solely with an extreme subjectivity: I exist as surely as you 
do.  Musically, however, I have no access to your musicianship because I can be 
certain only that I exist, musically.  Can I trust that you have such a thing as 
musicianship? 
 I would argue that all of this is far less bizarre than it may at first sound.  
Think of the various tests devised for the aural skills classroom to measure and 
ensure competency: non-verbal, verbal, bodily, transcriptional, vocal.  These 
assume a functional intersubjectivity—I can know the contents of my students’ 
consciousness, as demonstrated through these tests of competency.  But can I 
really?  How can I possibly know that my students hear the same things I hear 
when we sing various relations within the major scale, for example?  How can 
we hear the same relations?  We assume such agreement, we agree, socially and 
pragmatically, to act as if we understand one another, in order to make music 
theory as a discipline function relatively smoothly: a kind of pedagogical fiction.  
And yet, outside of behavior, I have no access to my students’ musicianship, to 
their internal perspectives—just as outside behavior, Wittgenstein assumed no 
access to others’ pains or toothaches.  The perhaps fictional status of pedagogical 
intersubjectivity should encourage us to question the smooth functioning of our 
chosen discipline.  Which Princeton Theory, both before and after the Turn, does, 
repeatedly.  Reflecting on the problematics of communication, intersubjectivity, 
and solipsism makes our jobs a little more difficult, a little less transparent, 
encourages a little more reflection, distance, a questioning, searching.  I would 
suggest we are the better for this difficulty, our discipline, more mature. 
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5.  Boretz’s Solipsism of the Present Moment 
 
There is another way to articulate and historicize Boretz’s solipsism and 
thus to develop the problematic of solipsism, and that is by discussing his 
evocation of a subtype called the “solipsism of the present moment,” as 
discussed by Bertrand Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and Nelson Goodman. (For 
reference, see Glock 1996, s.v. solipsism.) Before discussing that philosophical 
background, however, I wish to unpack further Boretz’s position; I shall then 
discuss Russell, Wittgenstein, and Goodman’s explanations and critiques.   
Boretz argues the position of solipsism of the present moment thus: “Since 
to be in a given place in a given chronology is to have a unique sound, and since 
to have a unique sound is to be a unique thing, we may truly suppose that no 
two musical entities can be alike, that musical qualities, as elicited by attribution, 
are all ontologically distinct, rather than repeatable” ([1977] 2003, 425–26, 
emphasis added).  And: “In music, as in everything, the disappearing moment of 
experience is the firmest reality” ([1985] 2003, 241).  Each moment in music is 
fully ontologically different from each preceding and successive moment, and 
the only truly real moment is the current one.  As Dubiel (2005–2006, 167) says, 
musical listening in this reading involves “constant ontological upheaval” of the 
music and presumably, given Boretz’s general solipsism, the listener’s own 
identity: neither the music nor I am who I was just a moment ago, at all.  As 
Wittgenstein says, connecting solipsism to the problematic of personal identity 
over time: “Sometimes the most satisfying expression of our solipsism seems to 
be this: ‘When anything is seen (really seen), it is always I who see it.’  What 
should strike us about this expression is the phrase ‘always I.’  Always who?—
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For, queer enough, I don’t mean: ‘always L. W.’  This leads us to considering the 
criteria for the identity of a person.  Under what circumstances do we say: ‘This 
is the same person whom I saw an hour ago?’” ([1933–1935] 1958, 61, emphasis 
original; see also pp. 63–4) We might say, one beat ago. 
Boretz, however, allows that over the span of an entire piece, “any 
moment is commensurable with everything else,” and states that this potential for 
comparison would take place within the musical mind, activating memory 
during the passage of time, hence he terms it “retrieval” ([1977] 2003, 425–26 
emphasis original).  If each moment of music can be compared in memory then 
we can have a situation of musical identity: two entities can be the same.  The 
crucial point, however, is that Boretz wishes to suspend musical memory, a 
move which creates false and true versions of musical identity, enabling, he 
supposes, each (new) moment to be fully vivid: “True identity is reserved, as 
always, for the only repeatable quality in music: being in the same place in the 
same piece” (Ibid., 427 emphasis added).  We are to read that last clause as an 
impossibility, implying its negation: no two musical entities can be in the same 
place in the same piece, therefore there are no truly repeatable qualities in music.  
The reason for claiming this is Boretz’s desire for a constant vividness in music, a 
sense of continuous adventure: “It seems that sheer ontological creativity is the 
desideratum of all readings: the multiplication of ways for things to be distinct, 
and the maximization of their distinctness” (Boretz [1977] 2003, 424).  Creativity 
and distinctness ensuring life.  (And, possibly, Cartesian certainty.) 
In two places Russell discusses what Wittgenstein will later call the 
“solipsism of the present moment” (1979, 25), a position for which Boretz is 
arguing, I think largely for pragmatic reasons: it seems to ensure the greatest 
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degree of vividness in music, encouraging our discourses to approach the 
vividness we routinely ascribe to music.  Boretz, in a sense, encourages us to 
listen/play directly on the beat, as opposed to behind or ahead of it.18  Striking 
for Russell, besides his philosopher’s patience in unpacking a position with 
which he ultimately disagrees, is the linguistic implications of this form of 
solipsism, which both Boretz and Wittgenstein will later thematize: 
 
How do we come to know that the group of things now experienced is not 
all-embracing [or, all that there is]…?  This question is one of great 
importance, since it introduces us to the whole problem of how 
knowledge can transcend personal experience…. At first sight, it might 
seem as though the experience of each moment must be a prison for the 
knowledge of that moment, and as though its boundaries must be the 
boundaries of our present world.  Every word that we now understand 
must have a meaning which falls within our present experience; we can 
never point to an object and say: “This lies outside my present 
experience.”  We cannot know any particular thing unless it is part of 
present experience; hence it might be inferred that we cannot know that 
there are particular things which lie outside present experience.  To 
suppose that we can know this, it might be said, is to suppose that we can 
know what we do not know.  On this ground, we may be urged to a 
modest agnosticism with regard to everything that lies outside our 
momentary consciousness.  Such a view, it is true, is not usually 
advocated in this extreme form; but the principles of solipsism and of the 
older empirical philosophy would seem, if rigorously applied, to reduce 
the knowledge of each moment within the narrow area of that moment’s 
experience. (Russell ([1914b] 1956, 133–34, emphasis original) 
 
Although evoking an ontology, Russell frames the issue primarily as an 
epistemological one, whereas for Boretz the composer/theorist, the issue is 
                                                
18 I am reminded here of Emmanuel Levinas’ comments about the future, which 
resonate: “The future is what is in no way grasped.  The exteriority of the future 
is totally different from spatial exteriority precisely through the fact that the 
future is absolutely surprising.  Anticipation of the future and projection of the 
future, sanctioned as essential to time by all theories from Bergson to Sartre, are 
but the present of the future and not the authentic future; the future is what is 
not grasped, what befalls us and lays hold of us.  The other is the future” ([1947] 
1987, 76–7). 
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fundamentally a matter of how knowledge of what there is creates what there is.  
To paraphrase, the problem of solipsism of the present moment is important for 
Russell because it raises the question, discussed earlier in relation to Rahn (1974) 
and Boretz’s general solipsism, of the intersubjectivity of experience and 
knowledge.  Russell evokes the notion of a prison to describe where Boretz 
would locate ultimate freedom: each moment, now fully new, now fully free.  For 
Russell, because a solipsism of the present moment knows no “outside” to this 
experience, knows no then, only now, there can be no freedom, no future, only 
(past and) present.  The solipsist of the present moment knows only that which 
must be because it is, not that which could be because it has yet to occur.19  
Where the solipsist of the present moment presents a radical denial—an 
atheism—of anything that lies outside now, Russell urges a “modest 
agnosticism.”  Boretz, we must conclude, is nothing if not extreme in his 
application of the principles of solipsism. 
But Russell goes further by providing two refutations of the position of 
solipsism of the present moment, which, as is typical of Russell, fall into 
empirical and logical replies, respectively.  Firstly, in the empirical reply, Russell 
evokes cases involving memory of something that is not currently in existence: 
although not currently listening to the piece, I can assert with certainty that the D 
follows the opening melodic C in a naïve hearing of Mozart K. 331, hence there 
are things that lie outside this present moment, hence a solipsism of the present 
                                                
19 I wonder, too, if Russell is implicitly articulating a problem with the facticity of 
the already existing: given that Russell is not necessarily thinking of aesthetic 
experience, to embrace the prison-like solipsism of the present moment is to give 
up on the genuinely creative, which in an aesthetic situation, such as music 
composition, would not present such a problem: again, we routinely hear each 
moment of music as fresh, alive, free.  The question is whether hearing the past 
or future within the present will increase that vividness. 
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moment is invalid.  Memory does exist—is real—as surely as the last moment 
slips into now, into the future.  As Russell says: 
 
We know by memory that hitherto we have constantly become aware, in 
sensation, of new particulars not experienced before, and that therefore 
throughout the past our experience has not been all-embracing.  If, then, 
the present moment is not the last moment in the life of the universe, we 
must suppose that the future will contain things which we do not now 
experience…. It is certain that the world contains some things not in my 
experience, and highly probable that it contains a vast number of such 
things. ([1914b] 1954, 135)  
  
 Russell’s logical refutation of the solipsist of the present moment again 
involves proof of the possibility of things that we are not now experiencing.  
Russell asserts, “We may know propositions of the form: ‘There are things 
having such-and-such a property,’ even when we do not know of any instance of 
such things.” (Ibid.) Russell includes here mathematical relations, but in music 
theory this would include objects and relations discussed in Babbitt’s ([1946] 
1992) dissertation, which lie prior to experience for Babbitt, in a Platonic sense.  
The later Boretz, in his role as a solipsist of the present moment, seems to deny 
the possibility of knowledge by description, implying that knowledge can only 
occur by acquaintance.  This distinction, introduced and discussed by Russell 
himself ([1912] 1997, 46–59), is restated by the pre-Turn Boretz in Meta-Variations 
as the distinction between music as, “an experiential domain that is not only 
thought about but also, apparently, thought in” ([1969] 1995, 26, emphasis original). 
Thinking about music translates Russell’s notion of knowledge by description, 
and thinking in music translates the notion of knowledge by acquaintance.  
According to Russell, “We shall say that we have acquaintance with anything of 
which we are directly aware, without the intermediary of any process of 
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inference or any knowledge of truths” ([1912] 1997, 46, emphasis original). 
Knowledge by acquaintance involves, “things immediately known to me just as 
they are” (Ibid., 47).  Knowledge by description, on the other hand, does not 
involve direct knowledge of sense data, but rather knowledge of physical objects 
themselves, such as a table: “There is no state of mind in which we are directly 
aware of the table; all our knowledge of the table is really knowledge of truths, 
and the actual thing which is the table is not, strictly speaking, known to us at 
all” (Ibid., emphasis original).  All that is known to us are the sense data of the 
table.  Similarly, for Russell, other people’s minds, thoughts, or internal 
perspectives cannot be known to us by acquaintance, but rather only by 
description (Ibid., 52).  Again, Boretz, as solipsist of the present moment, denies 
knowledge by description—thought about—including, given his general 
solipsism, knowledge of other minds.  The later Boretz seems to suggest that 
while we may be about music, when it comes to thinking music, we may think in 
music, but not about: music is music, not language, its own interior space. 
As stated, connected to solipsism generally, which asserts that “all that is 
real is my experience,” is solipsism of the present moment: “All that is real is the 
experience of the present moment” (Wittgenstein 1979, 25).  Boretz, as we have 
discussed, supports both views: all that is real is my experience of or during the 
present moment.  I am interested now in unpacking what Wittgenstein says in 
response to the assertion of solipsism of the present moment.  Wittgenstein’s first 
move is to draw the distinction we just have, between solipsism generally and 
one of the present moment, thus temporalizing solipsism.  He next presents a 
number of considerations: Wittgenstein identifies the present moment with the 
subject of experience; he suggests that, contra most considerations of solipsism, 
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and indeed his own later discussion of the private language argument (to be 
discussed later in this chapter), in the situation of a solipsism of the present 
moment we can have a solipsistic language: “We may be inclined to make our 
language such that we will call only the present experience ‘experience.’  This 
will be a solipsistic language, but of course we must not make a solipsistic 
language without saying exactly what we mean by the word which in our old 
language meant ‘present’” (Ibid.).  This seems to involve a language determined 
by definition, which Wittgenstein will later problematize in the Philosophical 
Investigations: mere naming.  (Boretz encourages us to experience, with no 
names.)  Wittgenstein next considers what Russell had said in an attempt to 
justify solipsism of the present moment and memory: “Russell said that 
remembering cannot prove that what is remembered actually occurred, because 
the world might have sprung into existence five minutes ago, with acts of 
memory intact.  We could go on to say that it might have been created one 
minute ago, and finally, that it might have been created in the present 
moment.”20  Thus, a solipsism of the present moment. 
 Wittgenstein next re-temporalizes solipsism of the present moment by 
suggesting the solipsist of the present moment envisions time moving in front of 
herself in a spatial sense—she supposedly exists at a Euclidean point, and time 
moves future, to present, to past, right to left on the page.  But: 
 
There is a grammatical confusion here.  A person who says the present 
experience alone is real is not stating an empirical fact, comparable to the 
fact that Mr. S. always wears a brown suit.  And the person who objects to 
the assertion that the present alone is real with “Surely the past and future 
are just as real” somehow does not meet the point.  Both statements mean 
                                                
20 Wittgenstein (1979, 25).  I have been unable to find the reference in Russell. 
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nothing….  Russell’s hypothesis was so arranged that nothing could bear 
it out or refute it.  The point of saying that something has happened 
derives from there being a criterion for its truth….  Such sentences seem to 
mean something.  But they are otiose, like wheels in a watch which have 
no function although they do not look to be useless….  My method  
throughout is to point to mistakes in language.  I am going to use the 
word “philosophy” for the activity of pointing out such mistakes.  
(Wittgenstein 1979, 25–26) 
 
Wittgenstein’s therapeutic method of philosophy here is to point out that when 
the solipsist of the present moment claims that only the present is real, she 
commits a grammatical error in assuming that this is an empirical proposition, 
capable of being proven or disproven.  Wittgenstein suggests it is, instead, a 
psychological statement, a statement of personal belief with which we cannot 
agree nor disagree (Pears 1987, 36).  We should accept the solipsist feels that 
way—that is her report—and move on. 
Before doing so, however, I would like to examine Nelson Goodman’s 
discussion of solipsism of the present moment, which occurs in two places in The 
Structure of Appearance: during a critical commentary on Carnap’s Aufbau, and in 
the context of speculations about the nature of time.  Firstly, in discussing the 
basic units of Carnap’s system—the elementarerlebnisse abbreviated as erlebs and 
discussed in Chapter Three of this dissertation—Goodman states that although 
the units present the perspective of the subject, the system has yet to construct 
the subject, thus: 
 
Although the system is solipsistic in a loose sense [which Carnap calls 
methodological solipsism, as discussed earlier in this chapter], it by no 
means embodies a “solipsism of the present moment.”  It commences with 
a set of momentary erlebs that together exhaust the total temporally long 
stream of experience.  That does not solve the problem of ordering the 
erlebs in time, nor of distinguishing past, present, and future; but it does 
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make unnecessary, for instance, the construction of past experience solely 
in terms of memory images and other present experience. ([1951] 166, 154) 
 
As we discover time and again throughout these texts, the threat of solipsism is 
always present, hanging over the discourse like a dark cloud.  The erlebs relieve 
the strain of constructing temporality within the system from the perspective of 
an ever-changing present moment—solipsism of the present moment—because, 
“their selection as basic units or ‘ground elements’ does not imply that erlebs are 
actually separate units marked off in experience, but merely that assertions can 
be made about, and relating, such places in the stream of experience.  Erlebs are 
preferred as ground elements because they seem to be the closest practicable 
approximation to what is given, namely, a single unbroken stream of experience” 
(Ibid.).  Interesting here is the digital quality of temporality, not as experienced, 
but as rationally reconstructed: as Dubiel (2005–2006, 168) mentions regarding 
Boretz’s temporality of the Mozart variations, onsets of pitch events define 
moments in time, with, as Wittgenstein says, those moments ordered in a single 
stream blurring past, present, and future.  Recall that Carnap begins his system 
from the memory of past similarity.  Goodman intervenes here by implying his 
system will not thus begin, which we are to read as an improvement.  (See 
Goodman [1951] 1966, 171–73, 189–204, and 219–24.) 
 In the highly speculative ending to The Structure of Appearance entitled, 
“Of Time and Eternity” (355–80), Goodman again discusses solipsism of the 
present moment, while discussing the temporal field, by conceding that any 
phenomenalistic system (such as his own or Carnap, Rahn, or Boretz’s) will take 
as basic the experience, “confined to the experience of a single subject; but does it 
comprise the lifetime experience of that subject, or only a moment of that 
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experience, or something in between?  The advocate of ‘solipsism of the present 
moment’ confines himself to the experience of one moment…. For him there is 
only a single moment; his position depends upon denying that there are any 
phenomenal temporal distinctions” (Goodman [1951] 1966, 377).  Goodman 
denies that there is only one single moment in or to experience, asserting that we 
do make temporal distinctions: past, present, and future are real, from outside the 
perspective of the experiencing I. 
But perhaps we read too quickly Boretz’s earlier comment, that, “in music, 
as in everything, the disappearing moment of experience is the firmest reality” 
([1985] 2003, 241).  We read it as simply specifying that this moment is the real 
moment, all other moments accessible in only an unreal sense, and ultimately 
inaccessible.  That reading actually implies a kind of atemporality: this moment 
is a frozen moment, the nunc stans, standstill, or Jetztzeit of eternity, Russell’s 
“prison” which for Walter Benjamin, for example, opens out onto Messianic time: 
a patient waiting or anticipation.21  As stated earlier, Goodman in fact ends The 
Structure of Appearance with a meditation on time and eternity, arguing that, 
“although a color quale, for example, occurs at times and persists through 
periods, it is nevertheless literally ‘out of time,’ i.e., it is discrete from all times.  It 
is, in a word, eternal…. Observe that the eternity of an individual is no bar to its 
occurrence at some times or its failure to occur at others; indeed, only what is 
eternal is with a time.  Theologians have perhaps overlooked something here” 
([1951] 1966, 358, emphasis original).  Perhaps Boretz, then, in fact temporalizes 
the present moment by using the locution “the disappearing moment of 
                                                
21 See Benjamin ([1940] 2003).  Heidegger, however, analyses the reckoning of the 
ordinary conception of time as a Jetztzeit; see Heidegger ([1927b] 2010, §81). 
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experience.”  Here, it is not now that is most real, but experience, the now of 
experience, but not an atemporal now, rather a now slipping into the past, 
always already on the move.  I can feel it draining away. 
 
 
6.  Babbitt, Guck, Wittgenstein’s Private Language Argument, Solipsism and Language 
 
 In response to Guck (1997), Babbitt (1997, 135–36) evokes the specter of 
solipsism by bifurcating the allegedly formal from metaphorical discourses 
within her talk, explicitly problematizing Guck’s analytical use of metaphor by 
stating, in part, “I feel obliged to wonder why she approaches the danger zone of 
that vulnerable yet invulnerable private language” (Babbitt 1997, 135).  This is 
the mid-way point of a long exhalation for Babbitt—one page-long paragraph—
during which he will diagnose the problems with all “metaphorical” discourse in 
music, evaluative discourse about music, possible worlds semantics, music’s lack 
of denotative power, evoking the work of Goodman on philosophy of art and 
language, and, as I would now like to discuss, Wittgenstein—the late 
Wittgenstein, of the Philosophical Investigations ([1953] 2009).  For this latter text 
contains the most well-known discussion of a “private language,” and Babbitt’s 
evocation of it immediately strikes me as odd, for Wittgenstein’s whole point is 
that it does not even exist.  If Wittgenstein is correct, then Babbitt’s problem with 
Guck’s discourse cannot exist.  Furthermore, if Wittgenstein’s critique of the 
possibility of a private language succeeds, then the epistemological conception of 
solipsism does not exist either, and, following logical positivism, the discussion 
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about epistemological solipsism, if not our tracing of it, has been metaphorical, 
metaphysical, a psychological but not cognitive, problematic. 
 Wittgenstein interpretation is famously difficult and contentious, and the 
interpretation of what is commonly referred to as the private language argument 
is no different.  In the most generally agreed upon reading of the private 
language argument, it begins at §243 of Wittgenstein ([1953] 2009), where he 
defines the notion of a private language itself, with a dialogue within a dialogue: 
“But is it also conceivable that there be a language in which a person could write 
down or give voice to his inner experiences—his feelings, moods, and so on—for 
his own use?—Well, can’t we do so in our ordinary language?—But that is not 
what I mean.  The words of this language are to refer to what only the speaker 
can know—to his immediate private sensations.  So another person cannot 
understand the language.”  Or later: “Now, what about the language which 
describes my inner experiences but which only I myself can understand?” (Ibid. 
§256) 
In using metaphors like “tantalizing,” Babbitt implies Guck is expressing a 
private language, accessible only to Guck herself, made up of words behaviorally 
connected to the immediate, private sensations they represent.  Babbitt cannot 
understand this language—he ends his long paragraph with the word 
“unintelligibility”—and neither, if Babbitt is correct, can we have any hope to 
understand it either.  Babbitt implies that Guck here, more to our point, is a 
solipsist, for the language she speaks is that of a solipsist: as Johnstone (1991, xvii 
and 15) would say, Guck is a Lingua-Sensa Solipsist, “for whom what exists is 
the private world of one’s own sensations or representations,” “as portrayed by 
Wittgenstein.”  How the private language argument relates to solipsism is 
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simple: the private language, were it to exist, would be the language the solipsist 
speaks, to herself.  Or, put another way, the music to which the solipsist listens is 
a private music, one which we (if we exist) cannot hear. 
 As stated, the point of Wittgenstein’s discussion is to deny the very 
possibility of such a private language: 
 
Look at the blue of the sky and say to yourself, “How blue the sky is!”—
When you do it spontaneously—without philosophical purposes—the 
idea never crosses your mind that this impression of colour belongs only 
to you.  And you have no qualms about exclaiming thus to another.  And if 
you point at anything as you say the words, it is at the sky.  I mean: you 
don’t have the pointing-into-yourself feeling that often accompanies 
“naming sensations” when one is thinking about the “private language.”  
Nor do you think that really you ought to point at the colour not with 
your hand, but with your attention.  (Consider what “to point at 
something with one’s attention” means.) ([1953] 2009, §275) 
 
Or, more directly: “The proposition ‘Sensations are private’ is comparable to 
‘One plays patience [solitaire] by oneself’” (Ibid., §248).  It provides no new 
information, is analytic or tautological.  And, as we discussed earlier with regard 
to solipsism of the present moment, it is not a factual claim about the world that 
can be evaluated. 
Perhaps Babbitt implicitly disagrees with Wittgenstein, assuming, with 
Ayer ([1954] 1986, 76) that a private language is possible, and that Guck has 
created one.  Is Babbitt’s problem, then, with the (lack of) sociality implied by 
this private language, that is, is the loss for music theorists, or, rather, is it a loss 
for music?  Let us remember that initially this occurs for the use of a metaphor—
“tantalizing”—to discuss the second-measure F in the space of Brahms’ E minor 
Intermezzo, Op. 117, no 1.  An assumption on Babbitt’s part is that not all 
language in the space of music is always already a metaphor, which is Boretz’s 
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later position, for example (Boretz [1999] 2003).  There is more, because Guck is 
arguing from that F and its description to a meta-analytical thesis that to Babbitt 
must have seemed an overturning of all for which he himself had worked.  
Guck’s broader argument is that we can use metaphors which express our heard 
experiences with music in rigorous ways, ways that should implicitly satisfy 
Babbitt’s desire for scientific discourse.  But this is surely the center of the 
problem for Babbitt: what, ultimately, are scientific discourses, discourses of 
sciences of?  Facts somehow in the world.  In music, this means not the score, not 
acoustic stimuli, but experiences.  Let us recall Chapter Three, wherein we 
discussed logical positivism/empiricism, and its traditional reading as using the 
verifiability of experiences as the foundations for meaning, cognition, therefore 
science.  But who is to say protocol sentences are themselves sharable?  (See Ayer 
[1954] 1986, 64–5.)  Hence the private language problem.  Science uses 
experiences as both foundation for and confirmation of its generalizations.  But it 
expresses these in language, and this will always be a problem for a discourse 
that understands music as fundamentally non-linguistic.  How is an F not a 
metaphor?  Through convention.  But although referring to it as “tantalizing” has 
yet to be established as convention, it is hearable, hence sharable, hence public. 
 Again, what is the source of Babbitt’s perturbation?  Although it appears 
to be not simply the use of metaphor, but its normative implications, I would like 
to argue a deeper problematic for Babbitt, which is that, as just stated, Guck, 
unlike, for example, Randall, makes claims that her metaphors can serve as the 
foundation for a science: Babbitt’s perturbation is not with Guck’s use of 
metaphor, but with Guck’s suggestion that metaphors could be used within or to 
form the basis of a scientific discourse.  Whereas Randall seems to Babbitt to be 
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expressing and have created a frankly private language, a frankly metaphysical 
discourse, hence there exists no claim on Babbitt’s own ideals of a scientific 
discourse, Guck, on the other hand, claims that her metaphysical words—
metaphors—can be treated rigorously, scientifically.  Not, however, for the 
normal reason of displaying the personal—that is, not for a social taboo (though 
he might have felt that too)—not for the thicket of problems he unpacks in using 
discourse in the space of the Brahms piece, nor for failing the scientific test of 
verifiability.  The usual reading of this situation is that Guck creates a category 
error, confuses domains.  But even that, I think, would not be the source of 
Babbitt’s deeper perturbation.  The deeper problem is that using metaphor in the 
space of science prompts the question: what is not a metaphor?  If music is a 
domain in which all language is meta—as Babbitt says, “the never-never land of 
music in the land of putative denotative reference”—then we cannot have a 
science of music.  If music cannot be transferred into discourse, then there is no 
science of music.  If there is no science of music, then everything for which 
Babbitt had fought since—we are led to believe—the 1930’s, is null.  Much of 
Babbitt’s discourse is about language, but that is a subsidiary concern, important 
for its relation to musical discourse as a science, which, as we shall discuss in 
Chapter Five, is itself important for ethical reasons. 
 I am talking about Babbitt’s comment on the potential for a private 
language in the space of solipsism because the alleged solipsist would speak a 
private language.  So when Babbitt accuses Guck of sliding into a private 
language, he shows his own concern with the situation of the solipsist, his own 
tension with the problematic of solipsism.  As discussed, Babbitt is the one, 
following Schoenberg, and famously, to think music and society from the 
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perspective of the lone(ly) individual, not Guck.  There is nothing in Guck’s 
writings to indicate she finds communication problematic, but if she finds 
communication problematic, this appears not to prevent her from still attempting 
to do precisely that. 
All along experience has been bound up with theory, discourse, of 
representation, of grasping music’s temporal flux, with problems of 
communication, hence the preceding discussion leads directly to where we now 
find ourselves.  Communication challenges solipsism, as surely as solipsism 
challenges communication.  The question: to what degree, in what manner, is 
music(al experience) pre- or para-linguistic for these thinkers?  It seems that any 
experience that is non-linguistic is simply not recoverable, metaphysical, 
solipsistic, or at least profoundly subjective.  If music is non-linguistic, it seems 
unclear how a logical positivist, or a music theorist working under the sign of 
logical positivism, would conceive of sharing music.  Resonance between souls?  
Love?  Hardly.  Babbitt: “Ben [Johnston] says that they [students] don’t listen, 
and I agree, but how do we find out whether they are really listening?  We have 
to indulge in verbalization.”22  If we are to discover whether our students are 
“really” listening, they must verbalize what they hear.  If they cannot bring into 
discursive space the non-verbalness of music, then it may not be the case that 
their experiences are not rewarding or valuable, it is simply that they are not 
recoverable, not knowable, cognitive.  If not cognitive, not shareable; if not 
shareable, solitary, singular, solipsistic. 
                                                
22 Westergaard ([1966] 1968, 72).  Long ago, Moses Maimonides too contended 
the necessity of verbal communication: “We have no idea or notion of any other 
mode of communication between the soul of one person and that of another than 
by means of speaking” ([1190, 1904] 2004, 113). 
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But unlike the logical positivists whom Babbitt so admired, I think Babbitt 
actually thinks there is a problem with frankly metaphysical discourse, even if it 
does not claim a scientific rigor.  Unlike a normal fact in the world—which the 
Vienna Circle would ordinarily take to be its object of inquiry—Babbitt is dealing 
with music, a traditionally aesthetic object, which he needed to argue was 
actually an object of scientific inquiry.  There exists a certain defensiveness in 
Babbitt’s confrontation with Guck, evidenced simply by Babbitt’s need for the 
long paragraph, which seems less to do with Guck or her words than with the 
fragility of music in relation to discourse—or maybe the issue is that discourse is 
fragile in relation to music.  Music is strong, but discourse can be twisted. 
Could it be, then, that music is the private language of which the solipsist 
has been dreaming?  That is to say, a sensation language that only the solipsist 
understands, private.  Is this Princeton Theory’s ultimate insight as it pertains to 
language and music?  What are the implications of this position?  How did we 
get here?  Music is not a language, a verbal discourse: one may think outside or 
beyond or anterior to language.  Music is, rather, its own entity.  But more, 
music, like language, is a form of communication between the self and itself.  
Before the Turn, Princeton Theory was convinced that music is a language—
hence the need to systematize axiomatically—but after the Turn, by some point, 
music is not a language.  If I am a musical thinker, I am so outside language.  
Boretz and Randall end their massive two-volume collected essays, entitled Being 
About Music, with the following postscript: “If there is anything outside 
language, it cannot be said that there is.  But there is.  Is there?” (Boretz and 
Randall, 2003, 564) Relatedly, in conversation Boretz recently said that, troping 
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the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus, in the case of solipsism, we can only say it, and 




V.  Ethics 
 
Ich bin du, wenn ich ich bin. 
 
—Paul Celan, “Lob der Ferne” 
 
Man, if not as Aristotle thought a political animal, is at all events a social animal. 
—Karl Marx, Capital Vol. I 
 
 
I must Create a System, or be enslav’d by another Mans 
 
—William Blake, Jerusalem 
 
 
This chapter argues that there exists an ethics in the writings of Princeton 
Theory, both in the sense of the authors pursuing a certain ethic while doing 
their theoretical work, and in the sense of their making ethics a topic of 
conversation.  This argument serves as an intervention because twelve-tone 
music, its attendant theory, and composers specifically have been accused of 
lacking morality, a sociability.  It is not apparent, for example, how to arrive at an 
ethics from the position of solipsism; Wittgenstein’s early thought was taken by 
the logical positivists generally to dismiss ethics (and aesthetics) from 
discussion;1 Carnap explicitly, and vehemently, rejected ethics as a 
pseudoproblem for philosophy; Princeton Theory’s “hermeticism” (Korsyn 2003, 
                                                
1 This is not to claim that ethics was absent entirely from logical positivism.  By 
1963, ethics was on Babbitt’s mind, as he, “took part in a panel discussion on 6 
August entitled ‘Ethical and Aesthetical Criteria of Value in Music Today,’” at 
the sixteenth annual conference of the International Folk Music Council (Babbitt 





185) implies a lack of sociability—indeed, a purposive withholding—and 
therefore a lack of ethics.  Putnam (2008, 22–5) implies solipsism of the present 
moment is not capable of generating an ethics.  Tomlinson (1993) charges all 
formalism with imperialism.  Babbitt ([1958] 2003), as Susan McClary ([1989] 
1993) has argued, appears to be the most isolating, indeed, anti-social of texts or 
arguments.  While Babbitt’s text actually circumscribes a particular group of 
composers—the “university” or “academic composer”—therefore Babbitt at least 
considered a restricted sociality, nonetheless that group has been considered elite 
(by Babbitt) and elitist (by McClary). (See Girard 2010 for further discussion.) I 
contend, however, that considered ethical positions appear in these writings, 
most prominently in those by Babbitt and Boretz.  The goal of this chapter is to 
uncover, situate, and develop these positions.  I shall problematize the ethical 
implications of Princeton Theory’s admittedly uneven appeals to solipsism.  I 
shall discuss Babbitt and Boretz’s evocation of the is/ought distinction or 
fact/value dichotomy; argue that Babbitt’s contextuality is itself an ethical 
position; that more recent writings by Boretz and Rahn argue a hermeneutic 
ethics, an ethics of musical and intersubjective interpretation; I develop Boretz’s 
notion of taking time and care from a Heideggerian perspective; and I argue that 
there exists for Lewin particularly a manner in which music analysis is or should 
be moral, life-changing. 
Throughout this chapter I shall be concerned for the most part with the 
ethical implications and claims of Princeton Theory, but of course moral 





The practical thinking of the agent trying to work out his own personal 
problems; this is the level of moral discourse…. There is philosophic 
thinking about the principles, patterns, and methods of making decisions 
in regard to moral problems; this reflective examination of practical 
thinking is the level of ethical discourse.  Finally, there is the study of what 
might be called the logic and epistemology of ethics, the consideration of 
some very general problems which go beyond the scope of ethical 
reasoning (such as the differences between ethical and nonethical 
judgments, the nature and relation of freedom to ethics, the comparison of 
empirical science and ethics): this third level is that of meta-ethical 
discourse. (Bourke 1968, 209–10, emphasis original) 
 
For example, when examining how Princeton Theory thinks we are to comport 
our discourses in relation to pieces while listening and other discourses, we shall 
be discussing ethical considerations.  While discussing Babbitt’s repeated 
invocation of the is/ought distinction, we shall be thinking at the meta-ethical 




1.  Solipsism and Ethics 
 
I stated that it seems less than obvious how to arrive at an ethics from the 
position of solipsism, especially metaphysical.  Let us recall, from Chapter Four, 
Tomlinson’s (1993, 20–1) charge that formalism coalesces solipsism into its 
motion, along with a host of other evils.  This motive is in effect a repetition and 
expansion upon an earlier charge Tomlinson had made against formalism: “The 
presentist view of artworks as transcendent entities fully comprehensible 
without reference to the conditions of their creation sacrifices Geertz’s expansion 




(1984, 358).  Keep in mind the notion that presentist formalism leads to solipsism 
and ultimately narcissism, for we will meet precisely these latter two terms, and 
their motion, from a different angle momentarily, serving as evidence for the 
position that especially high-modernist discussions of music are in some sense 
anti-social and wrong, morally. 
In order to reestablish Boretz’s solipsism, let us reread the following 
rhetorical questions, which Boretz has prepared and will go on to answer as his 
own position: “Does it seem, then, that an almost self-inscrutable singular ‘I’ 
looms as the natural citizen of a musical world whose only determinacy is the 
feel of experience?  Does it get down to subjectivity?  Or to solipsism, for those 
who really dislike the implications? Musical universes, perforce, of one 
inhabitant each?” (2008, 73) Let us recall too, the moment during Carnap’s 
Aufbau ([1928] 1967, 2003), 224) when the other SM is a construction within the 
world or universe of the self S, for this is one of the implications of solipsism, 
foundationalism, and phenomenalism.  I would like to pursue the “ethics” of 
these positions by reading Hilary Putnam at length: 
 
A problem that arises… is that even if the construction succeeded in its 
own terms—even if, per impossibile, one were to succeed in (re)-
constructing “the world” in terms of the philosopher’s ontology—the 
primitive elements of that ontology are my own experiences.  And there is 
something morally disturbing about this. 
To put the point in terms of Carnap’s… notion of construction, 
suppose that my friend is a phenomenalist and believes that all I am is a 
logical construction out of his sense-data.  Should I feel reassured if he tells 
me that the relevant sentences about his sense-data (the ones that 
“translate” all of his beliefs about me into the system of the Aufbau) have 
the same “verification conditions” as the beliefs they translate?  Am I 
making a mistake if I find that just isn’t good enough? 
If his avowals of friendship and concern are avowals of an attitude 
to his own sense-data, then my friend is narcissistic.  A genuine ethical 




independent reality and not in any way your construction. (2008, 77–78, 
emphasis original) 
 
This is an important critique, damning to phenomenalist systems, for following 
from the musically obvious position of phenomenalism is solipsism, but more, 
narcissism and amorality (or a disingenuous morality): a lack of the historical 
moment in discourse, but more, a lack of the simple acknowledgement of the 
difference of others.  While we might assert a solipsistic position shows the 
solipsist’s preoccupation with the difference of herself and thus others, such an 
assertion assumes others are more than simply narcissistic projections of the 
(solipsist’s) self, and is not borne out by the phenomenalist problematic of 
solipsism, as discussed during the last chapter.  The failure to absorb the face of 
the other is the tenor of Tomlinson’s critique, made explicit on a different, more 
foundational, level by Putnam.  To his credit, Boretz, for example, pursues at 
length and in detail the implications of Meta-Variations’ phenomenalism: music is 
thought of or in the individual mind.  To our great perturbation, this implies a 
moral position that we cannot countenance.  We assert our subjectivities: the 
other must disturb his system.  If the other is merely a construction within 
Boretz’s system, then there can be no disturbance, no reality principle to 
intervene.  Hence the loop, too, of relativism. 
But can we recuperate an ethics within the Boretzian text, within, indeed, 
the position of solipsism?  Does Boretz, following from solipsism, intend that we 
are merely constructs within his system?  Is there a way in which solipsism in 
fact respects the alterity of the other?  Putnam’s critique of Carnap’s 
methodological solipsism assumes that solipsism becomes an actual 




phenomenalism does not entail narcissism, the holding fast to the subjectivity of 
the self would seem to imply the same for all others: each of us has our system.  
Let us remember that for many years, and to a great extent even today, music 
theorists “have a system.”  It is not uncommon to be asked at conferences, not, 
“what are you working on, what is your area?,” but, “what is your system?”  
Indeed, Boretz once told me that the first question George Perle asked of him, 
upon their meeting, was, “what is your system?”  Contra the systems presented 
in Rahn (1974), Rahn (1979), and Rahn (1983), which their authors explicitly base 
on Boretz’s Meta-Variations, a fundamental idea of Carnapian axiomatic systems 
is that each of us would have our own; one cannot simply hang one’s system on 
the shoulders of another’s; we are each of us responsible for constructing our 
own worlds to inhabit. (“I must Create a System, or be enslav’d by another 
Mans.”) If each of us has a musical system/world/universe (implicit or fully 
cognizant), then the meeting of these systems would seem to force changes to 
both.  To quote Putnam again, now explicitly troping Emmanuel Levinas: “I 
know the Other [l’autrui] is not part of my ‘construction of the world’ because my 
encounter with the other is an encounter with a fissure, with a being who breaks 
my categories” (Putnam 2008, 79, emphasis original).  Can we claim that, in this 
reading, by presenting solipsism as asserting the fundamental difference 
between persons and their systems, Boretz maintains and respects the alterity of 
the other?  Perhaps all that (musically) exists is populated by a field of, if not 
solipsists, then monads: “Musical universes, perforce, of one inhabitant each?” 
(Boretz 2008, 73) Each, “a one-person culture.”2 
                                                
2 Boretz, personal communication.  Were I to develop the monadic reading of 




Martin Brody has recently offered a compelling reading of Babbitt’s ethics 
along similar lines of thought—balancing self and other—which I would like to 
rehearse here.  There exists in the Babbittian text a certain fervor, a moral demand 
to get our theories right, over and above the ordinary scholarly principles.  
Babbitt demands, according to Brody, “the highest level of accountability from 
everyone involved in the circuit of musical production and reception…. In 
Babbitt’s universe, no one is beneath critique or contempt, no one is let off the 
hook.  He speaks to us personally, and we have to take his judgments 
personally” (2012, 367).  According to Stephen Dembski (2012, 7), “Implicit in his 
[Babbitt’s] complex expressions was an expectation of understanding—that if 
you’d just listen, you’d get it—reflecting a consistent respect for the auditor.”  
Babbitt speaks of musical citizenship, of responsible musicianship in the public 
sphere, one who must abide by verbal and methodological responsibility as a, 
“concerned and thoughtful musical citizen” (Babbitt [1965] 2003, 200).  Thus 
while each of us maintains our critical faculties with respect to the other’s 
discourses, precisely such a stance extends respect to the other.  For absent is the 
condescension of the popular moment; present instead is an almost pedagogical 
ethics, ever rising to meet new mental and musical challenges. 
Brody argues that Hannah Arendt’s 
 
ethics of plurality and individual initiative provide an evocative context 
for rereading Babbitt.  In particular, his arguments about specialization 
and contextuality—often and easily dismissed as a highly evolved 
snobbery or pedantry—resonate strongly with Arendt’s reflections on the 
free actions of non-sovereign individuals in a pluralistic society.  Babbitt’s 
scrupulous dismantling of the metaphysics of music theory and his 
                                                                                                                                            
1999, §33, §55, and §56), Ricoeur ([1967] 2007, 106–07), Benjamin ([1928] 1998, 47) 




ruthless disenchantment of musical culture yielded an ongoing dialectic of 
ontological creativity and rational reconstruction—a theoretical 
framework much like Arendt’s—in which the social and epistemological 
aspects of creative speech and action are inextricable. (Brody 2012, 367–68) 
 
Although the impact of Babbitt’s methodological articles is to clear away 
discourse as a kind of epistemological hygiene—“Babbitt’s scrupulous 
dismantling of the metaphysics of music theory and his ruthless disenchantment 
of musical culture”—nevertheless this is carried out, among other reasons, for 
the purpose of creating new, particular(istic) systems and/or musical worlds: 
“an ongoing dialectic of ontological creativity and rational reconstruction.”   
As with Rahn’s (1974) discussion of the qualified listeners to Beethoven’s 
Fifth Symphony, discussed during Chapter Four, Brody implies that Babbitt’s 
contextuality—in the sense of a piece’s self-referentiality: a piece creates or 
enables creation of its own analysis or system—models respect for individuality: 
“the free actions of non-sovereign individuals in a pluralistic society.”  Babbitt’s 
contextuality is thus ethical in nature.  In discussing Berg’s discussion of 
Schoenberg, Babbitt states that, 
 
Those middle-period works of Schoenberg, the middle-period works of 
Berg [!], the middle-period works of Webern have this particular property 
in common.  They are to as large an extent as possible self-referential, self-
contained, and what I’m given to call “contextual.”  Contextuality merely 
has to do with the extent to which a piece defines its materials within 
itself.   
Now there is an obvious hazard here.  The problem of contextuality 
again is a problem of the listener; it’s a problem of the composer; it’s a 
problem of the performer.  Just consider what is involved.  It means that 
when you come to hear such a piece, you are listening to a piece which is 
going to use perhaps physical materials which are familiar, but very little 
else that is familiar.  You’re going to have to proceed with this piece by a 
complete concentration on the piece as piece.  You’re going to have very 




little that you can carry with you by way of your experiences of past 
music.  In other words, it is not very communal…. (Babbitt 1987, 167) 
 
Babbitt phrases this renewed attention as a matter of necessity, but never 
answers the fundamental why-question.  Why must I attend to this music in the 
manner Babbitt describes?  Because I cannot rely on the kinds of listening I can 
rely upon in tonal situations, situations where I can anticipate the medial 
caesura, for example.  Why else must I attend in the manner Babbitt describes?  
Because, as he said earlier, in relation to listening to Schoenberg’s Op. 7 String 
Quartet in D-minor, “in order to hear that piece, in order to follow its sequence of 
events, in order to follow it as a cumulative containment, a successive 
subsumption—all those things that musical memory requires if the work 
eventually is to be entified as a unified totality, an all-of-a-piece of music—you 
had to listen to that piece very much as a thing in itself” (Ibid.).  Here Babbitt 
tells us why we must hear a contextual piece as contextually defined: because we 
must hear each as “a unified totality, an all-of-a-piece of music,” a fully-formed 
thing, a work.  Our crucial next question emerges: why must we hear a work as a 
work?  Besides historical answers, there is the ethical one: because this is what an 
ethical approach to the work, and implicitly, the author behind the work, 
requests.  Why is it appropriate that we approach works that are contextual—an 
is-statement—with a particular mindset—an ought statement?  Because there is 
an ethical move being made by Babbitt here.  We ought to listen in particular 
ways, because each of these pieces is contextual.  It is a moral issue because 
Babbitt is telling us how we are to act.  I thus find myself arguing that Babbitt 
committed the fallacy of deriving an ought from an is.  (Which we shall discuss 




in this manner, “had all these new rewards; it had all these new possibilities.  The 
idea of writing a piece which is self-referential, self-contained, is of course an 
intriguing one, an exciting one” (Ibid., 167–8).  Thus, a utopian gesture, not 
strictly a logical or epistemological one, lies within Babbitt’s ideation of the 
notion of contextuality. 
Brody continues discussion of specifically Babbitt’s ethics by discussing 
Arendt’s notion of “togetherness”: “This revelatory quality of speech and action 
comes to the fore where people are with others and neither for nor against 
them—that is, in sheer human togetherness” (Arendt 1958, 180, emphasis 
original).  We shall return to this notion, “that acknowledges the differences 
between people and practices” (Brody 2012, 369), but Brody argues it leads 
Babbitt to become a specialist.  With the end of musical absolutes, “we are better 
off quizzing each other, he [Babbitt] suggests, than blowing smoke at our 
differences, proclaiming our bliss, and projecting our fantasies” (Ibid., 369). 
“Babbitt’s specialist acknowledges the opacity of others; he recognizes that the 
tension between the ‘communal’ and the ‘proprium’ can only be provisionally 
resolved” (Ibid., 370).  Insofar as Babbitt’s specialist escapes the solipsistic 
problematic, that specialist acknowledges that she lives and labors (works) in a 
field populated by other individuals, each respecting the right of the other to her 
own ideas (in this case, regarding musical compositions, structure, each person’s 
musical world).  “Opacity” need not be absolute, solipsism; it is the spacing 
between the two—the “communal” and the “proprium”—which enables or 
describes Princeton Theory’s ethics. 
Recall that for Boretz, in at least some of his moods, a solipsism of the 




addresses this possibility, claiming it is immoral.  Recall that in a post-Humean 
sense, solipsism can be read as negating the self: I never perceive a self, therefore 
the self does not exist.  Recall, too, that in a Carnapian sense, the self is 
constructed at a later level of the rational reconstruction, it is not assumed as 
foundational.  The question of personal identity then arises from these positions.  
If I change as a whole from moment to moment then there is nothing that keeps 
me in common, with myself.  As discussed by Putnam, the name for this position 
is nominalism, and as discussed during the preceding chapter, Boretz does seem 
to assert it on a metaphysical level, not merely on a pragmatic or epistemological 
level.  Putnam argues that this position presents a moral problem, and asserts 
that, “we are responsible for what we have thought and done in the past, 
responsible now, intellectually and practically, and that is what makes us thinkers, 
rational agents in a world, at all” (2008, 25, emphasis original).  We cannot 
repress our past actions and act as if they did not occur; we must own them, in 
the present. 
Following from his phenomenalism, if the other exists and implies an 
ethical relation for Boretz, then he follows Celan, maintains that I am only able to 
extend myself for you, for your benefit, after, if, I have first firmly established 
myself in myself. (“Ich bin du, wenn ich ich bin.”) The self constitutes itself, and 
only then extends itself.  The question of temporality now returns: when am I 
ever firmly established, such that I might only subsequently express concern for 
you?  Unavailable seems to be the notion of self-constitution during or through 
the concern or care for the other, such as made famous by Buber ([1923] 1970, 54, 
62, and 80): “There is no I as such but only the I of the basic word I-You and the I 




actual life is encounter…. Man becomes an I through a You.”  While we might 
maintain the placing of priority on self-constitution is Boretz’s implicit 
philosophical position, following too from solipsism, it seems strikingly 
dissonant with respect to his work as editor and teacher, wherein we find a 




2.  The Fact/Value Dichotomy 
 
In his argument with George Perle, familiar from Chapter Three of this 
dissertation, Babbitt concludes by saying that, “I suggested no evaluative 
conclusions (aware as I am that a descriptive or analytic statement entails no 
normative conclusion)” ([1963] 2003, 145).  This distinction, between what is 
variously described as fact and value, is and ought, analysis and judgment, or the 
descriptive and the normative, is often repeated in Babbitt’s writings, and takes 
on a different valence each time.3  Dembski, in a memorial to Babbitt, recently 
raised the issue of Babbitt’s ethics as regards his discourse and treatment of 
younger composers.  In commenting on a younger composer’s less than 
outstanding piece, Babbitt is reported to have offered multivalent words in 
response, which Dembski reads thus: “Milton had avoided compromising his 
philosophically grounded ethical stance by side-stepping the common 
                                                
3 Wright (2002, 76–92) discusses the fact/value dichotomy from the perspective 




implication of evaluation” (2012, 7).  We can unpack the music-theoretical and 
philosophical grounding of Babbitt’s ethics by discussing this refusal to evaluate.   
First, the music-theoretical: Babbitt, in comparing Schenker and 
Schoenberg, seems to locate the move from the descriptive to the evaluative in 
Schenker’s polemics, saying that, “Schenker made an illicit, irrelevant leap from 
his analyses to his evaluations” ([1979] 2003, 373; see also pp. 193, 280, and 441). 
In discussing his experiences with Ernst Oster (1908–1977) and the American 
Schenkerians, Babbitt states:  
 
I was attempting to discover to what extent, if any, there was an 
awareness that the Schenkerian cosmos in all its manifestations rested on 
normative, but fruitful, circularity; lurking behind every analytic diegetic 
was an intimated disguised evaluative.  The verbal components of the 
analyses are riddled with imperatives and prescriptives, and the very 
choice of instances rests ultimately on an illicit derivation of a “should” 
from an “is” or—given that the analyses are exegetic wakes—of a 
“should” from a “was….” Schenker’s small number of allowed entrants 
into the pantheon… suggests an enthymemic leap over concealed criteria 
that are not inferable from his “counterexample” analysis of the Reger 
Variations and Fugue on a Theme of Bach and of a small portion of the 
Stravinsky Piano Concerto. ([1999] 2003, 480) 
 
The bracketing—indeed, editorial excision—of Schenker’s evaluations comprises, 
in part, the post-War Americanization of Schenker, but let us pause for a moment 
to discuss Babbitt’s last example—the Schoenberg and Stravinsky analyses—a 
place where Schenker shifts from analysis in support of an evaluative conclusion 
to evaluation, eliding a premise.  As Babbitt says elsewhere:  
 
I was never certain that I interpreted correctly his [Stravinsky’s] silent 
reactions to the references to Schoenberg and him in Schenker’s Das 
Meisterwerk, Volume 2.  I showed him, at his request and as a result of a 
momentary aside in my Santa Fe talk, Schenker’s critical analysis of those 




inscrutably scanning the two pages of text and analytic sketch, then 
thumbed forward and—fortunately—backward through the article, where 
he discovered the excerpts from Schoenberg’s Harmonielehre.  He read 
Schenker’s commentary, and then I thought I detected a glimmer of 
satisfaction: was it in that Schenker had criticized Stravinsky’s music, but 
Schoenberg’s harmony book? ([1971] 2003, 266) 
 
Despite this, Schenker’s ([1926] 1996, 12–8) critique in Das Meisterwerk in der 
Musik, Volume 2, seems to shift from consideration of what we might call the 
cognitive to the moral.  Schoenberg doesn’t understand passing motion: 
“Schoenberg has too little understanding of the passing notes which he attacks” 
(Schenker [1926] 1996, 16).  Stravinsky, on the other hand, is incapable of doing 
good (musical) things: “The fact of life in general: that man is more often 
constrained to do bad things because he is incapable of doing good things” (Ibid., 
17).  Furthermore, “It is futile to masquerade all the inability to create tension by 
means of appropriate linear progressions as freedom, and to proclaim that 
nothing bad exists in music at all…. Stravinsky’s way of writing is altogether 
bad, inartistic and unmusical” (Ibid., 18).  This is a metaphorics of (failed) 
morality, not simply musical inability or failure of musical cognition, supported 
by musical (Schenker’s own) analysis, which demonstrates the corrupted 
Stravinskian morality.  Although Babbitt argues that Schenker moved 
inappropriately from is to ought in discussing single authors, Schenker’s 
discussion is interesting here for it temporalizes the distinction across composers: 
the fact of Schoenberg’s mental inability to the value of Stravinsky’s moral 
failing. 
The broad distinction traditionally originates in the philosophical 
literature in David Hume, in what is called the is/ought distinction or the 




I cannot forbear adding to these reasonings an observation, which may, 
perhaps, be found of some importance.  In every system of morality, 
which I have hitherto met with, I have always remark’d, that the author 
proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes 
the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; 
when of a sudden I am surpriz’d to find, that instead of the usual 
copulations and propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition 
that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not.  This change is 
imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence.  For as this ought, 
or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, ’tis necessary that 
it shou’d be observ’d and explain’d; and at the same time that a reason 
shou’d be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new 
relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from 
it.  But as authors do not commonly use this precaution, I shall presume to 
recommend it to the reader; and am perswaded, that this small attention 
wou’d subvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the 
distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of 
objects, nor is perceiv’d by reason. ([1737] 2000, §3.1.1, emphasis original) 
 
The main notion is that it is an informal fallacy to derive an ought—a normative 
statement as to what should be—from an is—a statement regarding a fact in the 
world.  As I type, it is nighttime.  It would be a fallacy to assert then that it should 
be nighttime, merely given the fact that it is.  This is a bald example, but as we 
have seen with Schenker, and as we can recall with many twentieth-century 
discussions of atonal, twelve-tone, and experimental musics, not far from the 
level of functioning of much musical discourse.  The reason the “level” of 
discourse is fairly low, is because this is a distinction basic to modernism 
generally, and because it requires a certain presence of mind to prevent one’s 
discourse from sliding from description of what is to prescription of what should 
be. 
 In attempting to locate causes for Babbitt’s bracketing of the moral or 
ethical in musical discourse, I have suggested that the trappings or we might say 
failings of Schenker would be one reason—a negative example.  Further, there is 




War II bracketing of ethics from scientific and academic discourse generally, in 
an attempt to prevent contention.  But further, there is the appeal to the logical.  
As Babbitt says, “Naturally, since I am not concerned with normative allegations, 
I cannot be concerned here with the invocation of the overtone series as a 
‘natural’ phenomenon, and that application of equivocation which then would 
label as ‘unnatural’ (in the sense, it would appear, of morally perverse) music 
which is not ‘founded’ on it” (Babbitt [1965] 2003, 197).  To base a music-
theoretical system upon principles somehow not based in nature—with nature 
understood in an historically normative sense—is to be morally suspect.4  The 
move here equivocates on the notion of “natural” as between given by physics 
and given by Judeo-Christian mores.  
As with many of the topics and approaches of logical positivism in the 
early twentieth century, Wittgenstein’s Tractatus-Logico Philosophicus set much of 
the tone for discussions of ethics: “So too it is impossible for there to be 
propositions of ethics” ([1921] 1961, §6.42).  This is because, per §6.41, as with the 
accidental and non-accidental, ethical propositions must lie outside the world, 
for if they were to lie inside the world, they would not be ethical propositions, 
they would be factual propositions, where ethical propositions, per §6.422, take 
on the form of laws for Wittgenstein.  Given that, as per §6.421, “ethics and 
aesthetics are one,” discussions of music, the arts, may be poetic but cannot be, in 
the normal understandings of music propagated by music criticism, the object of 
scientific knowledge.  Underappreciated in this connection, I would argue, is 
Babbitt’s achievement in making of musical understanding a science, this despite 
                                                





his knowledge that Carnap and other logical positivists, under the influence of 
Wittgenstein, would not have accepted study of music as a science, insofar as 
music is an art, unable to give forth verifiable propositions.  Schlick summarizes 
the sentiment: “Foreign to us is the pride of those philosophers who hold the 
questions of ethics to be the most noble and elevated of questions just because 
they do not refer to the common is but concern the pure ought” ([1939] 1959, 259, 
emphasis original). 
 Boretz, in discussing critical as opposed to expository writing, more than 
evokes or applies, but rather analyzes how the move from the descriptive to the 
normative appears to support certain music-theoretical claims:  
 
Of course, all the same confusions arise [in critical discourse as in 
expository writing], but a particular one that seems to cause the widest 
range of problems is the familiar procession from the descriptive to the 
normative, from “is” to “ought,” as, from “I cannot determine how this 
can be cognized as being in C major, so I don’t know what to make of it as 
a musical structure,” to “this isn’t in C major and hence is musically 
incoherent,” in which latter not only the compounded material implication 
but each of the italicized propositional components is a normative 
assertion disguised by grammar as an observational fact.  More confusing 
still is the situation in which the definitionally crucial criterion is left 
unstated, as: “You may have shown how the piece is organized, but not 
how it makes musical sense.”  Here, the conditions under which the latter 
reservation would be withdrawn are unstated and seemingly inscrutable, 
and those justifying the affirmation of the antecedent seem equally 
elusive.  A more subtle problem emerges from the obverse of this 
tendency: the assumption that all theoretical language as used by others is 
purely normative, and is thus to be understood as beyond all else persuasive 
in its implicit claim of coercive authority. (Boretz [1969] 1995, 16, emphasis 
original) 
 
Of course, Boretz’s example of C major is ironic, given that determining a piece’s 
key—especially when “in” C major—is normally considered a fundamental 




can present such difficulties, but it seems more likely to refer twelve-tone music, 
which mid-century presented the horizon of musical cognition under the sign of 
musical structure.  Reading again, however, while I still think the situation 
Boretz describes was historically precipitated by the problematic of twelve-tone 
music (how to hear a twelve-tone piece as twelve-tone, hence structured, hence 
coherent, hence, in some sense, “good,” or at least, not bad), nonetheless it is still 
imaginable that, as Boretz here describes it, he is referring implicitly to late-
Romantic music, wherein one intuits, we might say, a tonal center, but rationing 
the music out in such a way as to demonstrate tonal connections, coherence, over 
larger spans becomes highly problematic. 
Boretz here holds fast to the logical positivist distinction between fact and 
value, implying the only proper objects of scientific inquiry are facts.  Musical 
discourse concerns, not values, which are the domain of the social sciences, but 
rather facts, which are the domain of the empirical sciences.  Music theory is an 
empirical science, not one concerned with subjective observation reports, for 
example, nor surveys of group (in)abilities.  But we can read a utopian gesture 
into Boretz’s last move: his move to consider the logic by which music-theoretical 
discourse usually functions coercively, authoritatively.  We can read Meta-
Variations’s relativism here, where other authors project not so much the 
obligation, but rather the hope, to not impose their will power upon us, upon our 
hearings.   
Part of the background for Babbitt and Boretz’s dismissals of value 
judgments in music theory is the permeation and importance placed on value 
judgments in music criticism, the competing discourse, which Babbitt and Boretz 




can read Babbitt during the early stages of his career as implicitly writing against 
the composer/critic, that other, important option for the composer concerned 
with verbal communication.  (Although from 1962 to 1970 Boretz wrote 
exceptional music criticism for The Nation, I do no think this is the kind of 
criticism Babbitt was writing against, as Boretz even here evinces a certain 
modernist fervor.)  Indeed, we need not turn far into a book on the theory of 
musical criticism from 1966 to learn that judgment is the core act or faculty for 
the critic: “The practice of criticism boils down to one thing: making value 
judgments.  The theory of criticism, therefore, boils down to one thing also: 
explaining them” (Walker 1966, xi).  Interestingly, however, Walker still leaves 
room for a level of value-neutrality in the composition to audience process: 
“Means are precompositional; they are the concern of the composer.  The critic’s 
concern on the other hand, is the creative result.  We put the cart before the horse 
when we censure a composer for employing a technique which, for one reason or 
another, we happen to dislike.  By itself, a technique is neither good nor bad.  It is 
incapable of receiving censure until it has fulfilled itself in a creative result” 
(Ibid., 8).  Recall Partch’s problematization of the precompositional and 
compositional levels from Chapter Two of this dissertation.  On the one hand, 
Walker’s argument shows an absorption of theory into the music-critical 
imagination of the creative act: means, precomposition, technique, which he 
believes cannot be judged: they are value-neutral formalisms.  On the other 
hand, Walker simply shifts the fact/value dichotomy to a different level or stage 
in the transmission process, that of the “creative result.” 
As is generally well-known in music theory circles, Babbitt shared a Cold-




immigrated to the United States.  As Reisch (2005, 353–64) discusses, logical 
positivism effected a similar purging of evaluative discourse—specifically its 
pre-War Marxism—in the U.S.A. after the War, the relevant context being the 
McCarthy hearings.  Reisch (Ibid., 355) credits Hans Reichenbach’s popular 1951 
discussion of scientific philosophy with sounding the death knell for ethics—and 
politics—in logical positivism: as Reichenbach says, “The modern analysis of 
knowledge makes a cognitive ethics impossible: knowledge does not include any 
normative parts and therefore does not lend itself to an interpretation of ethics.  
The ethico-cognitive parallelism renders ethics a bad service: if it could be carried 
through, if virtue were knowledge, ethical rules would be deprived of their 
imperative character” (Reichenbach 1951, 277).  “The consensus within the 
profession [of philosophy of science in the U.S.A. during the 1950’s]… was that 
logical empiricism was apolitical and not concerned with problems and 
questions about values” (Reisch 2005, 353).  Throughout this dissertation I have 
pointed to the construction of axiomatic systems as central to the task of 
Princeton Theory in its high-modernist moment.  A proper music-theoretical 
system contains no premises, axioms, or definitions which make value 
judgments, they concern solely the is not the ought. 
That Babbitt and other Princeton Theorists in their high-modernist 
moment sought to bracket aesthetic judgments from music-theoretical 
discourse—that we should be unconcerned with musical oughts or what should  
be, but rather the musical is or could be—puts us in mind of Alexander Rehding’s 





The central question for Riemann’s harmonic dualism, as we shall see, 
was not so much about how we do hear music.  Rather… he exhibited a 
utopian concern with how we ought to hear music, and conversely, he 
argues that musical compositions ought to comply with harmonic 
dualism, even though the existing repertoire does not do so, or does so 
only partly.  On this level, Riemann’s musical thought touches aspects that 
merge epistemological and cognitive concerns with aesthetic ones: his 
musical thought becomes an aesthetic yardstick for past composers and an 
ethical guideline for composers of the present and the future.  This 
implicit “ought”—in other words, the relentless normativity of Riemann’s 
musical thought—is simply the flipside of his systematic and 
essentializing approach to music. (2003, 9) 
 
The obvious question: was Babbitt concerned with how we do or ought to hear 
music?  For Babbitt rarely seems to make appeals or concessions to how we 
already do hear music, but rather, as discussed in Chapter Three, appeals to the 
subjunctive, to that which could be learned to be heard.  Indeed, the oral history 
of Babbitt’s composition lessons tells us that they were steadfastly non-
normative: students not only studied with more than one composition professor 
at Princeton, but even then, Babbitt never encouraged students to compose 
specifically twelve-tone music.  Further, as Kerman (1985, 96) admits, there was 
in Babbitt’s world a relativism, an understanding that a given music-
compositional move was not right or wrong on its own terms—naturally—but 
rather was more or less appropriate for the specific effect desired, and given the 
local and global context of the piece.  Babbitt’s denaturalization of music theory, 
then, can be understood as presenting a decidedly non-normative framework for 
musical discourse.  While I think Babbitt in no way essentializes music, 
nonetheless he was unable to bracket completely evaluative discourse from his 
discourse.  The motion to bracket music criticism’s purple prose is itself 




normative claims where they do not “belong” is itself an ethical position.  The 
fact of a fact/value dichotomy is itself a value. 
Putnam historicizes and analyzes the point that the insistence of a 
distinction between is and ought is itself a moral as much as a logical position: 
“One clue that the claim presupposes a substantial metaphysics (as opposed to 
being simply a logical point) is that no one, including Hume himself, ever takes it 
as merely a claim about the validity of certain forms of inference, analogous to 
the claim ‘you cannot infer ‘p&q’ from ‘p or q’” (2002, 14).  The fact/value 
dichotomy assumes a distinction between the normative judgments of moral or 
ethical values and those of epistemic values.  But such epistemic, “judgments of 
‘coherence,’ ‘plausibility,’ ‘reasonableness,’ ‘simplicity…’ are all normative 
judgments… of ‘what ought to be’ in the case of reasoning.”  Therefore, 
“epistemic values are values too” (Ibid., 31).  Putnam calls this, “the 
entanglement of fact and value” (Ibid., 28–45), and Carl Dahlhaus uses the same 
language (in translation) to offer an historicization within art: “Reflecting on art 
and morals, one is entangled in the dialectics that the decision to exclude 
morality from the debate on art is in itself a moral decision” ([1970] 1983, 18). 
Dahlhaus traces the distinction between art and morality to a nineteenth-century, 
art for art’s sake misinterpretation of Kant, whereby the disinterested judgment 
of taste was conflated with a lack of interest in art’s moral implications.  From 
here, also the nineteenth-century tradition of music criticism’s exclusion of 
discourse about the “mechanics” of music led in the twentieth century to the sole 
concern, within modernist music-theoretical discourse, with musical “structure” 




history, as a symbol for Babbitt’s concerns, “structure” appears here as value-
free, a defining position for high modernism generally. 
What is more, in the early twentieth century music criticism and theory 
derogated new possibilities of musical structure or composing because of a 
conservative and reactionary attitude: the new ways were not the old.  In Babbitt, 
this encourages, as stated, an epistemological hygiene, wherein all the former 
assumptions regarding musical coherence, structure, and generation will be laid 
bare and challenged.  In this process, musical values are made overt; we can only 
understand one another’s musical worlds after achieving clarity regarding each’s 
foundations and implications.   
In order to move forward with the New Musicological critique of 
Princeton Theory, let us consider the question: whence comes the request for 
ethics or discussion of ethics within a music-theoretical discourse?  It appears to 
be the case that formalism brackets the ethical as a social concern. Consider, 
again, McClary ([1989] 1993, 65–6) which argues that Babbitt’s Philomel (1964) for 
soprano, recorded soprano, and synthesized sound, can be read as presenting an 
anti-rape message, but that because of Babbitt’s formalist discourse, we are 
discouraged from hearing any message at all in the music.  The way for music-
theoretical discourse to be ethical, then, is to not be music-theoretical discourse; it 
is to move from formalism to culture (via some form of hermeneutics). 
 But for Babbitt, to attribute cultural encodings to musical formalisms 
would have been intellectually and morally suspect, for in the mid-1930’s he had 
experienced discussions of twelve-tone music which argued whether the row 
was fascistic or democratic.  Troping Schoenberg ([1947] 1975), which discusses 




was it not “democratic?”’  After all, since all twelve pitch classes were permitted 
and included in the series—the referential norm of such a work—the self-
declared champions announced that, therefore, ‘all the notes were created free 
and equal,’ ‘one note, one vote’; but there were those who demurred and 
declared the music, the ‘system’ fascistic, since it imposed an ‘order,’ and each 
work imposed ‘a new order’ upon the pitch classes” (Babbitt [1991] 2003, 443).  
We can read Babbitt’s perturbation with the intellectually suspect transfer of 
political metaphors into musical structures.  The real import of Babbitt’s 
criticism, however, arrives a couple of sentences later, when he says, “It is a 
particularly distasteful reminder that in those countries which proclaimed 
themselves ‘socialist,’ music which they labeled—accurately or otherwise—
serial, atonal, or twelve-tone was denounced and banned as ‘bourgeois 
modernism,’ ‘imperialist formalism,’ or… ‘degenerate Jewish music’” (Ibid.). 
Thus formalism and the bracketing of values in relation to musical facts was 
itself an ethical move for Babbitt, for it appeared to present a means of 
preservation.  If music could escape such literally deadly categories, then 
perhaps so could its practitioners. (See Brody 1993, 173–83.) 
 Jean-Jacques Nattiez reads Babbitt as having shifted from the descriptive 
to the normative in Babbitt’s own meta-theorization of serial practices: 
 
When Milton Babbitt ([1965] 2003) defines a musical theory as a 
hypothetical-deductive [sic] system, one might think that he is operating 
in strict conformity with the epistemological exigencies of logical 
empiricism.  But if we look closely at what he says, we quickly realize that 
the theory also seeks to legitimize a music yet to come; that is, that it is also 
normative.  Such a model cannot account for certain sorts of music (some 
types of electro-acoustic music, for instance).  And there is a danger that in 
transforming the value of the theory into an aesthetic norm (by means of a 




From an anthropological standpoint, that is a risk that is difficult to 
countenance. ([1987] 1990, 167, emphasis original) 
 
I admit I am uncertain what to make of this.  How would Babbitt’s proposal of a 
given hypothetico-deductive system, such as presented in music theory, deny a 
genre its right to exist?  Bracketing the anthropomorphization, Nattiez says that 
Babbitt, “transform[s] the value of the theory into an aesthetic norm,” but he has 
neither demonstrated this shift in Babbitt’s discourse nor shown that theory had 
certain values.  The ideologial matter of canon-inclusion or simply piece-creation 
is different than theory construction.  For my entire training in Princeton Theory 
has taught me to think that although Babbitt was certainly trying to legitimize 
atonal and serial musics, he also would accept nearly any other form of music 
(with the possible exception of minimalism and Neo-Romanticism).  Clearly 
Babbitt was aware of the slippage between is and ought which Hume diagnosed 
and which Nattiez here evokes.  It seems that what Nattiez misses here is the 
music-theoretical plurality for which Babbitt and Princeton Theory would argue, 
and which we have discussed.  Serial theory was never the norm for music 
theory; Babbitt had all the respect in the world for the tonal “system.”  Electro-
acoustic pieces would give rise to their own systems, which Babbitt might prefer 
to be expressed in axiomatic form, but remember his dissertation does not so 
express, and recall too, during Chapter Three, the many types of things a theory 
can be, ways it can be expressed, goals it can achieve.  Even Kerman (1985, 96) 
could admit that Babbitt countenanced no norms, no universals in music theory, 
other than that music, in its various forms, is systematically explicable.  Again, 
even with minimalism, do we really think Babbitt would have denied composers 




Babbitt of a culturally imperialist position occasioned by faulty logic.  The 
problem is that this accusation seems supported by nothing in Babbitt’s 




3.  Ethics of Discourse and Music 
 
As suggested in Chapter One, the critiques leveled by Brown and 
Dempster (1989) can be read as having ended Princeton Theory—at least in the 
imaginations of normal music theory.  Boretz’s ([1989] 2003) quasi-response 
barely controls its rage, offering explicitly ethical claims in defense of Princeton 
Theory.  After diagnosing the displacement of a “tribal-ritual experience-code” 
by “self-conscious meta-musical discourse” (Ibid., 272), Boretz states that, “A 
‘music theory’ emergent within this subculture [of academia] will perforce be 
prescriptive, making claims of right thinking, right methodology, and 
presumptive universal intradisciplinary hegemony…. Within such an 
institutionalized enclosure it is not perhaps even discriminable that there might 
be other music-ontological commitments than its own” (Ibid., 273).  Boretz then 
designates one group the “institutionalizers” and another the “contextualizers” 
(Ibid., 274). 
 
In fact, I perceive that an “institutionalizer” is likely to read a 
“contextualizer’s” thoughts as a fascist would read an anarchist’s: the 
ontological assumption (social organization consists of an ordering based 
on relative power) implicates objectives (a program for position within 




prescribes a certain intention as to the ordering, formulation, and purpose 
of each proposal, analysis, observation, and thought-sequence in that text 
(persuasion, enforcement, appropriation of the authority of the true 
orthodoxy are invariant ploys; and steeltrap consistency, irrefutable 
authority, and ultimate universal prescriptive force and effect are 
inevitably being sought, or implicitly even being claimed). (Ibid., 274–75) 
 
These are damning lines of thought, for they compare persuasively normal 
music-theoretical discourse—indeed, Princeton Theory in its high-modernist 
moment, we might argue—and its sociality to fascism, a form of social 
organization we cannot consider ethical.  They situate Boretz’s own work—and 
those of the authors of the Turn—as anarchists and ritual-producing creators 
(composers) of musical being.  Dramatic lines of thought, but perhaps for that 
reason we should attend to them.  They clearly show an ethical concern on the 
part of Boretz, making stronger claims than Brown and Dempster’s positivist 
concerns to critique and adjust music theory to become a better science. 
Boretz ([1993] 2003 and [1999] 2003) has elsewhere discussed the ethics of 
communication: metaphor seems to be the key to maintaining an ethical stance, 
translating something (absolute music, the music itself) from its proper domain 
into another (verbal discourse),5 by not allowing the discourse to match or track 
too closely, too deeply, the musical phenomena.  Close but not touching, a kind 
of energy work or field surrounding: the music and discourse’s energies “touch” 
                                                
5 To my knowledge Boretz never uses “absolute music” nor “the music itself,” 
instead using simply “music,” “music, as a music” or the negation (music “with 
no names”), I think not using the former pair in an attempt to divorce his (and 
Babbitt’s) explicitly Americanist discourse from the German canon.  After all, “it 
is in the American spirit of freedom and independence that the journal 
[Perspectives of New Music] was founded and through which its [sic] remained 
pluralistic and forward-thinking” (Graber 1995, 55).  See also, Sessions ([1945] 
1979), Babbitt ([1954] 2003) and ([1989] 2003), Berger and Boretz ([1987] 2003, 244) 




each other’s energies, but their skins do not meet.  Works are identified with 
their authors, for Boretz, again as a kind of ethical stance: composers invest 
(literally and metaphorically) heavily in their music, so to treat pieces with 
anything other than the requisite concern, care, is to violate a kind of assumed 
ethical position.  To critique is to risk critique in turn.  Music as expressive 
utterance is Boretz’s latest move along these lines: we compose, write, because of 
a deep-seated, originary need to express ourselves musically (Boretz 2008; see 
also Boretz [1982] 2003).  Boretz wants to respect this need and individuality by 
respecting experiences without names: music as he experiences it (Boretz [1993] 
2003). 
Although I have worked toward recuperating an ethics for Boretz, at times 
he can seem unconcerned with the status of others—their compositions, 
discourse. 
 
One thing about a book that both John [Rahn] and I like a lot, Deleuze and 
Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus, is that it cites enormous quantities and 
varieties of texts, but always in contexts and with surrounding language 
which recontextualizes them so radically that there is no feedback to the 
texts themselves, to threaten them with inflation, invasion, or re-
interpretation; so they’re left still speaking their own voices, intensely 
“used” but not reconfigured (—disfigured, as it must always be).  And 
John nails it down for us right away: (John’s text, first sentence:) “Music 
theory, like any discipline or science, is a process of discourse.”  So—
implicitly—we’re responsible to a discourse which we co-opt for our own 
discourse.  If this is about morality, or ethics, or virtue, or etiquette, ok.  
But how people receive things, and how they accept them or not, are 
critical qualities of their world-processing, and the output of that into 
“the” world—ugly, nice, precise, gross, fair, foul, whatever.  The authentic 
motivation to accept a music discourse or a theory about music is about 
the same as for a music: its “truth” (as I’ve said before) is the truth of an 
individual experience at a particular moment, to which you’re being given 





Boretz appears to be trivializing “morality, or ethics, or virtue, or etiquette,” by 
emphasizing the individual musician’s response (to music, discourse).  For in 
Boretz’s reading of Deleuze and Guattari, to lose touch with the original author 
within one’s own discourse—to absorb to the point of loss of ownership—is the 
preferred option of engaging with others and their texts.  Might this express the 
opposite of a respect for the original author?  If it does express respect, however, 
it appears to do so by treating the original author as insulated, beyond 
interaction, precisely the opposite of Brody’s reading of Babbitt’s ethics, as 
discussed earlier. 
 Undoubtedly, however, a moral force exists in Boretz’s rhetoric.  Nattiez 
suggests that Boretz, in Meta-Variations, confuses, “his own formal, logical model 
with an immanent essence he then ascribes to the music.  He transmutes the 
virtue of logic into the formal ‘nature’ of music” ([1987] 1990, 166–67, emphasis 
original).  Boretz, I believe in response, uses Nattiez’s language in theorizing the 
difference between a moral or ethical discourse—the descriptive—and an amoral 
discourse—the ascriptive—in relation to music: 
 
I want to think of the discourse-action-relational transaction as operating 
in two complementary directions, which I want to call descriptive and 
ascriptive, respectively.  The ontological implications of both are 
formidable, but opposite to one another: in the descriptive use-mode, a 
discourse flow and a music flow are held in apart from one another, in a 
mutually metaphorical relation: each with its distinct integral time-
evolving ontological autonomy, strenuously forced into ongoing 
energized relational confrontation, strenuously constrained from 
collapsing or merging into one another, the force field between them 
exuding an awareness-content which is ontologically enriching or 
expansive or both; but the instant the ontological barrier crumbles, or even 
stabilizes, the moment one text denotes or defines or otherwise accounts 
for the other, an ontological transference occurs, the transaction becomes 




specificative and expansive: that is the ascriptive mode. (Boretz [1993] 2003, 
351) 
 
In using language like “formidable,” “strenuously forced” and “ strenuously 
constrained,” in reaching an apex at its midpoint on the utopian notion of a 
music-discourse, “which is ontologically enriching or expansive or both,” Boretz 
asserts a kind of morality for the commentator on music.  We know this moral in 
part by its subsequent negation, the possibility it will fail to keep music and 
discourse, “strenuously constrained from collapsing or merging into one 
another.”  The failure presents itself as what normal music theory might take as 
an achievement: the denoting, defining, or accounting for music and music-texts.  
But for Boretz these achievements imply a bad faith: they are static and 
reductive, terms of abuse.  Boretz desires and guides us toward a discourse 
which he considers ethical in the sense of specifying or expanding musical 
awareness and being, but not substitutive for musical being.  I read this as code 
for the discourse of the composer/theorist, one who specifies musical 
configurations or expands musical being by creating new musics, musical 
worlds, or hearings of pieces, all vivid, ever tumbling forward. 
Rahn ([1993] 2001, 25) furthers the comparison between works and people, 
outlining their limits: “Works of art, like people, are never adequately 
represented.”  Further,  
 
An artist puts herself on the line with every new work, exposing herself to 
the world.  The dimensions of the creative act are at once intimately 
personal—this is me out there—and intensely, inevitably involved with 
ideologies, religions, metaphysics, politics, matters that constitute a 
dangerous arena in which to present oneself naked…. We read the person 
in the actions as represented by the form, and the form is so intricate that 




complete than any normal social interaction could provide. (1994, 1–2, 
emphasis original) 
 
“This is me out there.”  Works are here identified with their composers, we thus 
have an ethical or moral responsibility to works, in our theories, our discourses.  
Pieces, for example, should be unique, as should people.  Thus a humanist or 
liberal moment lies within Princeton Theory. 
 In a note to the title page of Compose Yourself, Randall states the following: 
“Concerning extramusical behavior, the composer Al Daniels once asked me an 
interesting rhetorical question: ‘What code could I need, or even have any use 
for, that didn’t arise directly from the activity of composing?’  (That was thirteen 
years ago.)  What follows is a beginning” (Randall [1970] 1995, 1).  Thus we are to 
read Compose Yourself as motioning toward an answer to the preceding rhetorical 
question.  Compose Yourself can thus be read as a moral tale: a search for a code of 
conduct as a composer which did not arise directly from the activity of 
composing itself.  This is a bizarre stance for a work entitled Compose Yourself.  
We would think that the work would arise directly from composing, and 
feedback into composing.  Implicit in the work, and especially in its last section, 
however, is a critique of the music-compositional tradition’s ability to provide 
codes of conduct for the composer.  Needed is a motion outward, to baseball, for 
example.  Perhaps, too, it illustrates Randall’s dissatisfaction with the moral 
implications of formalism, of Princeton Theory before the Turn.  
After the Turn, Randall problematized the traditional composer-audience 
relationship, calling into question its ethics, and asserting that his legendary two-
person sessions in his cellar were non-hierarchical, non-egoistical.  Randall does 




implies a competition which replicates the composer-audience relation.  
Important too is the spatiality of the concert hall, where “they out there” will 
consume the piece, versus the intimacy of Randall’s cellar, within the home, yet a 
space apart.6  I would like to attend, too, to Randall’s discussion of the act of 
communication, but not to simply anyone, nor the “jerks,” but to those who 
might understand, with concern. 
 
I began to see the extent to which in fact composing is a question of 
putting together this thing that will establish you as somethin’ special and 
will earn plaudits from audiences and that’s what it’s all about.  You’re 
trying to write this piece that they out there will take in all right and then 
with the kicker that to me, as to most other composers, you have no high 
regard for the discrimination of the people out there that they’re gonna 
[claps with hands] do this.  It’s just that that’s what you’re doing it for.  So 
it began to strike me more and more, “wait a minute, if I want to feel that I 
am communicating something of value to people that I value, not just 
astounding the jerks, well then the whole set-up where I do it and you 
take it in is not the obvious choice.  More obvious is to try to get a 
communication going.”  It was on that basis that I started going to the 
cellar… usually with one other person and unscripted stuff.  We would 
just, [indecipherable] the understanding with which we would do this 
was, I’ve always described as ethical and social, namely you gotta listen, 
you gotta keep listening, you regard everything that happens, just the way 
you’d regard anything that you put out—that’s where it is, that’s what 
we’ve got—and sort of understood to be verboten was [to] start showing 
off the licks that you can play on your instrument or anything like that.   
(2011, disc 3, c. 19:00) 
 
Randall here places in close proximity the ethical and social with listening: 
perhaps by listening, continuing to listen, and by shunning our egos via our 
                                                
6 Striking then is Babbitt’s ([1970] 2003, 260) estimation that, “The university… 
provides us [composers] with a community, a select community of colleagues, 
rather than competitors.”  Given that around this time Randall was engaged in 
what we are calling the Turn, it appears that the university had become for him a 





technique, we might communicate, we might undergo, become, something—
presumably, somehow, better. 
 We know what these sessions sounded like (or at least many of them), 
because documentation and reflection via recording was an important aspect of 
the entire experience.  Boretz and Randall released during the 1980’s a series of 
cassette tapes of these sessions under the title INTER/PLAY.  Rather than 
address these myself,7 I would like here to reproduce sections of Robert Paredes’ 
(1948–2005) discussion of his own sessions with Benjamin Boretz as a kind of 
remembrance, because they problematize the athletic, “lick-machine” of self 
imposing itself on a group, as “somethin’ special,” and because they heighten the 
intimacy of these settings.  I could have chosen Paredes’ words at random, so 
beautiful are they, reflecting a life with “improvised” (for want of a better word) 
settings:  
 
To begin with, how are we together in this situation?  What, other than 
blowing the same notes at the same time—and with the same intensity—
allows us to establish a palpable connection within and between (or, at the 
very least, to satisfy ourselves that one has occurred)? …Today, in my living 
room, I respond to these memories of Ben’s performance with the playing of an 
air-only sound: a slack-jaw, chalumeau-register, pitch-class G in which the barest 
hint of pitch-presence is shadowed in the air’s ontology.  I imagine this touch of 
barely perceptible pitch-matter as at least a possible description of Ben’s 
potentially elucidative presence/non-presence…. (Paredes 2005–2006, 272, 
emphasis original) 
 
This is, of course, a utopian space, about which I am constitutionally skeptical, 
and yet patiently expectant.  Aware as Paredes was of his own tendency to 
                                                
7 See the end of Chapter Two of this dissertation for an improvisatory, 
experimental reading of Randall’s Compose Yourself.  Hibbard (1985) offers an 
experimental analysis of INTER/PLAY session “TWO (no. 8),” released on Open 




impose himself in an improvisational setting (Ibid., 270–72), he speaks here of 
collaboration, of group togetherness in the context of improvisational music-
making. (Recall Brody’s discussion of Arendt’s notion of togetherness.) To what 
end?  To the end of recovering or at least establishing of an authentic existence.  
Forgiveness, respect, mutual concern: utopian, to be sure, but also a vision of 
morality, personal and social, open in principle to all who would just take the 
time, to listen.  Crucial too here is memory, which promises the future. 
As Boretz has said, in a private communication, “In life, as in music, time 
and taking time is the indispensable resource, the real human meaning of the art 
and the practice in its most generic form.  Taking time, taking care, taking, even, 
pains to get it right and to ‘get somewhere’ with it—the pragmatics of 
imagination, in fact.”  This is a composerly ethics—the imaginative act, in life and 
music, inflected with time and care.  It is strikingly evocative of Heidegger’s 
notions of taking time as part of the vulgar (vulgären) conception of time (the 
Aristotelian conception as discussed in Chapter Two), and of conscience as 
inflected through a temporality of care (Sorge), the latter which unites past (being 
already thrown into the world), present (the ecstatic character of Dasein in 
relation to others), and future (Dasein’s continual openness to possibilities) 
(Heidegger [1927b] 2010, §79; King 2001, 36–7).  While Heidegger considers 
“taking time” a vulgar conception of time which he is in the process of 
overcoming, he does discuss taking time into the reckoning of Dasein’s 
interpretation of being. “Everyday Dasein taking time initially finds time in 
things at hand [Zuhandenen] and objectively present [Vorhandenen] encountered 
within the world.  It understands time thus ‘experienced’ in the horizon of the 




somehow present [Vorhandenes]” (Heidegger [1927b] 2010, §78).  Presence-to-
hand (Vorhandenheit) is a theoretical stance which regards objects as objects as 
against the experiencing subject, anterior to use or readiness-to-hand 
(Zuhandenheit) (Schalow and Denker 2010, s.v. presence-at-hand, readiness-to-
hand).  Although Heidegger downgrades the vulgar conception of time in 
relation to the primordial conception he has set out to disclose, I think that Boretz 
articulates such a deeper conception of temporality as care, the self immersed in 
the duration of time as care, as Boretz said, “the indispensable resource.”  As 
Heidegger says, “Temporality is the primordial, ‘outside of itself’ in and for itself.  
Thus we call the phenomena of future, having-been, and present the ecstasies of 
temporality” ([1927b] 2010, §65, emphasis original).  Further, “The primordial 
unity of the structure of care lies in temporality.” (Ibid., emphasis original) As stated, 
care unites past, present, and future.  Further, temporality and thus care are 
always intended, directed to the world and others, a caring for, ecstatic, stepping 
outside of one’s self.  In caring for the other, I constitute my self (Ibid., §64).  
Dasein’s essential existence as being is care, and Dasein’s meaning is time 
(Schalow and Denker 2010, s.v. time; King 2001, 36).  It is only through caring 
that being has being (King 2001, 97).  As stated in Chapter Two, after the Turn 
Boretz especially concerns himself with ontological issues surrounding 
(discourse about) music, and it is in this context that he discloses a temporal, 
primordial ethics of care for the self as Dasein, other, world—life—and music as 
fundamental, ontologically creative acts. 
 Having discussed the ethics of the musical practices after the Turn, we 
should inquire as to the ethical status of the Turn itself, and its relation to the 




every indication that the Turn was not merely an intellectual but rather a social 
phenomenon, and as such implied a kind of ethics, a concern for the other. 
(Again, see Chapter Two.) While Babbitt seemed to reject the larger public for 
sociological and political reasons, if not exactly ethical reasons, the authors of the 
Turn sought to embrace initially a broader sociality than that of Babbitt’s 
academic vision.  However, subsequent to this broadening the authors of the 
Turn, having rejected the normal routes of prestige, funding, and academic 
societies (The Society for Music Theory has never been an especially hospitable 
place for these authors), we find a subsequent constricting motion—into 
Randall’s cellar, for example.  The Randall-Boretz axis, although attempting a 
broader sociality than Babbitt, is actually more circumscribed.  It is therefore 
ironic that Babbitt—who supposedly disdained the general public—made further 
inroads with that public than the authors of the Turn—who supposedly 
embraced a more egalitarian public. 
 
 
4.  Lewin and Authentic Analysis 
 
Returning to a point made in Chapter Four regarding Lewin’s virtual 
debate with Nicholas Cook, I would like to discuss in greater detail Lewin’s 
evocation of Rilke, the utopian gesture in his image of the goals of artistic 
production and music-theoretical discourse, and, therefore, the implicit image of 
what a music theorist should, ethically, do; the kind of (music-theoretical) lives we 





Still, I find all these dissatisfactions regarding the ways Cook uses 
technical concepts and symbols to be relatively minor annoyances.  Many 
of them could be eliminated, without substantially changing Cook’s 
reportage, by a more concentrated and careful discourse.  There remain 
more general dissatisfactions with Cook’s approach, and these disturb me 
more.  They arise from the notion, implicit within much of Cook’s 
discourse and explicit in some of it, that we can afford to bypass any 
special effort to focus our ears on things about the piece that might not lie 
at hand from out previous musical training and experiences.  I am 
disturbed because the most crucial critical demand I make upon my 
experience of an artwork is that it make me undergo again Rilke’s 
experience before the torso of Apollo: “Du mußt dich ändern.” [sic] The 
quality of the conviction, not its intensity, or extent, is the crux of the 
matter; if the world is not in some way sensibly different as a result of the 
artistic deed, then I do not see in what sense one can say a work of art has 
transpired.  In reading Cook’s story of the piece [Stockhausen’s 
Klavierstück III], I get too much of the message, “Du mußt dich nicht 
ändern.”  I get the message that I can be perfectly at home with my 
listening if only I listen in a common-sense fashion for contours and 
registers and densities, and apply to those experiences some casual 
inferences from received notions about arch shapes, upbeats, etc.  In this 
way I will hear that (and how) Stockhausen’s piece, except for quirks in its 
notation, is quite traditional and comfortable; it will not challenge me, or 
provoke me, or in some ways infuriate me. ([1993] 2007, 61–2) 
 
 
While Lewin continues, I would like to pause here to retrace where we have 
been.  We could read a kind of positivist or analytic ethics into Lewin’s concern 
for “a more concentrated and careful discourse,” but this is a minor point for 
Lewin, a perhaps necessary but insufficient condition for ethical music-
theoretical discourse.  In fact, it emerges that while Lewin would prefer a certain 
carefulness in his discourse (which presumably means no elided clauses or ideas 
in the progression of an argument or description), actually Lewin prefers a 
musical and theoretical experience that throws caution to the wind.  Lewin 
values effort, effort to extend our hearings, our aural abilities in ways that are 




 Lewin next conflates his expectations for music-theoretical discourse with 
his expectations for artworks in general: he misquotes Rilke’s experience before 
the remnant of the statue of Apollo, which effected a change in Rilke as a human 
being, on some ur-level below personality, at the level of Rilke’s soul: Rilke’s 
original imperative reads, “Du mußt dein Leben ändern.”  Music, and by 
conflation, music theory, should do this to us too, for Lewin.  In Berthold 
Hoeckner’s (2002, 14) reading, “The final sentence—‘You must change your 
life’—appears to break forth with great force, not from the speaker’s self-
admonishment (as one would normally read it), but as if issued from the 
mouthless torso itself.”  Further, not simply one’s self, but the world should have 
changed, tangibly, after such an encounter.  The world here seems dependent 
upon the self, but this is not the high-modernist model of world-creation we have 
discussed previously.  Rather, this is a world not created explicitly, but rather 
implicitly, by the self, the ego, who has just now undergone a radical shift.  If the 
self and world fail to produce a sensible difference—one perceivable and felt via 
the senses—then a work of art has not elapsed before our eyes, ears, before our 
entire beings. 
But let us remember that Lewin’s is not solely a utopian gesture; it is also 
a warning, via negative example, of what a musical life lived in vain would be 
like.  In the situation of music that has the potential to change us and the world 
but which we are inadequate to allow or enable, Lewin evokes the quest 
narrative, and uses the standard locution, “perfectly at home.”  Home, here, is in 
fact unheimlich, it surrounds a false consciousness, is comfortable, Bourgeois.  
Tumbling forward from here in Lewin’s rhetoric, the man (!) of action, the 




his own past, his music-theoretical tradition, his own life.  Lewin’s controlled 
rage bursts forth in the last quoted words, “or in some ways infuriate me,” which 
literally refer to Stockhausen’s music, but almost explicitly to Cook’s lack of 
radicalness as an analyst, his inability to leave the home, be changed in his soul 
by music, have his world reordered by his encounter with music, to grasp this 
terrifying, ecstatic moment, control it, wrestle it to the ground, and channel it 
back into his own hearings of music, his understanding of musical details, music 
history, and the future. 
Lewin thus demands of authentic music-theoretical listening and 
experience that it model itself on Beethoven’s Third Symphony.   
 
Almost more important, however, is the type of Idee that Marx and others 
ascribe to Beethoven’s music, for it invokes nothing less than the highest 
values of their age, those of freedom and self-determination, as well as the 
decidedly human (as opposed to godlike or demigodlike) nature of the 
heroic type.  The trajectory of a work like the first movement of the Eroica 
is typically characterized as a spiral process in which a human hero goes 
forth (outwardly and inwardly), suffers a crisis of consciousness, and 
returns enriched and renewed. (Burnham 1995, 24, emphasis original) 
 
Lewin, via Rilke, sees in Apollo’s remnant a vision of human betterment.  This, 
“quest plot, or hero’s journey… carries significant mythic and ethical force” 
(Ibid., 25).  Lewin inherits a post-Beethovenian model of music-theoretical moral 
and personal development, holds other musicians to this standard, as a kind of 
obvious yet explicable moral standard, and adjudicates failures.  We fail, as 
people, when we fail as musical hearers.  We succeed, as people, when we 
succeed as musicians. 
Recall the plenary debate between Allen Forte and Joseph Dubiel, 




Yale from Princeton Theory, respectively, on the terrain of experience and 
conception in music theory.  For Dubiel a changed experience presents a change 
in theorizing—and, as we have discussed, for Lewin too.  For Lewin a changed 
experience means a changed person—no change, no morality, therefore amoral: 
Cook.  Forte appears, in his debate with Dubiel, almost non-moral, in the sense 
that the concept-formation he enacts via music does not change his experience of 
music, therefore the concept-formation he enacts via music does not change his 
(musical) life (or, life with music).  As Forte says, “it is not basically a didactic 
endeavor” (2000a, ¶1.5).  That is a positivist position.  Only positivists believe 
positivists do not exist. 
Perhaps the fetishization of the composer in Princeton Theory—as we 
have witnessed on nearly every page of this dissertation—is most fundamentally 
concerned with the proper musical person one is supposed to be, should be: to be 
musically ethical is to be a composer.  A composer creates her own musical 
world, inhabits it; Turns as a moral move upon learning that her musical world 
had been, perhaps, an amoral one; engages with musical experience, discourse, 
and other music(al) people in a manner that fundamentally changes her life, this 
despite the motion inward to the solipsistic.  To become more of oneself as a 
result of an encounter with a musical other, as problematic as that may be, is the 
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